Textualism and War Powers by Ramsey, Michael D.
The University of Chicago
Law Review
Volume 69 Fall 2002 Number 4
© 2002 by The University of Chicago
Textualism and War Powers
Michael D. Ramseyt
This Article explores the eighteenth-century use of the phrase "declare war," with the goal of
shedding some light upon the original understanding of the Constitution's Declare War Clause It
finds that "declaring" war in the eighteenth century had a broader meaning than is commonly sup-
posed: Nations could declare war by formal proclamation, but nations could also "declare" by ac-
tion alone. An armed attack showing an intent to settle differences between nations by force created
a state of war between those nation& Launching such an attack, even in the absence of a formal
proclamation, was called "declaring" war. As the Article explains this provides a textual basis for
the common assertion that Congress's constitutional power "to declare War" broadly encompasses
the power to initiate warfare. It also refutes the claim that the President can order military attacks
upon foreign powers without Congress's approval so long as no formal declaration is involved.
The Article further argues however, that since Congress's constitutional power is only to declare
war (by proclamation or by authorizing an attack), presidential actions that do not create a state of
war-even if they involve the use of military force or the threat or likelihood of war-do not re-
quire congressional authorization.
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary debate over the constitutional allocation of
war powers offers an unsatisfactory choice between ignoring the
Constitution's text and ignoring what the Framers said about it. Those
who would give comprehensive war powers to Congress point to an
array of quotations from leading Framers and other political leaders
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stating or heavily implying that the decision to go to war lies with the
legislative body.' Those who favor presidential war powers2 reply that
Congress has the constitutional power "to declare War," not the power
to authorize the use of military force;' and since few in the eighteenth
century would have thought that a formal declaration of war was
required before using military force, Congress's power cannot be so
broad. Congressional advocates have no persuasive answer to the
textual point, save to say that the text cannot be taken literally in ight
of the Framers' later statements. Presidential advocates have no
persuasive response to the Framers' post-drafting commentary, save to
say that the Framers' commentary cannot be taken literally in light of
the plain text.
As we confront complex questions about the constitutional
allocation of war powers in modern conflicts, this impasse at the level
of first principles presents a serious difficulty. If we cannot establish
how the Constitution originally made the basic allocation of war
powers, there seems to be little hope of consensus regarding its
application to complicated modem events.' The roles of the President
1 See, for example, William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare
War, 82 Cornell L Rev 695,740-56 (1997); Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power 3-12 (Kansas
1995); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its After-
math 3-5 (Princeton 1993); Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress the President,
and the United Nations, 81 Geo L J 597, 597,663-64 & n 343 (1993); Michael J. Glennon, Consti-
tutional Diplomacy 80-84 (Princeton 1990); Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitu-
tion: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair 74-77 (Yale 1990); Francis D. Wormuth and
Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law 17-
31 (Southern Methodist 1986); W. Taylor Reveley, III, War Powers of the President and Congress:
Who Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch? 55-115 (Virginia 1981); Raoul Berger, War-Making by
the President, 121 U Pa L Rev 29, 39-47 (1972); Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making
under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 Yale L J 672,677-88 (1972).
2 See, for example, John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal L Rev 167 (1996); Robert F. Turner, Repealing the War
Powers Resolution: Restoring the Rule of Law in U.S. Foreign Policy (Brassey's 1991); Eugene V.
Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 Tex L Rev 833 (1972); Henry P.
Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 BU L Rev 19 (Special Issue 1970).
3 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11.
4 In claiming a presidential power to use military force based on the text of the Constitu-
tion, presidential advocates rely on Article II, Section 1, which states that "the executive Power"
of the United States is vested in the President. As recent scholarship has shown, in the eight-
eenth century the ordinary understanding of the phrase "executive power" included substantial
power over foreign affairs, including war powers. See Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L J 231,265-72 (2001) (referring to
the ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, Blackstone, and others). Thus, unless the Constitution specifi-
cally allocates it elsewhere, the power to begin military hostilities would seem to lie with the
President. See Part I.B.2.
5 To raise a few modern problems: If the United States is attacked, as it was on September
11, 2001, may the President respond not only against the attackers, but against their allies and
supporters? May the President respond against state supporters of terrorism more generally,
even those not directly complicit in the September 11 attacks? What if a U.S. ally is attacked, or
U.S. strategic interests are threatened by aggression, as occurred prior to the Gulf War? What if
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and Congress in recent conflicts such as the Gulf War, Bosnia, and
Kosovo, and in the ongoing response to the recent terrorist attacks,
have been much debated.6 But it is hard to see much progress being
made in this regard, if both the case for the President and the case for
Congress are subject to such fundamental objections.
This Article describes a textual allocation of war powers that
avoids the difficulties of both sides in the current debate. The problem,
I argue, is that neither side has paid sufficient attention to the
eighteenth-century meaning of declaring war. At present, essentially
everyone in the war powers debate assumes that this phrase means
issuing a formal declaration of war, in keeping with its most common
modem meaning. Thus presidential advocates argue that the phrase
should be given its literal meaning in Article I, Section 8, so that
Congress's power does not extend to "undeclared" conflicts;
congressional advocates counter that we must move beyond the literal
meaning of the text to give effect to a broader "Framers' intent," since
the Framers, despite what they wrote, could not have meant to limit
Congress's role to issuance or nonissuance of a formal declaration.
I argue below that the eighteenth-century meaning of declaring
war was not limited to formal declarations, as has commonly been
supposed. Instead, "declaring war" meant initiating a state of war by a
public act, and it was understood that this could be done either by a
formal declaration or by commencing armed hostilities. In the words
of Emmerich de Vattel, perhaps the leading international law scholar
of the time, "when one nation takes up arms against another, she from
that moment declares herself an enemy to all the individuals of the
latter."' Or as John Locke earlier wrote, war may be declared "by
Word or Action. '9
the U.S. military campaign is of limited scope to achieve a narrow objective, as was the air cam-
paign during the Kosovo crisis; or what of a U.S. peacekeeping deployment into an area fraught
with hostilities but not directly opposed by any hostile power, as in Bosnia? And if congressional
involvement is required in any of these actions, must it actually take the form of a formal decla-
ration of war, or may something less definitive suffice? Without an agreed textual starting point,
we cannot begin to answer these questions. Even scholars who generally agree that Congress has
most of the war-initiation powers are divided upon the proper outcome in specific cases.
6 See, for example, John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powersn and the Multilateral Future, 148 U Pa
L Rev 1673 (2000); Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U Pa L Rev 1637 (2000).
7 Presidential advocates note that whatever the meaning of the Declare War Clause, Con-
gress retains an important voice in war policy through its control over appropriations. See Yoo,
84 Cal L Rev at 176-82 (cited in note 2). Congressional advocates respond that the funding limi-
tation is not meaningful, or does not capture all of the limitations on the President the Framers
appeared to assume. I discuss the impact of the funding limitation on the declare-war debate in
Parts IV and VI.D.
8 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations 399 (T. & J.W. Johnson 1863) (Joseph Chitty,
ed) (originally published 1758).
9 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Gov-
ernment 265, § 16 at 278 (Cambridge 1988) (Peter Laslett, ed).
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Applying this definition reveals a textual division of war powers
between the President and Congress. Because war can be declared by
commencing hostilities as well as by formal announcement, it should
be clear from the text that Congress has power over both sorts of
declarations, and the President does not. The President's possession of
"the executive Power" does not alter this conclusion, even if the
executive power is read, in keeping with modern textualist scholarship,
to include foreign affairs power. Though previously included within
the traditional executive power of eighteenth-century political
thought, the power to declare war by hostilities or formal
announcement is assigned to Congress by the Constitution's text, and
thereby denied to the President.
This conclusion is not, however, a complete vindication of
Congress, for eighteenth-century usage suggests two substantial
presidential war powers. First, a nation under direct attack did not
need to "declare" war.' Because self-defense in the face of hostile
attack was considered an absolute right that a nation would always
exercise, one did not need to look for a public manifestation of an
intent to do so-rather, it was assumed. Thus "declaring" war by
action indicated an initiation of armed hostilities in a time of peace,
not a response to an attack where the peace had already been
breached by the other side." If this is correct, Congress's declare-war
power does not limit the President's power to respond to an attack,
which remains part of the "executive Power" of Article II, Section 1.'2
And the response, in eighteenth-century terms, did not have to be
limited to defensive or proportionate measures. Thus an attack in itself
gives the President the authority to respond and carry the conflict to
its conclusion.
Second, the declare-war power extends only to war. Eighteenth-
century usage is clear that not all military deployments are "war"
(although the distinction did not turn on the presence or absence of a
formal declaration). Moreover, threatening or provocative acts, while
sometimes giving a just cause for war, were not declarations of war in
10 See Part VI.C.
11 It was not uncommon in the eighteenth century for a nation to issue a formal proclama-
tion of war after it was attacked. This was not done to create a state of war (since the state of war
was created by the attack), but it nevertheless remained an important communicative and rhe-
torical device.
12 See Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 252-65 (cited in note 4) (arguing that the
President's executive power includes powers over foreign affairs that are not textually allocated
to another branch of government by the Constitution). An element of this power is captured by
the often-repeated observation that the President has the power "to repel sudden attacks." See
Fisher, Presidential War Power at 11 (cited in note 1). I argue in Part VLC that the President's
power to respond to attacks extends considerably further than merely deflecting sudden attacks.
13 See Part VI.D.
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themselves. Again, as these matters were not conveyed to Congress as
part of the declare-war power, they remain part of the President's
executive power over foreign affairs."
The ensuing Article elaborates the foregoing argument. Part I
outlines the difficulties of both the case for Congress and the case for
the President in the contemporary war powers debate. Part II reviews
the eighteenth-century meaning of the formal declaration of war. This
Part concludes that, while some eighteenth-century writers argued
that a formal declaration should be prerequisite to commencing
hostilities, or at least prerequisite to the existence of a legal state of
war, neither view represented the ordinary understanding of the term.
Rather, in common usage the formal declaration was no more than an
official notification that a war existed, and it could be given or not
given according to the convenience of the belligerent powers.
Next, Part III demonstrates that eighteenth-century writing at
times spoke of war being "declared" not only by formal proclamation,
but also by acts manifesting a nation's intent to go to war. Most
prominently, this included launching an armed attack, even in the
absence of a proclamation. As a result, this Part concludes that the
Constitution's Declare War Clause, standing alone, has a critical
ambiguity. There were two common meanings of "declare war" in the
eighteenth century: a narrow meaning limited to issuing a formal
proclamation, and a broad meaning that also included armed attacks
creating a state of war.
Part IV argues that this textual ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the broader meaning of "declaring" war. The broader
meaning makes the best sense of the text and structure of the
Constitution, and only the broader meaning is consistent with the later
statements of the Framers and other political leaders. In particular,
reading the power to "declare war" to include the power to create a
state of war by formal proclamation or by action harmonizes the
Constitution's text and the post-drafting commentary, for it provides a
reading that is both consistent with the text's ordinary eighteenth-
century meaning and consistent with the views later expressed by key
members of the constitutional generation.
Parts V and VI elaborate the implications of this conclusion. Part
V considers the war powers of Congress, and Part VI considers the
war and war-related powers of the President. In particular, these
sections argue that while Congress generally has the power to initiate
hostilities, the President retains broad power to respond to hostilities
14 True, Congress also has power over letters of marque and reprisal, US Const Art I, § 8, cl
11, a form of limited hostility short of war. But, as shown below, marque and reprisal was one
subset of hostilities short of war, not a complete description of the category. See Part V.B.
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begun by another nation, and to make military deployments or take
other potentially provocative actions not amounting to "war." As a
result, the Article concludes that both Congress and the President
have substantial war-related powers arising from the original meaning
of the Declare War Clause.
I. THE WAR POWERS DEBATE
A. The Framers and the Case for Congress
Most academic voices in the war powers debate agree that, in the
original understanding of the Constitution, most or all power to
authorize military hostilities against another nation lies with Congress.
Louis Fisher's leading work argues that "[t]he constitutional
framework adopted by the Framers is clear in its basic principles. The
authority to initiate war lay with Congress. The President could act
unilaterally only in one area: to repel sudden attacks."' Historian
Charles Lofgren concludes that Congress's power was understood "as
meaning the power to commence war, whether declared or not."'6
Professor John Ely observes:
One of the recurrent discoveries of academic writing about
constitutional law ... is that from the standpoint of twentieth-
century observers, the "original understanding" of the
document's Framers and ratifiers can be obscure to the point of
inscrutability. Often this is true. In this case, however, it isn't. The
power to declare war was constitutionally vested in Congress.
The debates, and early practice, establish that this meant that all
wars, big or small, "declared" in so many words or not ... had to
be legislatively authorized."
While this view is in some tension with the actual practice of
recent decades, which have witnessed frequent hostilities initiated by
the President with little or no congressional authorization,'8 the
scholarly consensus has not been shy in charging that modem practice
simply and obviously runs counter to the Framers' expectations."
15 Fisher, Presidential War Power at 11 (cited in note 1).
16 Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 699 (cited in note 1).
17 Ely, War and Responsibility at 3 (cited in note 1). See also note 1.
18 See Fisher, Presidential War Power at 70-161 (cited in note 1) (recounting practice from
Presidents Truman through Clinton).
19 See, for example, Fisher, Presidential War Powers at 185-206 (cited in note 1) (arguing
that practice since World War II has radically transformed the Framers' design); Ely, War and Re-
sponsibility at 10-11 (cited in note 1) (stating that Truman's reading of the Constitution during
the Korean War "had from the dawn of the republic been recognized as erroneous"); Glennon,
Constitutional Diplomacy at 94-95 (cited in note 1) (claiming that critics of congressional war
powers have a "quarrel ... with James Madison"); Koh, National Security Constitution at 97
(cited in note 1) (suggesting that growing American power and expanding presidential authority
1548 [69:1543
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The academic case for Congress stands, in main, upon three
points. First, during the drafting and ratifying debates, and in the years
immediately following, a number of key Framers and other leading
figures made statements heavily implying that Congress had complete
control of the decision to initiate hostilities. In the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention, for example, framer James Wilson said of war
powers:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard
against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single
body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important
power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this
declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of
Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain
conclusion that nothing but our national interest can draw us into
20
a war.
Jefferson famously wrote: "We have already given in example one
effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting
him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body ...." Madison
stated less colorfully but to similar effect: "The constitution supposes,
what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive
is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It
has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the
Legislature."' Hamilton, perhaps the leading exponent of presidential
power among the Framers, stated in his 1793 Pacificus essays that "the
Legislature can alone declare war, can alone actually transfer the
nation from a state of peace to a state of hostility" and thus "[iut is the
province and duty of the executive to preserve to the nation the
blessings of peace. The Legislature alone can interrupt them by
placing the nation in a state of war." In John Marshall's view, "the
combined to transform the original "National Security Constitution" during the twentieth cen-
tury to one of excessive presidential war powers).
20 Jonathan Elliot, 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 528 (2d ed 1836). This quotation is a centerpiece of many academic studies
of the original understanding of war powers. See, for example, Ely, War and Responsibility at 3
(cited in note 1); Reveley, Who Holds the Arrows at 102 (cited in note 1).
21 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept 6,1789), in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 15
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 392,397 (Princeton 1958).
22 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr 2, 1798), in Gaillard Hunt, ed, 6
The Writings of James Madison 311,312 (G.E Putnam's Sons 1906) (abbreviations altered). In a
similar vein, Madison in 1793 wrote: "Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of
things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced." Letters of Helvidius No
1, in Hunt, ed, 6 Writings of James Madison at 138,148.
23 Letters of Pacificus No 1, in Henry Cabot Lodge, ed, 4 The Works of Alexander Hamil-
ton 432, 443 (G.E Putnam's Sons 1904). Hamilton was defending President Washington's 1793
neutrality proclamation. Agreeing that the decision to go to war was vested in Congress, he ar-
gued that preservation of neutrality, until Congress might have a chance to decide, was a presi-
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whole powers of war" are "by the constitution of the United States,
vested in congress .... "' These quotes, and others like them, show (it
is said) the Framers' understanding that Congress controls the
decision to initiate hostilities.
Congressional advocates also point to the records of the
Philadelphia convention regarding the drafting of the Constitution's
Declare War Clause. The convention's draft, at a point fairly late in the
proceedings, gave Congress the power to "make war." Madison and
Elbridge Gerry moved to substitute "declare" for "make," a proposal
ultimately adopted. Madison said that the President should have the
power to repel sudden attacks without the delay of consulting
Congress.2 Rufus King pointed out that congressional power to
"make" war might suggest that Congress had tactical control over the
conduct of the fighting once begun, and that this was properly a
presidential function." It is not clear if either or both of these reasons
persuaded the delegates to accept the change, but in any event the
change did not excite much discussion, and none of the delegates
seemed to think it effected a major reallocation of war powers. The
implication for the war powers debate is clear enough. A Congress
with the power to "make" war would have a comprehensive power
over the decision to initiate hostilities. A reading of Madison's
declare-war language that gives substantial war power to the
President would mean that the "make"-to-"declare" change did effect
a substantial reallocation of war powers-something the Framers did
not appear to contemplate.6 Accordingly, it is said, it should not be
read that way.
Third, congressionalists draw comfort from the exercise of war
powers in the years immediately following ratification. Though
Washington, as President, was fairly aggressive in exercising unilateral
dential power. Hamilton also wrote, as "Lucius Crassus" in 1801, that "it is the peculiar and ex-
clusive province of Congress, when the nation is at peace, to change that state into a state of war;.
.. in other words, it belongs to Congress only, to go to war." Examination of Jefferson's Message
to Congress of December 7,1801, No 1, in Lodge, ed, 8 Works of Hamilton at 246,249.
24 Talbot v Seeman, 5 US (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (Marshall).
25 Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 318-19 (Yale rev ed
1937). For secondary accounts of the debate, see Reveley, Who Holds the Arrows at 81-85 (cited
in note 1); Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 675-83 (cited in note 1).
26 Farrand, ed, 2 Records at 318 (cited in note 25) (Madison in support of the motion).
27 Id at 319 ("'make' war might be understood to 'conduct' it, which was an executive func-
tion") (statement of Rufus King).
28 This assumes that whatever power given to Congress was by the same measure taken
away from the President. As I have discussed elsewhere, this was the usual construction put on
the foreign affairs provisions of the Constitution, both with respect to war and elsewhere. See
Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 253-54 (cited in note 4) (presenting a "residual principle"
of the President's executive foreign affairs power). For example, the Convention's declare-war
proposal itself contemplated that if Congress had the power to "make" war, the President would
not have it. See Farrand, ed, 2 Records at 318 (Madison) (cited in note 25).
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foreign affairs powers,9 he did not unilaterally commit the nation to
hostilities, even though opportunities to do so arose on several
occasions. For example, facing hostilities from various tribes along the
United States's western border, Washington limited himself to
defensive measures and rejected offensive action without
congressional approval.3n Washington said: "The Constitution vests the
power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive
expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they shall
have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure."
3'
Similarly, Secretary of War Henry Knox said on Washington's behalf:
Whatever may be [the President's] impression relatively to the
proper steps to be adopted, he does not conceive himself
authorized to direct offensive operations against the
Chickamaggas. If such measures are to be pursued they must
result from the decisions of Congress who solely are vested with
the powers of War.3
Washington's restraint was notable because he could easily have
claimed that countermeasures were necessary to an adequate defense,
that the tribes themselves had begun the hostilities, or that
declarations were unnecessary against the tribes, which were not fully
foreign nations but resided on territory claimed by the United States;
none of these justifications would sound strained to the modern ear,
nor entail a frontal assault upon congressional war power.33
29 See Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 295-354 (cited in note 4) (discussing the execu-
tive power over foreign affairs in Washington's administration); H. Jefferson Powell, The Foun-
ders and the President's Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 1471,1477-1511
(1999) (recounting Washington's conduct of foreign policy).
30 On Washington's relations with the western tribes, see Fisher, Presidential War Power at
13-16 (cited in note 1); Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The
Origins 116-27 (Ballinger 1976).
3' Letter from George Washington to William Moultrie, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 33 The
Writings of George Washington 73,73 (GPO 1940).
32 Letter from Henry Knox to William Blount, in Clarence Edwin Carter, ed, 4 The Territo-
rial Papers of the United States 220,220-21 (GPO 1936).
33 At least two other incidents suggest deference by the Washington administration to
Congress's war powers. First, the North African state of Algiers had seized U.S. citizens as hos-
tages and demanded ransom; Washington and Secretary of State Jefferson agreed that any mili-
tary action in response required congressional approval. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Sepa-
ration of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev 211,242-60 (1989)
(discussing the Washington administration's relations with Algiers). Second, during a dispute be-
tween Britain and Spain known as the Nootka Sound incident, it seemed likely that Britain
would seek to march troops through U.S. territory to attack Spanish territory; the question was
whether the United States should resist militarily, and Washington and his cabinet agreed that
this was a question for Congress. See Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power at
101-03 (cited in note 30). On both points as examples of Washington's war-powers deference, see
Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 339-40, 346-50 (cited in note 4).
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But this broad academic consensus conceals a serious textual
embarrassment: Advocates of congressional war powers have great
difficulty grounding their view in the actual words of the Constitution.
Congress, after all, has the power "to declare war," not the power "to
authorize hostilities," and it is not immediately clear why the two
should be equated. Modem armed conflict rarely begins with a formal
declaration of war, and the eighteenth century likewise witnessed an
array of "undeclared" wars." But if formally declaring war is no more
than an optional prelude to armed struggle-as it apparently was in
the Framers' day and as it is in ours- Congress's authority "to declare
war" would seem to fall far short of comprehensive war powers.
Advocates of congressional war powers have given little attention to
this problem, inviting us on the strength of post-ratification quotations
and practice to look past the literal wording of the text and to
construe the "declare war" power to encompass all conflicts, whether
declared or not.'
In short, the consensus academic account of Congress's war
powers remains essentially without an explanation of how the text
accomplishes the result the consensus says must have been
accomplished.37 This failure leaves the standard academic account
34 See Brien Hallett, The Lost Art of Declaring War 112-41 (Illinois 1998) (discussing mod-
em practice).
35 See J.E Maurice, Hostilities without Declaration of War (Her Majesty's Stationery Office
1883) (discussing eighteenth-century practice).
36 Two theories in support of Congress have been advanced that grapple with the actual
words of the text. One view is that whatever war power is not encompassed by the "declare war"
power falls within Congress's power to issue letters of marque and reprisal. See Lofgren, 81 Yale
L J at 696-97 (cited in note 1) (discussing this view). A second position, elaborated by Professor
Gregory Sidak, is that the Declare War Clause actually requires Congress to issue a formal dec-
laration of war prior to all military engagements. See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke
L J 27,63-73 (1991) (arguing that a formal declaration is necessary to maintain the separation of
powers). These views are discussed below, but two observations may be made at this point. First,
neither view commands much of a following among advocates of congressional war power. Sec-
ond, neither view is in accord with the eighteenth-century understanding of the relevant phrases.
The power of marque and reprisal was not equivalent to undeclared war in the eighteenth cen-
tury, but rather involved a small subset of undeclared wars. See Part V.B. And, as noted, unde-
clared wars were common in the eighteenth century, so it is a stretch to suggest that the Framers
intended by implication to render this common practice unconstitutional.
37 Congressional advocates have stated, on the basis of the evidence discussed here, that
"declare war" must be read to mean "commence war," but little effort has been devoted to show-
ing that eighteenth-century usage in fact did equate the two. See Wormuth and Firmage, To
Chain the Dog of War at 20 (cited in note 1) (arguing that "[t]he verb declare ... describe[d] a
formal public proclamation of hostilities, but it was used also to mean simply the initiation of
hostilities"); Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 695 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that "'declare' had a
broader meaning ... [i]t meant 'commence'). Wormuth and Firmage purport to describe a
common understanding, but their lone citation-to a 1552 dictionary-does not appear to sup-
port their claim. See Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War at 20 (cited in note 1). Lof-
gren concedes that his suggestion is contrary to "treatises and international practice" of the time,
but thinks it compelled by the quotations of the Framers. Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 695 (cited in
note 1). Both works, and others like them, essentially reach their results by reasoning
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vulnerable to troublesome textual objections. As elaborated in the
ensuing sections, three developments have called the case for
comprehensive congressional war powers much into doubt, and its
academic defenders have managed little in the way of response.
B. The Text and the Case for the President
The congressionalists' textual weakness has opened the door to a
powerful counterattack. A series of presidential administrations-
from Truman in Korea through Bush in the Gulf War and Clinton in
Kosovon-and a small group of legal scholars-most recently
Professors Robert Turner and John Yoo-have claimed broad
presidential warmaking powers on the basis of the Constitution's text.
Recent scholars further contend, in keeping with broader shifts in
scholarly attitudes toward the meaning of "original understanding,"
that the congressionalists' case is methodologically flawed: The search
should focus upon the ordinary meaning of the text itself and not
merely upon the subjective views of a few prominent Framers.
1. Textualism and original understanding.
The first problem for congressional advocates is that, although
they are making a claim about how the Constitution was originally
understood, their approach does not comport with the increasingly
accepted approach to determining the Constitution's original
meaning.- Previously, those who sought an original interpretation of
the Constitution typically spoke of unearthing a (somewhat
hypothetical) intent of the Framers-commonly by assembling a
series of quotations from key Framers and extrapolating from these a
guess as to what those individuals would have decided, had they been
presented with the questions we now ask. But modem theories of
backwards from the post-convention statements of the Framers.
38 See Fisher, Presidential War Power at 70-161 (cited in note 1).
39 This is perhaps unsurprising, as most leading war powers scholars-including Professors
Ely, Glennon, and Koh-are not also leading theorists of originalist interpretation. The principal
exception is Charles Lofgren, a self-consciously originalist scholar whose work pays the closest
attention to the text, and works hardest (though in my view unsuccessfully) to ground the stan-
dard academic account of war powers in the actual words of the Constitution. For Professor Lof-
gren's other works on the original understanding of the Constitution, see Charles A. Lofgren,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const Commen 77 (1988) (finding the foun-
ders themselves rejected framer intent, but not necessarily ratifier intent); Charles A. Lofgren,
Government from Reflection and Choice: Constitutional Essays on War, Foreign Relations, and
Federalism (Oxford 1986) (collecting several essays on original understanding); Charles A. Lof-
gren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 Yale L
J 1 (1973) (questioning the historical basis of Justice Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright).
Most of Professor Lofgren's work occurred, however, before the turn to textualism in modem
originalist scholarship.
40 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 BU L Rev
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original understanding focus much less on a reconstructed or
subjective Framers' intent and much more on the objective meaning
of the constitutional text, as it would have been understood at the
time it was written. Though this approach does not necessarily lead to
different results, it is a fundamentally different methodology that gives
much more primacy to the actual words of the Constitution, and
accords much less importance to extrapolations from statements
(particularly after-the-fact statements) of the generalized outlook of
individual Framers.
This new textualist orientation is problematic for advocates of
congressional war powers because it elevates to primacy the most
troublesome part of their argument. In the modern intellectual
climate it is no longer tenable to say, on a subject specifically
addressed in the Constitution's text, that we need not be concerned
with the actual meaning of the words since we have sufficient extrinsic
evidence of the drafters' subjective thinking. As noted, the
congressionalist case relies primarily upon selected quotations from
key Framers and other political leaders, excerpts from the debates in
the Philadelphia convention, and practice following ratification. For
most modem scholars of the Constitution's original meaning,
however, none of these sources would be the primary focus of inquiry.
This is true in part because each of these sources may prove less
than it appears to. Selected quotations may be taken out of context or
might have been made for political or strategic reasons; our records of
the debates are fragmentary and in any event were not available to
the ratifiers or anyone else for decades after the Convention; and
early presidents may have asserted constitutional limitations not from
their actual reading of the Constitution but to justify decisions they
would have made anyway."
More important to modem views of original understanding,
however, is the observation that the Constitution does not enact the
unstated views, beliefs, preferences, or predictions of its drafters and
ratifiers. Rather, the authoritative voice is the text itself.3 Regardless
204,205-24 (1980) (criticizing this approach).
41 See, for example, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
38 (Princeton 1997) ("What I look for in the Constitution is ... the original meaning of the text,
not what the original draftsmen intended."). For an engaging discussion of the shift, see Randy E.
Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loyola L Rev 611,620-29 (1999).
42 As to early practice, President Washington had no navy and a tiny standing army; practi-
calities as much as constitutional limitations would have curtailed unilateral hostilities. See So-
faer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power at 61-129 (cited in note 30) (discussing Wash-
ington's administration). On the fragmentary nature of the convention debates, see especially
Reveley, Who Holds the Arrows at 69-70 (cited in note 1). For a wide-ranging critique of the use
of history by congressionalist scholars in the war powers debate, see John C. Yoo, Clio at War:
The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U Colo L Rev 1169,1172-74 (1999).
43 See Barnett, 45 Loyola L Rev at 621 (cited in note 41) ("[T]he shift ... from original in-
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of what any individual thought the best system to be, what the ratifiers
collectively adopted (and all they collectively adopted) is what
actually appears in the Constitution's language. Accordingly, the
inquiry is not what any individual member of the constitutional
generation intended, or even our best guess as to what that generation
collectively intended; it is, instead, the best reading of the text.4
But few textualists suppose that a text can have a single meaning,
shorn of its context. 5 This means textualist interpreters look not for
what the words mean in the abstract, but for how the words would
have been understood at the time they were used. This produces an
overlap of textualism and originalism, for textualist interpretation
seeks not the meaning of the words in isolation, but the original
meaning-that is, the meaning of the words in the context in which
they were written. As a result, the focus is on history, though not
history broadly, but rather the history of the particular words and
phrases in question." Thus to know what the constitutional text meant
to the constitutional generation, one must look to see how the words
of the Constitution were used (and thus would have been understood)
at the time the document was drafted and ratified. Moreover, one
must look to the circumstances surrounding their use in the
Constitution, for most words, even in a given historical period, may
have multiple meanings depending upon how they are used. The
question is, given the range of meanings a word or phrase had in the
eighteenth century, which meaning would have made the most sense
tentions or will of the lawmakers, to the objective original meaning that a reasonable listener
would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment.").
44 Id at 622 ("while some originalists still search for how the relevant generation of ratifi-
ers expected or intended their textual handiwork would be applied to specific cases, original
meaning originalists need not concern themselves with this, except as circumstantial evidence of
what the more technical words and phrases in the text might have meant to a reasonable lis-
tener."). As Justice Scalia puts it:
We look for a sort of 'objectified' intent-the intent that a reasonable person would gather
from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris .... And the
reason we adopt this objectified version is, I think, that it is simply incompatible with de-
mocratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law
determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated ....
Government by unexpressed intent is [ ] tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not the intent
of the lawgiver. That seems to me the essence of the famous American ideal set forth in the
Massachusetts constitution: A government of laws, not of men. Men may intend what they
will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 17 (cited in note 41).
45 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 37 ("In textual interpretation, context is every-
thing.") (cited in note 41).
46 In Judge Posner's description, textualist originalism is "a narrowly focused inquiry into
precise and answerable questions of historical meaning of specific words and sentences" in the
Constitution. Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adju-
dication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U Chi L Rev 573,595 (2000).
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in the context in which it was used in the Constitution. This ordinary
understanding establishes the original meaning of the Constitution. In
Justice Holmes's aphorism, "we ask, not what this man meant, but
what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of
English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used."
This inquiry, in turn, leads (in part) back to the statements of the
Framers, the convention and ratification debates and post-ratification
commentary and practice. The way "intelligent and informed people
of the time," such as the Framers and their contemporaries, used
language is evidence of that language's ordinary meaning. Thus a
modern textualist/originalist would not dismiss the evidence upon
which the advocates of congressional war power rely. But neither
would such an interpreter find it wholly dispositive, nor use it in the
way that it is typically used. The congressionalists' evidence is usually
presented not as an interpretive guide to any particular language in
the text, but as authority in itself. The evidence, in the
congressionalists' hands, does not show how the ordinary eighteenth-
century meaning of "declare war" encompasses all decisions to use
military force; rather, it purports to show that Congress must control
all decisions to use military force, whatever the literal meaning of the
language in the Constitution. Under the modern view of the way to
ascertain the Constitution's original meaning, this is exactly
backwards: It is the text that controls, and the surrounding
circumstances that help explain the text.
Further, the modem view likely would not accept the
congressionalists' evidence, standing alone, as the best evidence of the
ordinary eighteenth-century meaning of the relevant words. None of
the evidence shows members of the constitutional generation
unambiguously using "declare war" to mean "commence hostilities."
Rather, it is indirect evidence: statements that Congress has control
over commencement of hostilities, or that declaring war is an
important power, from which it is surmised that "declare war" means
"commence hostilities." In addition, most of the congressionalists'
evidence comes in the context of an asserted interpretation of the
Constitution, made against a political and strategic background that
may have influenced the speakers' reading. For example, Washington
said that Congress's power over war foreclosed him from unilaterally
opening offensive action against the western tribes. This might have
been because Washington actually read the Constitution that way, but
it might also have been because Washington did not wish to
47 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv L Rev 417,417-18
(1899). See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 22-23 (cited in note 41) (approving of two similar
quotes from Holmes).
48 See Scalia, A Matter ofInterpretation at 38 (cited in note 41).
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commence offensive actions for some other reason. In any event, it is
less persuasive than a more complete history of the relevant phrase.
In short, modem textualist interpretation focuses on the objective
meaning of the particular words and phrases appearing in the
Constitution as they would have been understood at the time and in
the context of its adoption. That entails, first, starting with the precise
words of the text and attempting to give them the meaning that they
would have had to an ordinary eighteenth-century reader. It further
means looking at the surrounding context to see how the words of the
text would have been understood as part of the Constitution as a
whole. Finally, it acknowledges the relevance of the statements of
Framers and other political leaders, the convention and ratification
debates, and the post-ratification practice-but not as ends in
themselves. The goal is not to construct an ideal (or intended) system
of government from the general statements or intents of individual
Framers and politicians, but rather to reconstruct what the words of
the text meant in the context in which they were used.
2. Textual problems of the case for Congress.
Focusing on text throws harsh light upon the academic case for
congressional war powers. The immediate difficulty for congressional
advocates is that the text on its face does not appear to say what they
want it to say. The core congressionalist position is that Congress has
complete (or nearly complete) control over the decision to initiate
hostilities. The text, however, only says that Congress can "declare
war.' 4 There is good reason to believe that the primary meaning of a
declaration of war in the eighteenth century was roughly what it is
today: a formal announcement of a state of war between two nations,
often (though not necessarily) coupled with justifications for
mounting the war or conditions on which peace can be made.n As
eighteenth-century Americans likely would have known, the practice
dates at least to Roman times, when it was accompanied by elaborate
ceremony." Though shorn of many of its rituals by the eighteenth
century, the practice remained common, with Britain, for example,
commonly issuing pronouncements styled "declarations of war"
49 I leave aside for the moment the question of the power to issue letters of marque and
reprisal. See Part V.
50 See Vattel, Law of Nations at 314-20 (cited in note 8) (discussing the declaration of war).
See especially id at 315:
[W]e owe this further regard to humanity, and especially to the lives and peace of the sub-
jects, to declare to that unjust nation, or its chiet that we are at length going to have re-
course to the last remedy, and make use of open force, for the purpose of bringing him to
reason. This is called declaring war.
51 See id (describing "the Roman manner of proceeding, regulated in their fecial law").
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between 1700 and 1789.2 If "declare war" had this meaning in the
eighteenth century (as assuredly it did), what justifies refusing to give
that phrase in the Constitution its ordinary eighteenth-century
meaning? And if the phrase is given its ordinary meaning, is not
Congress's power much less extensive than commonly claimed, and
indeed limited to the making of a formal declaration?
A further problem for congressionalists is that in the eighteenth
century, hostilities were regularly commenced prior to, or in the
complete absence of, a formal declaration of war. If a formal
declaration had been understood as necessary to begin war in the
eighteenth century, one might comfortably read the constitutional
language as equivalent to commencing war. Modem practice, of
course, involves "undeclared" wars and low-level hostilities perhaps
not needing a declaration, but if eighteenth-century practice were
otherwise, it might be appropriate to say that the Constitution's
phrase "declare war" in effect meant "commence hostilities" since
hostilities could not be commenced without a formal declaration.
Unfortunately for the congressionalists, the eighteenth-century
practice-as they themselves acknowledge-was essentially the same
as modern practice. The "undeclared" war was very much a part of
eighteenth-century reality, as eighteenth-century Americans surely
knew. A number of leading wars were never formally declared or were
formally declared only long after hostilities had begun. The Seven
Years' War, which was fought between Britain and France in the mid-
eighteenth century largely in North America, was not formally
declared by either side until long after hostilities began, and neither
France nor Britain made a formal declaration of war prior to
hostilities during the American Revolution.'" Further, any number of
smaller localized conflicts went without a formal declaration." In
short, one simply cannot say that a formal declaration was necessary
or even common prior to initiating hostilities in the eighteenth
century."
52 See Maurice, Hostilities (cited in note 35). Examples include the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession (Declaration of England against France, May 4,1702), id at 13; Declaration of England
against Spain, 1719, id at 15; War of Austrian Succession, declaration of England against Spain,
October 19,1739, id at 16; and against France, in March of 1744, id at 19; Seven Years' War, decla-
ration of England against France, May 17,1756, id at 21.
53 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 215-17 (cited in note 2) (discussing the Seven Years' War);
Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 693 (cited in note 1) ("During the War of the American Revolution [ ]
Britain and France never expressly declared war on each other."); Maurice, Hostilities at 20-23,
24-25 (cited in note 35).
54 See generally Maurice, Hostilities (cited in note 35).
55 The point is not seriously contested, as Congress's academic advocates readily concede
it. See, for example, Ely, War and Responsibility at 3 & n 5 (cited in note 1) (acknowledging
"most weren't [declared], even then"). See also Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 693 (cited in note 1) (stat-
ing that "hostilities without declarations of war were common during the period"); Federalist 25
1558 [69:1543
Textualism and War Powers
Taken together, these points are a substantial problem for
advocates of congressional war power. One cannot seriously contest
that the primary meaning of "declaring war" in the eighteenth century
was-as it is today-issuing the formal pronouncement of war known
as a "declaration." Nor can one seriously claim that the ordinary
eighteenth-century reader would have thought such a declaration
prerequisite to beginning a war, since that was not the practice in the
eighteenth century. Thus the language of the Constitution appears, at
first inspection, to give Congress only the power to make a formal
announcement of war, not the power to control the initiation of
hostilities. The congressionalists' evidence suggests that the Framers,
in some post-ratification contexts, asserted a broader reading of
congressional war power, but this might merely have been an
overreading of the text motivated by political and strategic
considerations. Advocates of congressional war power must show how
the constitutional language gives Congress broad war power (not
merely that some Framers later claimed it did).
Advocates of Congress make at least two important responses.
The first is to rely on Congress's power to "grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal." The argument is that, if the Declare War Clause
encompasses only formally declared wars (as its language might
suggest), then the Marque and Reprisal Clause covers everything
else-and thus maintains congressional control over the initiation of
hostilities." The Marque and Reprisal Clause is discussed in greater
detail below,- but for present purposes it is sufficient to say that this
reading does not conform to the eighteenth-century meaning of
marque and reprisal. Even given its broadest meaning, marque and
reprisal meant something fairly specific: the seizure or destruction of
the property of another nation to atone for an international wrong
committed by that nation.9 Reprisal did not encompass all undeclared
(Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 162,165 (Mentor 1961).
56 USConstArtI,§8,cll.
57 See Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 696-97 (cited in note 1) (suggesting this point). See also Jules
Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U Pa L
Rev 1035, 1040 (1986) (arguing "that the marque and reprisal clause grants Congress sole
authority to authorize private individuals to use force against another country or its citizens,
whether in peacetime or during declared war").
58 See PartV.B.
59 See Vattel, Law of Nations at 283-86 (cited in note 8) (discussing reprisals and letters of
marque).Vattel writes:
If a nation has taken possession of what belongs to another ... the latter may seize some-
thing belonging to the former, and apply it to her own advantage till she obtains payment of
what is due to her, together with interest and damages, or keep it as a pledge till she has re-
ceived ample satisfaction.
Id at 283-84. See C. Kevin Marshall, Comment, Putting Privateers in Their Place: The Applicabil-
ity of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared Wars, 64 U Chi L Rev 953,981 (1997) (argu-
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wars or include all military actions. For example, the French actions
during the American Revolution were not reprisals, since they were
not directed at avenging any particular British wrongdoing and were
directed toward achieving strategic goals rather than toward seizing or
destroying British property.
The second response is that, whatever the textual problems with a
broad reading of the Declare War Clause, there are greater textual
problems with a narrow reading. Most notably, it is said, the textual
powers of the President also do not extend to initiating undeclared
wars. A narrow reading of Congress's declare-war power thus
apparently creates an improbable gap in the Constitution's allocation
of war powers: No branch appears to have the power to begin
hostilities without a formal declaration, even though that was a
common practice of nations in the eighteenth century.O The onus is
therefore placed upon advocates of presidential war powers to
develop a competing textual explanation of war powers, and this,
congressional advocates maintain, cannot be done. True, the President
has the commander-in-chief power, but there are reasons for thinking
that this power should not be read broadly to encompass all decisions
to commence hostilities. 6' At first reading, one might not suppose that
the President has any other plausible source of war power. As
Professor Lofgren has argued, Congress seems to have most of the
war powers specifically allocated by the text. Therefore, it makes sense
to locate the whole of war powers in Congress?6 But as set forth in the
next subsection, the congressionalist claim in this regard has been
substantially eroded, as recent scholarship has developed a competing
textual theory of presidential war powers.
ing for a narrow reading of the Marque and Reprisal Clause emphasizing "the unique and perva-
sive financial aspects of letters of marque and reprisal that allowed their holders to operate in-
dependently of Congress's power of the purse").
60 See Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 695 (cited in note 1) (advancing this argument).
61 Briefly, the eighteenth-century political theorists, on whom the Framers relied in devel-
oping their views of executive power, seemed to regard the war initiation power as distinct from
the commander-in-chief power; they described them as separate components of the executive
power over foreign affairs. The Framers would have been familiar with a system that separated
the war-initiation power and the commander-in-chief power, since that was the system of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation (in which the Continental Congress had the power to "determine on war
and peace" but Washington was the field commander). And although the founding period dis-
cussed presidential power in some detail, no one gave the commander-in-chief power a broad
construction. See id at 679-80, 685-87,695.
62 See id at 695 ("It seems unlikely [ ] that an observer in 1787-88 would have concluded
that the Constitution would leave such an important power unvested.... It also seems improb-
able that a contemporary would have accepted the alternative that the power was lodged with
the executive.").
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3. War and the executive power over foreign affairs.
The textual argument for presidential war powers begins with
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution. By this provision, the
"executive Power" of the United States is vested in the President.6
Recent scholarship has argued that the common eighteenth-century
understanding of "executive power" included power over foreign
affairs.. Many of the greatest political writers of the time-including
Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone-spoke of the executive power
as encompassing foreign affairs. The British monarch-the executive
most familiar to the Framers-had broad power over foreign affairs,
and the political writers said that this arose from the monarch's
possession of the executive power. Further, this terminology was
common in pre-constitutional America. For example, in the
Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation the foreign
affairs department was called an executive department, and foreign
affairs were considered to be part of the executive powers of Congress
under the Articles.6 And in practice after the Constitution was ratified,
foreign affairs powers continued to be called executive powers. As
Thomas Jefferson said, "The transaction of business with foreign
nations is Executive altogether." Thus, when the Constitution gave
the "executive Power" to the President, that phrase included an
independent power over foreign affairs.
63 US Const Art II, § 1.
64 See Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 265-72 (cited in note 4) (discussing the execu-
tive power in eighteenth-century political theory);Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 196-217 (cited in note 2)
(same). See also Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 NC L
Rev 133, 206-10 (1999) (suggesting the executive power as a textual source of foreign affairs
power);Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution at 52-80 (cited in note 2) (same); Charles J.
Cooper, et al, What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U Miami L Rev 165,167-68
(1988) (same). Of course, not everyone accepts the "executive power" as a source of substantive
presidential power. See, for example, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 641
(1952) (Jackson concurring) ("I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all
conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the ge-
neric powers thereafter stated."); Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 Colum L Rev 1, 47-48 n 195 (1994) ("[Tlhe [Article II] Vesting Clause does
nothing more than show who ... is to exercise the executive power, and not what that power
is ).
65 See Locke, Second Treatise §§ 143-48 at 364-66 (cited in note 9); Montesquieu, The
Spirit of the Laws 156-66 (Cambridge 1989) (translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia
Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone); William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of
England *244-49 (Chicago 1979). See also Jean L. De Lohne, The Constitution of England 49-50
(William Hein & Co. 1999) (originally published 1784);Thomas Rutherforth, 2 Institutes of Natu-
ral Law 54-59 (. Bentham 1756).
66 Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 272-79 (cited in note 4).
67 Jefferson's Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments
(Apr 24,1790), in Boyd, ed, 16 Papers of Jefferson at 378,379 (cited in note 21). For other exam-
ples, see Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 295-339 (cited in note 4).
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This analysis does not argue that all previously executive foreign
affairs powers, as conceived by Montesquieu, Blackstone, and others,
and as exercised by the British monarch, became powers of the U.S.
President. To the contrary, the Constitution specifically assigned some
foreign affairs powers elsewhere: for example, treatymaking and
diplomatic appointments (shared with the Senate), and the power to
declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal (given to
Congress)." These provisions took from the President powers
previously understood to be executive. But other foreign affairs
powers, not specifically mentioned in the Constitution's text, remained
part of the President's executive power. Thus, in this view, the
President's executive power in foreign affairs is residual: Executive
foreign affairs powers not otherwise allocated in the text are
presidential powers.69
The theory of residual executive powers in foreign affairs has
important implications for the war powers debate. There can be no
doubt that the power to commence hostilities was an executive
foreign affairs power prior to the Constitution. The leading theorists
of executive power such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, all
included initiation of hostilities as part of the executive power. 7 In
Britain, the monarch's executive power included the unilateral power
to initiate hostilities. As the delegates in Philadelphia recognized, a
grant of "executive power" if otherwise unqualified likely would
include the "power of war and peace.
71
As a result, the theory of residual executive power in foreign
affairs holds that if the power to commence hostilities is not taken
away by the Constitution, it remains an executive/presidential power.
This in turn supplies a textual basis for presidential war powers: If the
declare-war power is read narrowly, the President can claim the
balance of war powers (including the power to commence hostilities
without a formal declaration) as part of the unallocated executive
powers. As a result, the congressionalist argument based on
incompleteness is eliminated: If the declare-war power is read
narrowly, it is not the case that power over undeclared war is
unallocated. Rather, it is part of the presidential residual. This
conclusion places the burden squarely on the advocates of
68 See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2; US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11.
69 Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 253-54 (cited in note 4) (describing the President's
residual executive foreign affairs powers).
70 Locke, Second Treatise §§ 143-48 at 364-66 (cited in note 9); Montesquieu, Spirit of the
Laws at 156-66 (cited in note 65); William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England
*244-49 (Chicago 1979).
71 Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 279-87 (cited in note 4) (discussing the executive
power over foreign affairs at the Philadelphia Convention).
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congressional war power to explain why "declare war" means
"commence hostilities." Presidential advocates would not deny that
Congress has the sole power to declare war, nor would they deny that
if declare war meant commence hostilities then Congress would have
that power as well. However, they can argue that unless "declare war"
means "commence hostilities," war power other than the formal
declaration itself remains with the President. And they would say that
the congressional advocates have not carried the argument about the
meaning of "declare war."
4. The case for presidential war powers.
The foregoing scholarly trends-focus on eighteenth-century
textual meaning and recognition of the executive power in foreign
affairs-are forcefully united in Professor John Yoo's attack on
congressional war powers, the most powerful modem indictment of
the conventional academic view. Professor Yoo begins with the idea of
executive power, showing that in the English constitution and in
eighteenth-century political thought the monarch possessed broad
powers in war and foreign affairs as part of the "executive power."
'
2
However, he stresses that these powers were limited by two very
substantial legislative powers: the control of spending and
impeachment. Thus it is not true that the executive/monarch had
unchecked war power; rather, Professor Yoo argues that during the
eighteenth century Parliament played a considerable role in foreign
affairs, and in the commencement of war in particular, through the
exercise of these powers, and especially through the spending power.'
Turning to the U.S. experience, Professor Yoo finds a similar
structure, with similar but enhanced checks upon executive war power.
In his view the President/executive retained most of the traditional
executive war power held by the monarch. The U.S. Constitution also
retained the traditional checks upon that power-legislative control of
spending and impeachment-but in both cases the checks were
strengthened. Whereas the eighteenth-century monarch had some
independent sources of revenue, the Constitution stated that all
appropriations must be made through Congress. Thus the President
was wholly dependent upon Congress for wartime finance. In addition,
under the Constitution the President could be impeached, whereas in
72 Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 198-207 (cited in note 2). See also irner, Repealing the War Pow-
ers Resolution at 52-S0 (cited in note 2) (grounding presidential war power in the historic mean-
ing of "executive power").
73 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 208-14 (cited in note 2). See also the work of English historian
Jeremy Black. Jeremy Black, A System of Ambition?: British Foreign Policy 1660-1793 43-58
(Longman 1991) (discussing Parliament and British foreign policy); Jeremy Black, British For-
eign Policy in the Age of Walpole 75-92 (John Donald 1985) (same).
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England impeachment was a remedy only against the crown's
ministers."
With respect to the Declare War Clause, Professor Yoo does not
deny that grants of foreign affairs power to other branches of
government take power away from the President-and thus the power
to declare war, though formerly an executive power of the monarch, is
in the U.S. system exclusively a power of Congress. But he denies that
declaring war equates with commencing war. He criticizes the
congressionalists for their "traditional focus on the legislative history
of the Declare War Clause and on a few statements by individual
Framers," arguing instead that the focus should be on the text as
understood in its eighteenth-century context.7 Further, he argues,
congressional advocates "have misinterpreted the meaning of a
declaration of war. Interpreting 'declare' war to mean 'authorize' or
'commence' is a twentieth-century construct inconsistent with the
eighteenth-century understanding of the phrase."76
Professor Yoo then presents his own view of the eighteenth-
century meaning of declare war. In his reading, "a declaration of war
was significant for its juridical purposes-for altering the formal legal
status between nations-but not for the domestic constitutional
question of commencing hostilities."'' As he further explains,
[A]ccording to [eighteenth-century international] scholars, a
declaration of war played a dual legal purpose. First, it notified
the enemy that a state of war existed between them. If a nation
warned its enemy of future hostilities, its later actions would
receive the protection of international law. A declaration
announced that hostile actions by its soldiers were taken under
national aegis, and thus did not constitute piracy or robbery."
In addition, "declarations played a domestic legal role by informing
citizens of an alteration in their legal rights and status.... Declarations
instructed citizens of their new relationship with the enemy state, and
informed them that they could take hostile actions against the enemy
without fear of sanction. ,79
As Professor Yoo emphasizes, this did not mean that a formal
declaration was required before commencing war. To the contrary,
numerous wars began without a declaration: "[T]he usual British
74 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 241-90 (cited in note 2).
75 Id at 196. For an elaboration of the critique of the congressionalists' use of history, see
Yoo, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1175-91 (cited in note 42).
76 Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 204 (cited in note 2).
77 Id.
78 Id at 206.
79 Id at 207.
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course toward war involved months, if not years, of direct armed
conflict without a declaration of war."'' The declaration was employed
only when the monarch wished to accomplish the legal changes it
implied. In short, "a declaration of war performed a primarily juridical
function under eighteenth-century international law, and it was this
understanding that the Framers drew upon in giving Congress the
authority to declare war."" Because it altered legal rights, it made
sense for the Constitution to give the power to Congress. But in
Professor Yoo's view there is no basis for believing the power carried
with it any authority over commencement of hostilities:
[A] declaration of war was not the same thing as a domestic
authorization of war. In fact, a declaration of war was understood
as what its name suggests: a declaration. Like a declaratory
judgment, a declaration of war represented the judgment of
Congress, acting in a judicial capacity (as it does in
impeachments), that a state of war existed between the United
States and another nation. Such a declaration could take place
either before or after hostilities had commenced. While the
power to "declare" war adds to Congress' store of powers, it does
little to alter the relative domestic authorities of the executive
and legislative branches. Its primary function was to trigger the
international laws of war, which would clothe in legitimacy
certain actions taken against one's own and enemy citizens."
As Professor Yoo concludes, "Americans of the eighteenth
century would have understood that the power to declare war dealt
with setting the formal, legal relationships between two nations, and
not with authorizing real hostilities."'3 In short, the power transferred
away from the President by the Declare War Clause was not a broad
authority over initiating hostilities, but a narrow authority over
establishing war in a legal sense.
C. The Framers and the Case for the President
The foregoing points add up to a serious challenge to the
conventional view of congressional war powers, yet no one has
convincingly taken it up. Very few responses of any length have
addressed the arguments of Professors Yoo and Turner, and those that
have merely repeat the prior approach.84 None has engaged the
80 Id at 215.
81 Id at 242.
82 Id.
83 Id at 245.
84 See Fisher, 148 U Pa L Rev 1637, 1658-68 (cited in note 6) (analyzing Professor Yoo's
work); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology
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modern scholarship of textualist originalism, nor considered the new
scholarship of executive power in foreign affairs.
But, while the presidential advocates such as Professor Yoo
would thus seem to have the better of the textual argument, they are
unable to explain contemporaneous readings of the Declare War
Clause given to it by the Constitution's drafters and other political
leaders of the period. As congressional advocates have detailed,
Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson, Wilson, Washington, Jay, Marshall, and
an array of lesser figures indicated that war power lay primarily with
Congress, and no prominent figure took the other side.8' True,
textualist/originalist scholarship would not accord these post-drafting
statements conclusive effect, since the ultimate authority is the text
itself. But the way leaders of the time read their own language-even
if after the fact-is at least some persuasive evidence of its objective
meaning. ' Even though advocates of Congress have not been able to
explain as a textual matter why the Framers thought Congress had the
war-initiation power, the fact that the Framers apparently did think so
leaves presidential advocates in a difficult position. It is one thing to
insist upon an interpretative methodology that gives primacy to the
Constitution itself and not the subjective views of the Framers, and
quite another to insist upon a reading that runs precisely counter to
what the Framers said about a particular clause of the text.
Presidential advocates have launched various attacks seeking to
discredit the congressionalist sources, arguing principally that they are
not legitimate evidence of Framers' intent, that they represent
idiosyncratic views, or that they do not unambiguously show an
understanding of the Declare War Clause in which Congress has most
of the war initiation power.5 ' But none of these strategies is entirely
effective. As to the first point, congressional advocates have left
themselves open to criticism by relying on materials with only the
remotest bearing upon the original understanding (for example, a
letter by Abraham Lincoln). But not all the congressionalists'
evidence can be so easily dismissed, for, as noted, it includes the
observations of many leading members of the late-eighteenth-century
political and legal elite. This circumstance also undermines attempts to
Matters, 106 Yale L J 845, 853-61 (1996) (discussing the arguments of Professors Yoo and Turner
in a book review of Louis Fisher's Presidential War Power).
85 See Part I.A.
86 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 38 (cited in note 41) ("I will consult the writings
of [members of the constitutional generation such as Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and Jefferson] be-
cause their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of the time, display how
the text of the Constitution was originally understood.").
87 See generally Yoo,70 U Colo L Rev 1167 (cited in note 42).
88 Id at 1186 ("Professor Stromseth quotes and cites ... a private 1848 letter by Abraham
Lincoln (certainly not a Framer).").
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make the pro-Congress Framers seem like outliers. Professor Yoo
argues, for example, that James Wilson-who supplies one of the
congressionalists' most devastating quotes'-was not representative
of conventional thinking about congressional powers.9 But the
number of leading members of the constitutional generation arrayed
on the other side make the "outlier" argument difficult. As described
in greater detail below, what Wilson said was not materially different
from contemporaneous comments by, for example, Hamilton and
Madison in the 1793 Pacificus/Helvidius debates and James Iredell
and Charles Pinckney in the ratifying debates.91
Presidential advocates have also been able to find little in their
favor in the post-drafting history. Professor Yoo, for example, finds
that the Declare War Clause was not often discussed in the ratifying
debates, and accordingly finds little direct evidence in either
direction.n His principal point here is that during the ratification
process; the defenders of the Constitution stressed the congressional
powers of spending and impeachment as checks on the President, not
the Declare War Clause. That is certainly consistent with his view of
the Framers' design, but it is also consistent with the opposing view.
The ratifiers probably did think that spending and impeachment were
the most important checks upon the President, but this hardly proves
that the President was not also limited in war power. In any event, as
discussed below, important voices in the ratification debates did
identify the Declare War Clause as an important limit on presidential
power (though unfortunately they failed to elaborate this point fully).
Moreover, presidential advocates have not found any affirmative
evidence in the ratifying debates of a broad understanding of
presidential war power.3 Presidential advocates generally make their
case in spite of the Framers' post-drafting commentary, not in reliance
upon it.
D. Conclusion: The Constitution's Text and the War Powers Debate
In short, the debate over the original understanding of war
powers stands at an impasse. Neither side can produce a reading that
is both based on the ordinary eighteenth-century meaning of the
Constitution's text and in harmony with the way the Framers and
other political leaders of the time described war powers in the
89 Elliot, 2 Debates at 528 (cited in note 20). See Part I.A.
90 Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 286 & n 547 (cited in note 2) ("James Wilson's views can be seen as
exceptional rather than typical.").
91 See Part IV.B.
92 See Yoo, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1202-08 (cited in note 42) (discussing the state ratification
debates); Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 269-94 (cited in note 2) (same).
93 See Yoo, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 42) (essentially conceding this point).
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ratifying debates and in post-ratification practice. Instead, the
congressional advocates would emphasize the Framers' post hoc
statements at the expense of the apparent ordinary meaning of the
text, and presidential advocates would embrace what appears to be
the ordinary meaning of the text at the expense of the Framers' later
comments.
There seems no way out of this dilemma, for while neither side
can present a complete explanation, both sides seem to be right on
their central claims. Presidential advocates seem correct in saying that
the power to issue a formal declaration of war-which is what
Congress appears to have-cannot be the equivalent of
comprehensive war powers, since no one in the eighteenth century
would have thought a formal declaration was required to begin an
armed attack. Presidential advocates also seem correct in saying that
the President's "executive power" encompasses foreign affairs power
not given to other branches by the text, and therefore includes war
powers other than the power to issue the formal declaration. It is hard
to see how giving Congress the ability to issue a formal declaration
could take away the President's power to commence hostilities
without a formal declaration, given that a formal declaration was not
required prior to commencement. And presidential advocates are
right to say that modern theories of original understanding demand
that a search for the ordinary meaning of "declare war"-not isolated
post-drafting statements-should be the central focus of the inquiry.
Advocates of congressional war power simply have not grappled with
these difficulties.
On the other hand, the congressionalists appear to be on solid
ground in saying that the Framers and other political leaders, in the
period immediately following the drafting of the Constitution,
generally seemed to regard all of the war power-not just the
formalities of the declaration-as lodged in Congress. If the
congressionalists truly relied on isolated quotes from only a few
leaders, these likely could be discounted. However, the breadth of the
consensus on which the congressionalists rely seems much greater
than executive advocates credit. It is difficult to dismiss all of these
quotes as taken out of context, the work of philosophical outliers, or
the product of political and strategic considerations. At minimum,
these leaders must have thought it a plausible claim that Congress had
the exclusive power to initiate a state of war, and that the Declare War
Clause imposed material limits on presidential power. Presidential
advocates have not explained how such a broad spectrum of leaders
could have arrived (as they apparently did) at an interpretation of
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"declare war" completely at odds with the (supposed) ordinary
meaning of the phrase."
Such a paradox, were it actually to exist, would pose profound
questions about the methodology of "original meaning." But the
reality is that it is an unlikely historical outcome for most of the
leading members of the constitutional generation to converge upon an
understanding of the text wholly at odds with the text's ordinary
meaning at the time. This illustrates a leading way in which textualists
can use statements of the Framers (and other members of the
constitutional generation), the convention and ratification debates,
and post-constitutional practice to establish textual meaning. To a
textualist the text is authoritative, and the meaning of the text is fixed
by its ordinary meaning at the time it was adopted; what particular
individuals-even particular drafters or ratifiers-said, thought or
predicted about it does not alter its meaning. In the first instance, then,
one should interpret the text, not interpret what people later said was
intended by it. But views of the drafters and their contemporaries,
particularly consensus views, are nonetheless an important
interpretive tool because they provide a cross-check upon our reading
of eighteenth-century meaning. That meaning is sufficiently remote
that we may doubt our ability to uncover it, even where the
constitutional language seems reasonably clear. Where we, through
our best efforts to reconstruct eighteenth-century meaning, reach a
result at odds with the consensus views of the Framers and other
eighteenth-century interpreters, it is particularly appropriate to doubt
our construction. That does not mean that we should substitute the
Framers' intent for the meaning of the text, but it does invite us to
revisit our assumptions about the meaning of the text, to see if we
might have missed something.
II. THREE VIEWS OF THE FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR
This Part examines the eighteenth-century understanding of the
formal declaration of war, as reflected in both theory and practice. The
most obvious meaning of the Constitution's phrase "declare war" is
that it referred to the practice of issuing a formal proclamation, styled
a "declaration of war," which announced the existence of a state of
hostilities. As noted, this was a common sense in which the phrase
94 The commentary of the founding generation is particularly troubling because much of it
comes from individuals such as Hamilton, who generally took an expansive view of executive
power. One would not expect Hamilton, for example, to embrace a substantial limit on executive
power if he did not think the Constitution compelled it. Yet Hamilton consistently acknowl-
edged-most plainly in his 1793 Pacificus essay-that the decision to go to war lay with Con-
gress. See Parts IV.1B and IV.C (discussing Hamilton's views).
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"declare war" was used in the eighteenth century.9 It is, moreover,
what today we most immediately associate with "declaring" war, espe-
cially in the constitutional sense. When we speak of times that the
United States has "declared war," we refer to times that the United
States has issued a formal proclamation announcing war, as done dur-
ing World War I and World War II; when we speak of "undeclared"
wars we mean conflicts such as the Korean War, where no such formal
proclamation was promulgated. Accordingly, it is important to exam-
ine closely the role the formal proclamation of war played at the time
the Constitution was drafted.
As set forth below, eighteenth-century theoretical writers did not
agree upon the role of the formal announcement of war (which they
variously called a "proclamation" or "denunciation" as well as a "dec-
laration") in international law. Their views fall into three categories:
(a) that it was prerequisite to commencing hostilities, (b) that it was
necessary to invoke the legal state of war, or (c) that it served as an
optional medium for the notification and justification of (often-
preexisting) conflict. While each of these views appears in theoretical
writing, only the last view described the actual practice, and thus can
be called a common or ordinary meaning.
A. Grotius and the Seventeenth Century
We may begin with Hugo Grotius, the great Dutch writer of the
seventeenth century. Grotius, who wrote his leading work, De Jure
Belli et Pacis,9 in Latin more than 150 years before the framing of the
Constitution, might seem too remote from the Framers to offer any
clear guidance as to their meaning. But Grotius is important for at
least three reasons. First, he has been called "the founder of modem
international law," and though this may overstate his work's novelty,
he certainly was recognized as a preeminent figure in the field. In
particular, the international law writers of the eighteenth century saw
95 See Vattel, Law of Nations at 315 (cited in note 8) ("[W]e owe this further regard to
humanity, and especially to the lives and peace of the subjects, to declare to that unjust nation, or
its chiet that we are at length going to have recourse to the last remedy, and make use of open
force, for the purpose of bringing him to reason. This is called declaring war.").
96 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace [De Jure Belli et Pacis] (M.W. 1682) (William
Evats, trans) (originally published 1625).
97 William Holdsworth, for example, calls Grotius the "founder of modem international
law" and says that "publication in 1625 of the De Jure Belli et Pacis marks the beginning of mod-
em international law." William Holdsworth, 5 A History of English Law 54-55 (Little, Brown
1924). As Holdsworth notes, Grotius had intellectual roots in the prior writing of Francisco de
Vitoria and Alberico Gentili, though neither of these authors had received the wide reception
Grotius did. On Grotius's influence generally, see Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the
Study of International Relations, in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, eds,
Hugo Grotius and International Relations 65 (Clarendon 1990).
1570 [69:1543
Textualism and War Powers
him as an intellectual forefather, and often defined their views by
comparison to his. Second, Grotius was widely read and cited in eight-
eenth-century America, despite his temporal and physical remote-
ness."3 Third, he offered an interpretation of the formal declaration of
war that forms an important element in the textual case for presiden-
tial war powers.99
Grotius's view was that war "must be publickly declared; yea so
publickly, that both parties may have equal knowledge thereof... : to
exercise Hostility without denouncing War or requiring satisfaction, is
not done like a Christian, nor allowable by the Law of Nations."'' 9 In
support Grotius relied heavily on Roman practice. The Romans had
(at least in theory) an elaborate ritual for beginning war, by which
heralds or "feciales" were sent to make demands upon and announce
war to neighboring states. 1 Grotius, writing at a time when recovering
Roman knowledge was much in vogue, held up their wisdom in
warmaking as guidance to his own time.
Grotius carefully rejected the idea that the formal declaration
was required by a sense of chivalry or fair play (which might be re-
garded as a medieval, and hence outdated, concept). The point was not
to allow the enemy time to prepare, but rather to make plain the sov-
ereign authority by which war was made: "[T]he true reason [for a for-
mal declaration] is to remonstrate unto all Nations, That the War is
made not rashly or upon any private ends, but with the Consent and
Approbation of both Nations, or at least of those who have the Su-
preme Power on both sides."'' 9 This was to distinguish the actions of
"Pyrats and Robbers" whose actions did not have the endorsement of
any sovereign; as Grotius quoted a Roman authority: "They are ene-
mies ... against whom we publickly denounce War, or who do the like
against us; the rest are but Pyrats and Robbers."'' 9
The difference between authorized and unauthorized force was
of enormous importance. As far back as St. Augustine, the idea of "just
war" held that war to be lawful must be "waged for a just cause" and
"waged on the authority of a prince."'' 9 As Professor G.I.A.D. Draper
93 On Grotius's influence in eighteenth-century America, see Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 689 &
n 74 (cited in note 1), and sources cited therein.
99 Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 206-07 (cited in note 2) (citing and quoting Grotius).
100 Grotius, Rights of War at 452 (cited in note 96).
101 See G.I.A.D. Draper, Grotius' Place in the Development of Legal Ideas about War, in
Bull, Kingsbury, and Roberts, eds, Hugo Grotius and International Relations 177,177-79 (cited in
note 97) (discussing Roman practice and its influence on Grotius).
102 See Grotius, Rights of War at 450,452 (cited in note 96) (citing such Roman authors as
Cicero and Livy); id at 455-56 (citing other Roman authors).
103 Grotius, Rights of War at 454 (cited in note 96).
104 Id at 450.
105 Draper, Legal Ideas about War at 180 (cited in note 101). See M.H. Keen, The Laws of
War in the Late Middle Ages 65-67 (RoutIedge & Kegan Paul 1965) (discussing the influence of
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summarizes, "If a war were just in this sense ... then it could not only
legitimize acts that would otherwise have been criminal-e.g. killing as
an act of war, as opposed to brigandage-but also confer on such acts
legal consequences, including, for example, legal title to a ransom for a
prisoner."'O' But, Professor Draper continues, despite lip service to the
idea of just cause, the sovereign authority became the only material
component:
By the late Middle Ages a war waged on the authority of the
prince (although there might be much legal debate about which
princes had that right), was presumed to be a 'just war' . ... The
prince being sovereign, it followed that in practice there was no
other authority to pass judgement upon the 'wrong' alleged by
the prince who declared the war. The only practical standard of
justice to be applied was that the war had been levied on the
authority of a prince. 'O
Thus a private act of hostilities without sovereign imprimatur was
not properly war and was not protected by the laws of war, while
sovereign-authorized violence was entitled to legal protection. ' But
as Professor Draper also points out, "[a] difficult legal question was
determining whether such a prince had indeed authorized an act of
war," especially as this period represented "a phase in the gradual
transition from warfare seen as a form of private commercium by
military personnel to the idea of war as a public military service in a
sovereign's army.' ' °
Grotius, adopting Roman tradition, argued that the formal decla-
ration provided the sovereign imprimatur. He described the Roman
ceremony of declaring war, saying "[the ceremony] being done, it was
lawful for them to kill and spoil."" On this basis he concluded, for ex-
ample, that in a "solemn" (that is, formally declared) war a person who
"doth thus injure his Enemy, though he be apprehended in another
Princes Dominion[,]" cannot "be proceeded against as an Homicide,
thinkers such as Augustine, Isidore, and Cicero).
106 Draper, Legal Ideas about War at 182 (cited in note 101).
107 Id at 183. Specifically, Professor Draper discusses the writings of Balthazar Ayala and
Alberico Gentili. See id at 189-90. See, for example, Balthazar Ayala, 2 De Jure et Officiis Bellicis
et Disciplina Militari Libri 111 9 (Carnegie Institution of Washington 1912) (John Pawley Bate,
trans) (originally published 1582) (concluding that a war duly authorized on both sides should be
viewed as just on both sides); Alberico Gentili, 2 De lure Belli Libri Tres 15-21 (Oxford 1933)
(John C. Rolfe, trans) (originally published 1612) (concluding that the legal status of war is unre-
lated to its cause, so long as it is authorized by the sovereign).
108 Draper, Legal Ideas about War at 182-84 (cited in note 101) (describing the rise of sov-
ereign authority and decline of private roles in war); Keen, Laws of War at 78-81 (cited in note
105) (same).
109 Draper, Legal Ideas about War at 183-84 (cited in note 101).
110 Grotius, Rights of War at 456 (cited in note 96).
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or as a Thief" for "[by the Law of Arms all things are lawfull.'.' In
short, the effect of a "just and solemn war" -by which Grotius meant
a formally declared war"2-is a "license and impunity" to injure the
enemy in ways that would be considered criminal in peacetime.
13
In describing his view of the specific laws of war in subsequent
sections, Grotius was careful to say, in each case, that these laws apply
only to what he called a "just" or "solemn"-that is, formally de-
clared-war. He wrote, for example, of the "Right to things taken in
War" that "[b]esides the license that a just War gives to commit such
acts [in other words, violence] against men,.., there is also another ef-
fect, which by the Law of Nations is proper to a solemn War" which is
that "those things may be acquired by a just War, which are, either
equivalent to that, which though due, cannot otherwise be obtained; or
which causes them to suffer who have done wrong."114 In short, war au-
thorized seizure of enemy property, but only if it was a "just" -that is,
formally declared-war.
The reason, again, was that sovereign approval manifested by the
formal declaration made legal what otherwise would have been illegal.
Samuel Pufendorf, another seventeenth-century writer who closely
followed Grotius on many points, argued that the difference was be-
tween a formal war "conducted on each side by the authority of the
supreme sovereignty of a state" and informal hostilities which were
not announced by previous notice and were more in the nature of a
"freebooting expedition.' For Pufendorf, as for Grotius, the key was
sovereign authorization, and the formal declaration (or "proclama-
tion" to Pufendorf) was needed to show that authorization. As an
eighteenth-century commentator on Grotius observed, in Grotius's
view "the great necessity for a declaration, is that there may be un-
doubted evidence, that the war proceeds from a sovereign power."
1 6
Or as Professor Yoo summarizes, the formal declaration's "primary
function was to trigger the international laws of war, which would
111 Idat457.
112 In this context, Grotius defined "just war" not as a matter of justice, but only whether it
had been declared. See id at 450 (stating that a war is called just "not from the Cause that excites
it, nor from those Heroick Actions that are done in it[,]" but from whether it is commenced with
due formalities). This point follows from the idea expressed previously by Ayala and Gentili,
among others, that there is no authority to assess the "justness" of a war between equal sover-
eigns. See note 107.
113 Grotius, Rights of War at 457 (cited in note 96).
114 Id at 468. See also id at 481 (discussing the rights over captives "taken in a solemn
War").
115 Samuel Pufendorf; 2 De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo 1300 (Clarendon 1934)
(C.H. and W.A. Oldfather, trans) (originally published 1688).
116 Robert Ward, An Enquiry into the Manner in which the Different Wars in Europe Have
Commenced, During the Last Two Centuries, 61-62 (G.Woodfall 1805).
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Grotius's view suffered from two insuperable difficulties, one
practical and one theoretical. As a practical matter, Grotius simply did
not describe the world around him. Something like the Grotian ideal
may have existed in earlier times,"" but in any event by the seven-
teenth century the pre-hostilities formalities were becoming rare. Mat-
thew Hale, a leading English treatise writer well known in America,
wrote:
A general war is of two kinds: 1. Bellum solemniter denunciatum,
or bellum non solemniter denunciatum; the former sort of war is,
when war is solemnly declared or proclaimed by our king against
another prince or state .... A war that is non solemniter denuncia-
turn is, when two nations slip suddenly into war without any so-
lemnity, and this ordinarily happeneth among us.19
Hale's example was Spain's abortive 1588 invasion of England, which
was launched without a formal declaration being made on either
side.n Similarly, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, writing in the early
eighteenth century, found Grotius unrealistic, as in practice "[w]ar
may begin by a declaration, but it may also begin by mutual hostili-
ties."12'1 Bynkershoek pointed to the undeclared Spanish-Dutch war of
the late sixteenth century, and also to Sweden's undeclared attack on
the forces of the Holy Roman Emperor during the Thirty Years War,
roughly contemporaneous with Grotius's writing.'9
Of course, Grotius never claimed that undeclared wars did not
happen, only that they did not create a legal state of war differentiated
from piracy. But this too had no basis in seventeenth- (or eighteenth-)
century reality. True, pirates and similar unauthorized forces were
117 Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 242 (cited in note 2).
118 See Hallett, Lost Art at 61-95 (cited in note 34) (discussing early practice).
119 Matthew Hale, 1 The History of the Pleas of the Crown [Historia Placitorum Coronae]
162-63 (E. Rider 1800) (originally published 1672). Hale's influence in America is noted in Ber-
nard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 30 (Belknap 1992). See also
Charles Molloy, 1 De Jure Maritimo et Navali, Treatise of Affairs Maritime and of Commerce 7
(T.Waller 9th ed 1769) (using parallel language to describe the prevalence of wars begun without
formal declaration). Professor William Hall, a leading internationalist of the nineteenth century,
cited Molloy approvingly and agreed that "[m]ost of the wars of the seventeenth century began
without declaration, though in some cases declarations were issued during their continuance"
William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law 446-47 & n I (Clarendon 8th ed 1924) (A.
Pearce Higgins, ed).
120 Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at 162-63 (cited in note 119). See also Molloy, 1 DeJure Mari-
timo at 7 (cited in note 119) (also relying on the Spanish invasion as a key example of war begun
without formalities).
121 Cornelius van Bynkershoek, 2 Quaestionum Juris Publici Libri Duo 19 (Clarendon
1930) (Tenney Frank, trans) (originally published 1737).
122 See id at 21-25.
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treated harshly and not in accordance with the laws of war. But where
sovereign authorization was manifest, the applicability of the rights of
war did not turn on the presence of a formal declaration. As Bynker-
shoek argued in his critique of Grotius, it simply was not the case that
nations applied the laws of war only in formally declared wars, and
applied the laws of piracy otherwise. Bynkershoek, who was Dutch,
was most familiar with examples from Dutch history, and in particular
the struggle between the United Provinces and Spain that occupied
much of the early seventeenth century. That conflict, he pointed out,
was never formally declared, and yet the laws of war (as described by
Grotius) were applied by both combatants, as even Grotius acknowl-
edged. m
Hale's treatise makes the same point. Though war may often not
be solemnly declared, such a conflict constituted "a real, tho not sol-
emn war"; as a result,
to prove a nation to be in enmity to England, or to prove a per-
son to be an alien enemy, there is no necessity of showing any war
proclaimed, but it may be averred, and so put upon trial by the
country, whether there was a war or not.'
As an example, Hale cited a case from the 1580s, when England
had been at war with Spain; as Hale recounted, the defense turned
upon the existence of war and, in Hale's words, the defense's "plea
was ruled good, tho he [the defendant] shewed not, that any war was
proclaimed between the two realms" since "in very deed there was a
state of war between the crowns of England and Spain, and the Span-
iards were actual enemies, especially after the attempt of invasion in
[15]88 by the Spanish Armada, and yet there was no war declared or
proclaimed between the two crowns."'2' From this and similar cases
Hale concludes "that a state of war may be between two kingdoms
without any proclamation or indiction thereof or other matter of re-
cord to prove it."1'2 Accordingly, if a case turns upon it, "whether there
were a war between the king of England and [another] prince ... is
purely a question of fact and triable by the jury.' '
123 Id at 18-53 (discussing the laws of war); id at 82-85 (in discussing neutral rights, describ-
ing Grotius's reliance on a case from the undeclared Dutch-Spanish war).
124 Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at 162 (cited in note 119).
125 Id at 163.
126 Id.
127 Id at 163. Hale's immediate point was proof of treason, which among other things con-
sisted of adhering to the king's enemies in wartime, and thus called for a determination of when
war existed. The idea that the legal state of war was triggered by hostilities rather than purely by
the declaration continued through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See Hall, Interna-
tional Law at 81 (cited in note 119) ("When differences between states reach a point at which
both parties resort to force, or one of them does acts of violence which the other chooses to look
upon as a breach of the peace, the relation of war is set up, in which the combatants may use
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In short, Grotius described an ideal world with little basis in sev-
enteenth-century reality. In practice, a formal declaration of war might
be useful in deciding whether a legal state of war existed, but it was
not necessary to the existence of a legal state of war. But even as a
theoretical matter, Grotius's view had enormous drawbacks. Grotius
stated a commonplace in saying that war required assent of the sover-
eign, and that sovereign direction distinguished war from homicide
and piracy. But this hardly showed that a formal declaration was
necessary. The formal declaration made sovereign authority plain, but
sovereign authority could also be manifested in other ways. Grotius
set up a dichotomy between formally declared, sovereign authorized
war, on the one hand, and unauthorized piracy on the other; the laws
of war applied to one and the criminal law applied to the other. This
dichotomy was seriously incomplete, for it took no account of a war
obviously begun with sovereign approval, but not formally declared.
Even in Grotius's theoretical world, it made no sense to treat partici-
pants in an authorized but undeclared war as pirates, for the very
definition of piracy was unauthorized violence.'2
A new generation of international law writers soon pointed this
out. Bynkershoek was the first to take the point on directly: "[I]f two
sovereigns are engaged in hostilities without having declared war, can
we have any doubt that war is being waged according to the will of
both? In that case there can be no need of a declaration, since it is be-
ing waged publicly and needs no proof."'  Jean Jacques Burlamaqui,
another leading writer of the first half of the eighteenth century,
agreed:
With respect to the reasons why a solemn denunciation was re-
quired into such a war, as by the law of nations is called just;
Grotius pretends it was, that the people might be assured, that
the war was not undertaken by private authority, but by the con-
sent of one or other of the nations, or of their sovereigns. But this
regulated violence against each other .... ); Henry Wheaton, Elements ofInternational Law 214
(De Capo 1972) (originally published 1836) ("[N]o declaration, or other notice to the enemy, of
the existence of war, is necessary, in order to legalize hostilities, and [] the property of the enemy
is, in general, liable to seizure and confiscation as prize of war... '); id at 212 ("A contest by
force between independent sovereign states is called a public war. If it is declared in form, or
duly commenced, it entitles both the belligerent parties to all the rights of war against each
other.") (emphasis added).
128 See Draper, Legal Ideas about War at 180-84 (cited in note 101) (showing that
Augustine, Aquinas, and subsequent thinkers required war be waged on sovereign authority).
129 See Samuel Johnson, 2 A Dictionary of the English Language (Arno 1979) (originally
published by W. Strahan 1755) ("War may be defined as the exercise of violence under sovereign
command .... Violence, limited by authority, is sufficiently distinguished from robbery, and like
outrages.") (defining "war" and quoting Walter Raleigh).
130 Bynkershoek, 2 Quaestionum Juris Publici at 21 (cited in note 121).
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reason of Grotius's seems insufficient; for are we more assured,
that the war is made by public authority, when a herald for in-
stance comes to declare it with certain ceremonies, than we
should be, when we see an army upon our frontiers, commanded
by a principal person of the state, and ready to enter our coun-
try?
13'
Similarly, Thomas Rutherforth, the leading eighteenth-century
English commentator on Grotius, emphasized that the difference be-
tween lawful combatants on one hand and pirates on the other was
that one had sovereign authorization and the other did not. Grotius
maintained that sovereign authorization could only come from a for-
mal declaration, but, Rutherforth said, that was plainly untrue:
But even this effect [Grotius's "impunity and license"] may be
produced ... without a declaration of war. For in the less solemn
kinds of war, what the members do, who act under the particular
direction and authority of their nation, is by the law of nations no
personal crime in them: they cannot therefore be punished con-
sistently with this law for any act, in which it considers them only
as the instruments, and the nation as the agent.'n
As Burlamaqui, Bynkershoek, and Rutherforth suggest, Grotius's
concerns about clarifying the sovereign authority of a military expedi-
tion were largely outdated even as Grotius wrote them, and had little
place in the eighteenth century at all. In earlier times a fair bit of hos-
tility among nations was carried on by quasi-private forces with quasi-
sovereign authority-consider, for example, the sixteenth-century
voyages of the English buccaneers against the Spanish.'33 In such times
a fine line separated the pirate from the patriot, and Grotius's atten-
tion to clarifying the sovereign authority of a hostile act made sense.
But the seventeenth century-and even more so the eighteenth cen-
tury-was an era of nation-states and national armies, and most hostil-
ity was conducted by regular armies and navies rather than freelanc-
ers.LO To take one of Bynkershoek's examples, Sweden's army attacked
the forces of the Holy Roman Empire without declaration upon Swe-
den's entry into the Thirty Years War, but there could have been no
doubt as to the sovereign authority behind the attack, since Sweden's
king Gustavus Adolphus led the army in person.f Nor could anyone
131 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, 2 The Principles of Natural and Politic Law 189 (Cambridge
1807) (Thomas Nugent, trans).
132 Rutherforth, 2 Institutes at 580 (cited in note 65).
133 See Harry Kelsey, Sir Francis Drake: The Queen's Pirate 40-67 (Yale 1998).
134 See Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason 14-18 (Atheneum
1988) (discussing the regularization of military forces in the eighteenth century).
135 Bynkershoek, 2 Quaestionum Juris Publici at 24 (cited in note 121).
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mistake the eighteenth-century Prussian army for a group of pirates,
even when Frederick the Great invaded his neighbors without formal
declaration.'7 Under these circumstances, it became increasingly diffi-
cult to maintain that a formal declaration was necessary to show sov-
ereign authorization.
B. The Formal Declaration in Eighteenth-Century Theory
As described above, Grotius's view of the formal declaration had
no basis in the realities even of his own time, and by the eighteenth
century it had come under withering theoretical attack from first
Bynkershoek and then Burlamaqui and Rutherforth. To Bynkershoek
and Rutherforth, at least, Grotius's theoretical incoherence was suffi-
cient reason to abandon the formal declaration altogether. But an-
other group of writers, led by Burlamaqui, shifted the focus of the
formal declaration to preserve its status as prerequisite to war. The
point, they said, was not to make known the sovereign endorsement of
war (which could be done in other ways, as Bynkershoek and Ruther-
forth pointed out), but to serve as a demand upon an erring nation to
cease giving injury or face armed attack.
Burlamaqui began by saying that a just war could only be made
in defense, or "to obtain satisfaction for the damages, we have injuri-
ously sustained, and to force those, who did the injury, to give security
for their good behaviour."'M7 Further, war was a last resort: "[W]e
ought not to have recourse to force; but when we can employ no
milder method of recovering our right.' 39 So far, he largely tracked
Grotius's views'4 But then he tied these points directly to the formal
declaration:
[I]f after having used all our endeavours to terminate differences
in an amicable manner, their remains no further hope, and we are
absolutely constrained to undertake a war, we ought first to de-
clare it in form.... [P]rudence and natural equity equally require,
that, before we take up arms against any state, we should try all
amicable methods to avoid coming to such an extremity. We
136 Duffy, Military Experience at 151-88 (cited in note 134) (discussing Frederick's
campaigning style); Maurice, Hostilities at 22 (cited in note 35) (discussing Frederick's wars
against Austria and Saxony).
137 See Bynkershoek, 2 Quaestionum Juris Publici at 21 (cited in note 121) ("[T]he argu-
ments by which they [including Grotius] generally support the requirement of such a declaration
are of no worth. Grotius disapproves of the one offered by Gentili, but his own argument ... if
not worse is at least very poor."); Rutherforth, 2 Institutes at 576-80 (cited in note 65) (question-
ing Grotius).
138 See Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 163 (cited in note 131).
139 Id at 184.
140 See Draper, Legal Ideas about War at 194-97 (cited in note 101) (discussing Grotius's
ideas on the just causes for war).
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ought then to summon him, who has injured us, to make a speedy
satisfaction, that we may see whether he will not have regard to
himselt and not put us to the hard necessity of pursuing our right
by force of arms.
14
1
Burlamaqui's justification for the formal declaration was picked up by
the leading German internationalist, Christian Wolff, shortly after
mid-century. Wolff began by saying that the "declaration" should
really just be called an "announcement" since declaration might imply
an unnecessary level of formality.
Since a declaration or announcement of war is made with the
purpose that the other party may understand that we have de-
termined on war against him and for what reason that has been
done, consequently nothing else is required than that this should
come to the notice of the other; the method of announcing the
war will naturally depend upon the will of the one announcing it,
nor does it require special solemnities.1
2
But whatever the form, Wolff was clear that some announcement
was required prior to hostilities:
[W]e must not resort to this remedy [in other words, war], which
is especially to be avoided, because it draws after it a great mass
of evils for each of the belligerent parties, as long as there is even
the least hope that without it we can acquire what we are striving
to acquire by force of arms; it is therefore necessary that we
should indicate that we are going to bring war upon another, in
order that, before there may be a resort to arms, he can offer fair
conditions for peace, and thus war may be avoided. "
Emmerich de Vattel, the international law writer best known to
the Framers, made similar points. He began by emphasizing that war
can only be made in a just cause, to remedy an injury:
The right of making war belongs to nations only as a remedy
against injustice: it is the offspring of unhappy necessity. This
remedy is so dreadful in its effects, so destructive to mankind, so
grievous even to the party who had recourse to it, that unques-
tionably the law of nature allows of it only in the last extremity, -
141 Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 187 (cited in note 131). See also id at 189 ("[T]he principal
end of a declaration of war ... is to let all the world know, that there was just reason to take up
arms, and to signify to the enemy himself; that it had been, and still was, in his power to avoid
it.").
142 Christian Wolff 2 Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum 365 (Clarendon 1934)
(Joseph H. Drake, trans) (originally published 1764).
143 Id at 367.
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that is to say, when every other expedient proves ineffectual for
the maintenance of justice.'"
Accordingly, said Vattel, a nation must have suffered an injury
from another, and "a reasonable satisfaction have been denied" by the
latter."5 At that point, in his view, the injured nation had the right to
resort to war, but only upon making a formal declaration, for:
[a]s it is possible that the present fear of our arms may make an
impression on the mind of our adversary, and induce him to do us
justice,-we owe this further regard to humanity, and especially
to the lives and peace of the subjects, to declare to that unjust na-
tion, or its chief, that we are at length going to have recourse to
the last remedy, and make use of open force, for the purpose of
bringing him to reason. This is called declaring war."
The key to the Burlamaqui/WolfflVattel view of the formal decla-
ration was that it gave the opposing party a chance to offer compensa-
tion without fighting; as in Grotius's view, the purpose of the formal
declaration was not to give the other party a fair chance to prepare to
fight. In Wolff's words, "war is not announced for the purpose that you
may not assail another who is unprepared."4 Further, "war is to be
announced with no other purpose than that the opposing party can
avoid it by the offer of fair conditions of peace."'" Thus "it is not to be
doubted that an announcement of war can be made by one who has
already advanced with his army to the boundaries of the territory of
the opposing party."'49
In short, Burlamaqui, Wolff, and Vattel saw war (properly con-
ducted) as a system of justice providing a remedy for nations injured
by another sovereign. The formal declaration of war was a key part of
this "judicial" system, since war was permitted only as a last resort:
The formal declaration was the final warning, required before hostili-
ties could be commenced, to assure that the last resort was indeed
necessary. In this way they preserved Grotius's requirement of a for-
144 Vattel, Law of Nations at 314 (cited in note 8).
145 Id.
146 Id at 315.
147 Wolff 2 Jus Gentium at 370 (cited in note 142). Vattel makes the same point in almost
the same language. See Vattel, Law of Nations at 317 (cited in note 8) ("The law of nations does
not impose the obligation of declaring war, with a view to give the enemy time to prepare for an
unjust defence."). Burlamaqui less conclusively said that "we ought not to commit acts of hostil-
ity immediately upon declaring war, but should wait ... until he, who has done us the injury,
plainly refuses to give us satisfaction," although he thought such restraint was required only "so
long at least, as we can without doing ourselves a prejudice." Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 187-88
(cited in note 131).
148 Wolff 2 Jus Gentium at 370 (cited in note 142).
149 Id.
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mal declaration, while investing it with a new rationale to shield it
from Bynkershoek's critique."*
Though Burlamaqui, Wolff, and Vattel were arguably the three
leading internationalists of their day, their view could hardly be said to
represent a new consensus. First, it did not even persuade all interna-
tional law writers. Bynkershoek's work remained a powerful rejection
of the whole idea of the necessity of formal declarations, although he
had written before Burlamaqui began to reconceptualize the formal
declaration and thus did not address the new arguments. But even
some late eighteenth-century writers-in particular the English inter-
nationalist Rutherforth and his compatriot Richard Lee-rejected the
idea of a formal declaration being in any sense required.151
Second, legalists like Burlamaqui, Wolff, and Vattel described a
theoretical world wholly divorced from the reality of eighteenth-
century power relations. European war in the eighteenth century was
not primarily about pursuing redress for injuries, but about territorial
expansion, commercial advantage, and domestic security from over-
powerful neighbors. Though nations often ascribed their aggression to
real or imagined slights, there can be little doubt, for example, that the
War of Spanish Succession was (on the coalition side) primarily about
preventing France from dominating Europe; that the War of Austrian
Succession was (on the Prussian side) primarily about making territo-
rial gains at the expense of Austria and (on the English side) about
keeping Austria as a balance to Prussian ambition; and that the Seven
Years' War (in its Franco-British dimension) was about control of co-
lonial empires, especially in North America.n
In this world the formal declaration as Burlamaqui, Wolff and
Vattel described it had little place. If war was not really about righting
a wrong, there was little point in a prior statement of the wrong, which
would do little but betray one's plans and goals prematurely. Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, in the real world (as opposed to the world of the
treatise writers) formal declarations almost never preceded the com-
mencement of hostilities. As noted, Hale, Molloy, and Bynkershoek
150 The rationale was not really new, in that it formed at least part of the rationale of the
ancient Roman system. See Vattel, Law of Nations at 315 (cited in note 8) (interpreting Roman
practice as designed to give an enemy a chance to offer satisfaction).
151 Rutherforth, 2 Institutes at 577 (cited in note 65) ("The only real effect of a declaration
of war is, that it makes the war a general one, or a war of one whole nation against another whole
nation"); Richard Lee, A Treatise of Captures in War 11-34 (W. Clarke & Sons 2d ed 1803). Lee,
relying heavily on Bynkershoek and Rutherforth, concluded that "it does not appear, by the law
of nations, that a solemn declaration of war is absolutely requisite," while noting that princes of-
ten do it voluntarily from a "greatness of mind.' Id at 19.
152 See Duffy, Military Experience at 319-26 (cited in note 134) (appendix describing princi-
pal wars and campaigns during the Age of Reason). See generally J.R. Hale, War and Society in
Renaissance Europe 1450-1620 (St. Martin's 1985); Michael Howard, War in European History
(Oxford 1976).
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recorded the rarity of the pre-hostilities declaration in the seventeenth
century;" it became, if anything, rarer still in the eighteenth. Ward and
Maurice, who each compiled exhaustive lists of eighteenth-century
conflicts, concluded that no more than three or four were declared in
advance."4 Of the three most important wars of the mid-eighteenth
century-the war of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War, and
the Anglo-French conflict associated with the American Revolution-
none was declared in advance." In sum, the Burlamaqui/WolfflVattel
view was as removed from actual practice as was that of Grotius.
The Burlamaqui/WolfffVattel view, by reconceiving the formal
declaration, also created a new theoretical problem. If the formal dec-
laration was not about showing sovereign authorization, there was less
justification for applying the laws of war to declared conflicts but not
to undeclared conflicts, as Grotius had urged. On the other hand, if the
formal declaration was not required to trigger the legal protections of
the laws of war, there was even less incentive for rulers to embrace it.
Grotius's system at least provided a penalty for failure to declare (or
at least, it would have provided a penalty, had domestic legal systems
treated undeclared wars the way he said they should). Burlamaqui's
system even in theory lacked comparable sanctions.
The eighteenth-century advocates of formal declarations dealt
with this problem in three ways. Burlamaqui, generally the most criti-
cal of Grotius, flatly rejected Grotius's conclusion as to the conse-
quences of a failure to declare. Following his discussion of the laws of
war, Burlamaqui wrote: "These are the rights, which war gives us over
the effects of the enemy. But Grotius pretends, that the right, by which
we acquire things taken in war, is so proper and peculiar to a solemn
war, declared in form, that it has no force in others.""" This, however,
was to Burlamaqui unwarranted; he extended the laws of war to all
contests, even civil wars, except those involving actual pirates."1 In
short, Burlamaqui, while requiring a formal declaration as a matter of
the law of nations, did not admit of any immediate practical conse-
quences of failing to issue one.
Wolff maintained the idea that the rights of war applied only in
just wars, not in unjust wars.'58 (By "just" he meant not merely
153 See notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
154 See generally Maurice, Hostilities (cited in note 35);Ward, Enquiry (cited in note 116).
155 See generally Maurice, Hostilities (cited in note 35); Ward, Enquiry (cited in note 116).
Richard Lee's mid-eighteenth-century treatise similarly concluded that wars frequently began
without formal declarations. See Lee, Captures in War at 29-32 (cited in note 151) (citing exam-
pies, including the crucial example of the Seven Years' War).
156 Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 209 (cited in note 131).
157 See id at 209-10.
158 Wolfn 2 Jus Gentium at 402 (cited in note 142) ("He who wages an unjust war has no
right in war.").
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formally declared, but also undertaken for good cause.) 9 But, he said,
as a practical matter the international community must deem all wars
just on both sides, leaving the judgment of the justice of a war to the
sovereigns involved. Thus all combatants enjoyed equally the rights of
a just war.O As with Burlamaqui, this would seem to produce no legal
effects of failing to issue a formal declaration.
Vattel is a more complicated case. Initially, he appears to follow
Grotius:
Thus, when a nation, or a sovereign, has declared war against an-
other sovereign on account of a difference arisen between them,
their war is what among nations is called a lawful and formal war;
... Nothing of this kind is the case in an informal and illegitimate
war, which is more properly called depredation. Undertaken
without any right, without even an apparent cause, it can be pro-
ductive of no lawful effect, nor give any right to the author of it.
A nation attacked by such sort of enemies is not under any obli-
gation to observe towards them the rules prescribed in formal
warfare. She may treat them as robbers.""1
Like Grotius, Vattel thereby appears to set up a sharp dichotomy
between formally declared wars and piracy:
Legitimate and formal warfare must be carefully distinguished
from those illegitimate and informal wars, or rather predatory
expeditions, undertaken either without lawful authority or with-
out apparent cause, as likewise without the usual formalities, and
solely with a view to plunder.... Such were the enterprises of the
grands compagnies which had assembled in France during the
wars with the English,-armies of banditti, who ranged about
Europe, purely for spoil and plunder: such were the cruises of the
buccaneers, without commission, and in time of peace; and such
in general are the depredations of pirates.'6'
Therefore, Vattel, like Grotius, does not have a way to deal with wars
undertaken for strategic reasons (or other reasons beyond mere rob-
bery) under clear sovereign authority, but without formal declaration.
159 See id at 42 ("[Tlhere is no just cause of war unless a wrong has been done or threat-
ened.").
160 See id at 454-56 (describing war considered just on both sides). Hall echoed Wolff's
point a century later:. "[B]oth parties to every war are regarded as being in an identical legal po-
sition, and consequently as being possessed of equal rights." Hall, International Law at 82 (cited
in note 119).
161 Vattel, Law of Nations at 320 (cited in note 8). See also id at 319 ("A war in due form is
also called a regular war, because certain rules, either prescribed by the law of nature, or adopted
by custom, are observed in it.").
162 Id at 319.
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In his discussion of formal war, Vattel finessed the point: All his exam-
ples of affairs that were not "legitimate and formal war" were situa-
tions in which sovereign authority was either unclear or plainly lack-
ing. Vattel did not say how he would handle undeclared but plainly au-
thorized war. In working out the details, though, Vattel approached
the matter differently from Grotius, suggesting that he (like Wolff and
Burlamaqui) thought that the rights of war turned on sovereign au-
thorization, not upon the formal declaration. Grotius, it will be re-
called, carefully prefaced his discussion of each specific right of war by
saying that this was a right that obtained in a formally declared war.16
Vattel, on the other hand, defined the laws of war as relating to "bel-
ligerents" or "enemies," which in turn he defined in a way that did not
depend upon formal declaration. The enemy, he said, is simply "he
with whom a nation is at open war."1" The laws of war, he said, permit
us to seize property from "the enemy"-so that the right of seizure
does not appear to turn on a formal declaration.
In any event, the legal systems of the eighteenth century, as in the
seventeenth century, did not treat the participants in undeclared wars
as pirates. Rutherforth and Lee, who followed Bynkershoek in reject-
ing the required declaration, emphasized that in practice the declara-
tion was not necessary to invoke the laws of war. Rutherforth, for ex-
ample, followed English practice in denying that a formally declared
war "produces any effects of right, by a purely positive law of nations,
which other public wars will not produce."1'6  Nothing occurred in
eighteenth-century jurisprudence that would call into question Mat-
thew Hale's conclusion of a century earlier, namely that while a legal
state of war might be established by the existence of a formal declara-
tion, it might also be established by actions taken by the contending
sides.7 Rather, English courts adhered to the view that hostilities cre-
ated a state of war, as reflected in a leading 1779 decision:
163 See Part II.A.
164 Vattel, Law of Nations at 321 (cited in note 8).
165 Id at 364 ("We have a right to deprive our enemy of his possessions.").
166 See Rutherforth, 2 Institutes at 577 (cited in note 65). See also Lee, Captures in War at
64-77 (cited in note 151) (discussing the right to seize an enemy's goods during war without sug-
gesting that the presence or absence of a final declaration affected the matter). Lee said of the
formal declaration: "[w]hether these methods are observed or not, yet, if defacto there be a war
between princes, they and their subjects are in a state of hostility; and they are in the condition of
enemies to each other," and in any case "these solemnities are now, for the most part, anti-
quated." Id at 17. And, as Lee asked rhetorically, "What is, or ever was, the difference between a
war declared and not declared?" Id at 14.
167 See notes 119-28 and accompanying text. Professor Yoo relies on Blackstone as import-
ing the Grotian ideal into eighteenth-century English law. See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 205-07 (cited
in note 2). But Blackstone seems highly ambiguous. He followed Grotius in saying that a formal
declaration served to distinguish between wars conducted under sovereign authority and acts of
private piracy. See Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *249-50 (cited in note 70) (citing Grotius ex-
plicitly). However, he softened Grotius's language somewhat, saying only that "a denunciation of
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Where is the difference, whether a war is proclaimed by a Herald
at the Royal Exchange, with his trumpets, and on the Pont Neuf
at Paris, and by reading and affixing a printed paper on public
buildings; or whether war is announced by royal ships, and whole
fleets, at the mouths of cannon? . . . If learned authorities are to
be quoted, Bynkershoek has a whole chapter to prove, from the
history of Europe, that a lawful and perfect state of war may exist
without proclamation."'
C. The Formal Declaration in Eighteenth-Century Practice
The Burlamaqui/Wolff/Vattel view of formal declarations ulti-
mately suffers the same problem as did Grotius's view: It is too re-
mote from practice, since undeclared wars were frequent, and were
fought on the same terms as formally declared wars. This is not to say,
however, that there were no formal declarations of war. In fact, formal
declarations remained fairly common throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury. There simply were few pre-hostilities declarations.'  Further, the
declarations rarely set out conditions for peace, as the legalists would
have them do. Rather, they served purposes that Vattel and Wolff de-
scribed as secondary. They made a "publication" (as Wolff called it) of
the war to subjects and third parties, and frequently contained specific
directions to subjects and third parties of rules to be enforced during
the war. Further, they often recited injuries sustained, not with a view
war ought always to precede the actual commencement of hostilities" so that "it may be certainly
clear that the war is not undertaken by private persons, but by the will of the whole community."
Id at *250. This passage certainly suggests that a declaration might be dispensed withif sovereign
authority was "certainly clear" from another source. For Blackstone the key distinction was sov-
ereign authority: "Whatever hostilities therefore may be committed by private citizens, the state
ought not to be affected thereby; unless [it] should justify their proceedings, and thereby become
partner in the guilt. Such unauthorized voluntiers in violence are not ranked among open ene-
mies, but are treated like pirates and robbers ... " Id at *249. Again, this suggests that duly au-
thorized sovereign agents, even in an undeclared war, would not be treated as robbers and pi-
rates, not being "unauthorized voluntiers in violence." See id.
Blackstone also wrote that "in order to make a war completely effectual, it is necessary with
us in England that it be publicly declared and duly proclaimed by the king's authority; and, then,
all parts of both the contending nations, from the highest to the lowest, are bound by it" Id at
*250. Professor Yoo relies heavily on this passage, Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 205, but the difficulty is
that Blackstone did not specify what he meant by "completely effectual"; his contemporary
Thomas Rutherforth thought this a meaningless phrase. See Rutherforth, 2 Institutes at 576-80
(cited in note 65). In any event, Blackstone nowhere directly contradicted what Hale said in the
previous century: that under English law the legal state of war could be created either by a for-
mal declaration or by a hostile act.
16s The Maria Magdalena, 165 Eng Rep 57,58 (Adm 1779). Wormuth and Fi-mage quote
this passage and conclude that "it has always been possible at British and American law to enter
into war without a formal proclamation ... ."Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War at
19-20 (cited in note 1).
169 See generally Maurice, Hostilities (cited in note 35).
The University of Chicago Law Review
of averting war by settlement (as typically the war had been going for
some time), but with a view to justifying the hostilities to third parties.
As Wolff said:
Now justifying reasons are set forth in declarations of war par-
ticularly for the sake of outsiders, that they may be able to decide
as to the justice of the war; and they are explained for the sake of
subjects, that their complaints concerning the undertaking [of]
the war may be cut off or at least mollified.70
Thus eighteenth-century practice suggests a different and more
modest role of the formal declaration. In theory it could be used to
provide advance notice of war, but in fact it was rarely used that way.
In theory it also could be used to show sovereign approval of hostili-
ties, in order to create (or confirm) a legal state of war, but in fact it
was rarely used that way either, and sovereign authorization was
rarely in doubt as a result of eighteenth-century military practice.
Rather, the formal declaration was used to give notice of the existence
of hostilities, to those who might not otherwise have heard of them,
and as a rhetorical device for explaining the reasons for the war.
Neither of these uses should be dismissed as empty or pointless.
In a century of limited communications the official pronouncement
was an important (and reliable) source of news. A formal declaration
served as a warning to subjects and neutrals of the existence of a state
of war, and thus of the applicability of the international laws of war
(especially those relating to seizure of persons and property). This was
particularly important to international merchants, who would need to
take steps to safeguard ships and cargo. As indicated by practice in the
prize courts, prizes could be taken without a formal declaration, but
the formal declaration made merchants - especially one's own mer-
chants -aware of the risks. Similarly, a formal declaration was a warn-
ing to subjects that treating with the enemy was treason. As Hale's
treatise made clear, treating with the enemy would be treason even
absent a formal declaration, but the formal declaration was useful in
informing subjects of the risks. Conversely, the formal declaration no-
tified one's own subjects that property of the enemy could be seized.
Again, the formal declaration itself was unnecessary to legitimize the
seizure, but it made that legitimacy more widely known. In short, the
formal declaration was a practical convenience-a way of conveying
official notice -but not a legal or practical necessity.
As Wolff's comments indicate, the rhetorical element of the for-
mal declaration might also be useful. Though the eighteenth century
generally had a practical and strategic view of international power re-
170 Wolff, 2 Jus Gentium at 380-81 (cited in note 142).
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lations, rhetorically it remained under the influence of the interna-
tional writers' legalism. Nations often felt the need to justify war in
terms of wrongs done by the other party. Again, given the limited
communication, the formal declaration was a way of showing to citi-
zens and third parties the justness of the war in a communication
likely to attract attention due to its symbolic significance. Thus, formal
declarations often included justifications or lists of outrages commit-
ted by the other side, and frequently asserted that the other side had
begun the hostilities. Although as a practical matter the reasons given
might be pretextual, they might have rhetorical force in rallying sup-
port. Relatedly, as Wolff noted, formal declarations might contain spe-
cific directions or prohibitions aimed at neutrals, or subjects of the
warring states. A formal declaration might state, for example, that cer-
tain goods would be treated as contraband or a certain type of contact
with the enemy would or would not be permitted. These prohibitions
did not flow from the formal declaration itself, but rather were specifi-
cally enunciated by the sovereign authority. As such, they could have
been announced independently from the formal declaration, and
sometimes were, but the formal declaration made a convenient vehi-
cle.
This view of the formal declaration is (unlike the theorists' views)
consistent with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century practice. It ex-
plains why formal declarations were commonly made, but rarely made
prior to the commencement of hostilities, and sometimes not made at
all. Because they were made largely for the convenience of the war-
ring state and its subjects, they were dispensed with or delayed when
issuance would not be convenient for other reasons. However, they
were not abandoned altogether, for they still had some utility. More-
over, they were typically directed at neutrals and subjects rather than
enemies, and were often phrased as recognizing an existing state of
war, usually said to have been begun by the other side.17"
D. Conclusion: The Eighteenth-Century Understanding of the
Formal Declaration
In sum, the eighteenth-century formal declaration of war was a
matter of convenience to the nation that issued it, and not a thing re-
quired to achieve any particular result in international law or practice.
The idea of a formal declaration as prerequisite to war, while appeal-
ing, represented little more than the wishful thinking of a number of
European writers who viewed war legalistically rather than practi-
171 See Hallett, LostArt at 76 (cited in note 34) (describing this practice as the "degenera-
tion of declarations of war from international negotiating instruments to domestic propa-
ganda").
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cally.17 Not even all European internationalists endorsed the view:
Bynkershoek, the great Dutch jurist, was a conspicuous dissenter. In
England, many leading names-including Molloy, Hale, Rutherforth,
and Lee-rejected the idea outright, and Blackstone, while remaining
somewhat ambiguous, did not endorse it directly.'7 More importantly,
practice was flatly against the idea of formal declaration as prerequi-
site, as early Americans well knew. The majority of eighteenth-century
conflicts (including the Anglo-French hostilities accompanying the
American Revolution) began without a formal declaration, though in
many cases a formal declaration was issued during the course of hos-
tilities.' In short, interpreting a formal declaration as a prerequisite to
hostilities would not have seemed a common or reasonable reading to
eighteenth-century Americans.1 75
The same can be said for the second view, principally associated
with Grotius, that the formal declaration was prerequisite to the invo-
cation of the laws of war. Again, some European publicists-notably
Grotius and to some extent Vattel-sought to attach this consequence
to the formal declaration. However, this view enjoyed even less accep-
tance than the idea of formal declaration as prerequisite to hostilities,
as some writers -including Wolff and Burlamaqui- accepted the lat-
ter view but not the former. Again, of critical importance, this view did
not describe ordinary practice in England. As Matthew Hale showed,
English law treated a legal state of war as arising from the fact of hos-
tilities; a formal declaration was evidence that a legal state of war ex-
isted, but it was not prerequisite to a legal state of war. 
76
172 In particular, this was the view of Burlamaqui, Wolff and Vattel. See Part II.B.
173 See notes 119-36,151, 166-67 and accompanying text.
174 See Part II.C.
175 The Framers of the Constitution-and educated Americans generally-no doubt knew
of the declaration-as-prerequisite view. Some, perhaps even a majority, may have privately en-
dorsed it. But without constitutional language explicitly adopting it, there is little ground for em-
bracing it as the natural implication of the constitutional language, since it was not the prevailing
view in practice, nor even the consensus view in theory.
In fact, almost no one among the congressionalist scholars takes the position that a formal
declaration of war necessarily preceded hostilities in the eighteenth century, or that it is constitu-
tionally prerequisite to the commencement of hostilities. The exception is J. Gregory Sidak, who
argues for the formal declaration as a constitutional necessity but without much inquiry into
eighteenth-century meaning. See generally Sidak, 41 Duke L J 27 (cited in note 36). See also
Hallett, Lost Art at 27-57 (cited in note 34) (arguing for a return to the use of formal declara-
tions, more as a matter of political and democratic theory than constitutional law).
176 Professor Yoo, to the extent he reaches a contrary conclusion, relies on three writers:
Grotius, Vattel, and Blackstone. Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 205-07 (cited in note 2). Grotius did see the
formal declaration as a prerequisite to invoking the laws of war, but as demonstrated he was an
outlier even among European writers. Vattel is ambiguous on the point, as he initially endorses
Grotius's view, but does not seem to insist on it in later, more detailed discussions of the law of
war. Blackstone is also difficult to read, saying that a declaration is necessary to "perfect war"
without explaining the practical implications of "perfect war." See note 167. Professor Yoo does
not discuss the views of Burlamaqui, Wolff Bynkershoek, Rutherforth, and Lee. all of whom
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Rather, the only eighteenth-century view that commanded any
broad support in practice is the third sense of the formal declaration,
discussed above. The formal declaration was a notification of a state of
war, which might be convenient at times but ill-advised at others. It
could have practical effects in that it could be used as evidence of the
existence of war for legal purposes, and it informed neutrals and sub-
jects that a war existed where they might not otherwise realize that it
did." It did not, however, have any indispensable legal or practical
content, for the legal state of war could be (and usually was) triggered
by hostilities, and a formal declaration was not prerequisite to hostili-
ties. In short, this was the ordinary meaning of a formal declaration of
war in the eighteenth century, however much some European writers
sought-against all evidence of practice-to infuse the formal declara-
tion with greater significance.
As a result, if the Declare War Clause is taken to refer to the
power to issue a formal declaration, this is the sense of the formal dec-
laration it must convey. Yet this interpretation of the phrase as a con-
stitutional matter is problematic in several respects, as explored in
greater detail in Part IV. It cannot be harmonized with post-drafting
statements of numerous political leaders (many of them Framers) who
indicated that Congress had all or most of the power to place the na-
tion in a state of war, and argued that the President's lack of the de-
clare-war power left the U.S. presidency weaker than the English
monarchy.n It also does not provide a structural explanation of the
Declare War Clause. As discussed, the idea of residual executive
power in foreign affairs means that the President has the executive
foreign affairs powers (including war powers) not conveyed to an-
other branch by the text of the Constitution. " Put another way, the
Declare War Clause should be viewed as a reassignment of previously
executive war powers to Congress. Yet it is difficult to understand why
the Framers would want to reassign an essentially rhetorical power to
Congress, or why they would think that making such an assignment
was a worthwhile limitation upon the President's executive power.=
took the opposing view, nor does he consider actual English practice as summarized by Hale. See
Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 205-07.
177 Professor Yoo's account at times appears to shift between this third view of the formal
declaration (that is, that it was merely an announcement of a preexisting legal status) and the
view discussed earlier (that is, that it triggered a change in legal status). To the extent he views it
as merely an announcement, I think he is largely consistent with eighteenth-century practice-
but viewing the formal declaration in this way greatly undermines his attempt to explain the De-
clare Wvar Clause. See Part IV.
178 See Part I.A.
179 Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 252-56 (cited in note 4) (outlining the theory of re-
sidual executive foreign affairs power in the President).
IS0 See Part IV. For this reason, Professor Yoo strives to embrace Grotius's view that a for-
mal declaration was needed to trigger a state of war. See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 242-50 (cited in
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These difficulties might not be enough to overcome the plain
meaning of the Constitution's text, if no other reading were available.
However, they do suggest a need to revisit the common assumption
that "declare war" refers only to the issuance of a formal declaration.
III. DECLARING WAR BY "WORD OR AcTION"
Most discussions of war powers have been content, without
elaborate analysis, to equate the constitutional phrase "declare war"
with the eighteenth-century practice of issuing a formal proclamation
of war. This approach misses an important alternate usage of the
phrase that makes more sense as a constitutional matter. Review of
eighteenth-century writings makes clear that a nation might "declare"
war, not only by a formal announcement, but also by an act of
hostility; as John Locke wrote, one may declare "by Word or Action.''
First, consider the dictionary definition. Samuel Johnson's Dic-
tionary of the English Language, published near the time of the fram-
ing, does not define "declare war" as a phrase, but its individual defini-
tions are consistent with the idea that "declaring war" could be done
by pronouncement or by hostile act. Johnson defined war as "the ex-
ercise of violence under sovereign command against withstanders.' ' ..
This reflects the common view in both the seventeenth and eighteenth
century that what distinguished war from ordinary violence was the
sovereign authorization, or in Johnson's words, "sovereign com-
mand..'
For "declare," Johnson listed as relevant definitions: "to make
known; to tell evidently and openly"; "[t]o publish; to proclaim"; "[t]o
shew in open view.""4 Since the "sovereign command" was the sine qua
non of war (as opposed to other violence), one would expect this
element to be the one the sovereign needs to "make known." A formal
proclamation would, of course, accomplish the task, so issuing an
official pronouncement would easily come within the definition of
"declaring" war, as everyone at the time understood. But it seems
difficult to say (as Grotius did) that this was the only way of making
note 2). This view would provide a structural explanation of the Declare War Clause-that it
shifted control of the legal aspects of war to the legislative branch-without limiting the Presi-
dent's power to initiate hostilities. But, as discussed, Grotius's view hardly represented a com-
mon understanding of the formal declaration.
181 Locke, Second Treatise § 16 at 278 (cited in note 9).
182 Johnson, 2 Dictionary of the English Language (cited in note 129).
183 We may presume that by "sovereign command" Johnson meant that the violence was
done at the ultimate direction of the sovereign, not that the sovereign necessarily had to be pre-
sent at the field of battle, since eighteenth-century monarchs typically were not battlefield lead-
ers.
184 Samuel Johnson, 1 Dictionary of the English Language (Arno 1979) (originally pub-
lished by W. Strahan 1755).
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the sovereign command known. Indeed, this was the central point of
Grotius's critics.'9 Consider again, for example, King Gustavus
Adolphus personally leading the Swedish army against the Holy
Roman Empire in the Thirty Years War, or the Prussian regular army
moving at the direction of Frederick the Great's generals in the Seven
Years' War. In both cases the "violence under sovereign command"
was "ma[d]e known" and "shew[n] in open view" by the hostile acts of
the armies, though no formal proclamation was issued. Thus Johnson's
definition is entirely consistent with "declaring" by action as well as by
proclamation.
This view of "declaring" war is consistent with the way a legal
state of war was understood to begin in the eighteenth century. As dis-
cussed, the state of war depended upon sovereign authorization, but
not upon formal pronouncement.nThe sovereign authorization had to
be manifested in some public way (else one would not know that a le-
gal state of war had commenced), but it did not have to be done in a
formal document. One way authorization could be manifested was by
the hostile attack of an army under sovereign direction, and since
eighteenth-century armies were closely identified with the sovereign,
this was a common way that a state of war began."' In such case, the
act that made the sovereign authority manifest (that is, made it known
or showed it in open view) was the hostile attack by the regular army,
rather than a proclamation. In other words, what made the state of
war known or shown in open view was the attack, and thus the attack
would, in Johnson's definition, "declare" the state of war.
Such a reading is confirmed by the way the treatise writers actu-
ally used the term "declare" in conjunction with discussing a state of
war. In John Locke's words:
The State of War is a State of Enmity and Destruction; And
therefore declaring by Word or Action, not a passionate and
hasty, but a sedate setled Design, upon another Mans Life, puts
him in a State of War with him against whom he has declared
such an intention."'
Three key points are apparent from this passage. First, Locke
gave "declaring" a broad meaning that included committing physical
acts, as well as making spoken or written announcements, manifesting
one's intent - hence, "declaring by Word or Action." Second, Locke di-
rectly linked this usage of "declare" to the creation of a state of war:
As he said, "declaring by Word or Action ... puts him [the declarer] in
185 Parts II.A and l".B.
186 See Part II.
187 Id.
188 Locke, Second Treatise § 16 at 278 (cited in note 9) (emphasis added).
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a State of War." Finally, the principal "Action" Locke presumably had
in mind was an attack: Launching an attack would be the action most
evidently manifesting a "setled Design upon another man's Life." In
short, for Locke an attack "declared" the intention to enter into a
state of war.
Locke was not speaking specifically about war between nations,
but more figuratively about the state of mankind outside civil society.
But there is no reason to think that he was using the words in an
artificial way that would not translate directly to a war between
nations. Indeed, the section in which the passage appears is not
principally about how the state of war is declared but what its
consequences are. His wording is therefore excellent evidence of an
ordinary (as opposed to idiosyncratic) usage in which "declaring"
could be done by "Word or Action. '' ' 9
Similar usage is found in Blackstone over a half-century later.
Though not primarily addressed to questions of international law, the
Commentaries' discussion of piracy uses "declare war" in a way that
can only mean to announce through hostilities:
[T]he crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high
seas, is an offence against the universal law of society... As
therefore [a pirate] has renounced all the benefits of society and
government, and has reduced himself afresh to the savage state
of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must
declare war against him."o
Plainly here Blackstone is speaking of declaring war by conduct,
for pirates were not in the habit of announcing themselves with
formalities, nor was society's response expected to be delivered by an
embassy.
Turning to the works of the international law writers, one may
again find parallel usage, even among those authors who thought the
formal declaration should be prerequisite to hostilities. Vattel, for
example, wrote: "[W]hen one nation takes up arms against another,
she from that moment declares herself an enemy to all the individuals
of the latter, and authorizes them to treat her as such."' 9'
As in Locke and Blackstone, Vattel in this passage uses "declare"
to mean an action (taking up arms) that itself makes a statement.
Moreover, this is no casual usage, but is specifically addressed to the
way in which a state of war is created. In the section from which this
189 Locke's writing, though remote in time from the Framers, was well known to them, and
thus must be counted as influential upon their language. See Bailyn, Ideological Origins at 27
(cited in note 119) (noting the extent to which the Framers looked to Locke).
190 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *71 (cited in note 65).
191 Vattel, Law of Nations at 399 (cited in note 8).
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passage is lifted, Vattel was discussing the rights of subjects of a nation
involved in hostilities to attack subjects of the opposing nation. This
right, Vattel said, is given by the laws of war; in the passage quoted, he
was saying that by taking up arms the aggressor nation invokes the
laws of war. Thus, said Vattel, nations could trigger a state of war, and
the application of the laws of war, by hostile acts. Similarly, Vattel said
that those who ally with a nation's enemies in war are also subject to
the laws of war "as their own conduct proclaims them [that nation's]
enemies."' 2 In short, Vattel used "declare" (and "proclaim") to include
the commission of hostile acts triggering a state of war."3
Another example comes from Wollf Speaking of alliances during
war, Wolff wrote: "[H]e who allies himself to my enemy, as by sending
troops or subsidies, or by assisting him in any other way, declares by
that very fact that he wishes to be a participant in the war carried on
against me."''" Wolff, like Vattel, was prepared to find sovereign
authorization of hostilities from a hostile act as well as from a formal
announcement, and like Vattel he used the word "declare" to mean
the commission of the hostile act.'5 Again, this is perfectly consistent
with Johnson's dictionary definition of "declare" as meaning (among
other things) to "make known" or "shew in open view." In the cases
Wolff and Vattel were discussing, the state of war was made known by
the sovereign's hostile act.
192 Id at 330. Note that Vattel generally used the word "enemy" as it appears in these quotes
to denote the opposing party in a war. See, for example, id at 363 ("A State taking up arms in a
just cause has a double right against her enemy."); id at 327 ("Whatever rights war gives me
against my principal enemy, the like it gives me against all his associates: for I derive those rights
from the right to security.. and I am equally attacked by the one and the other party."). In giv-
ing an example from Roman history, Vattel said that "[t]he Galatians, in furnishing troops for an
offensive war against the Romans, had declared themselves enemies to Rome." Id at 331.
193 Vattel was not retreating from his view that the law of nations ordinarily required a
formal declaration. But he was realistic enough to see that, however much the law of nations
might require it, nations often would dispense with a formal declaration. In such case, he said,
opening hostilities amounted to a declaration (though by actions rather than words), and one
might treat the attacker as a wartime enemy just as if a formal declaration had been made. This
usage suggests a way to reconcile Vattel's apparent endorsement of Grotius's view that the state
of war was triggered only by a formal declaration of war with Vattel's subsequent discussion of
the rights of war as applying in both formally declared and formally undeclared wars (so long as
there was sovereign authorization). I think it plausible, on the basis of the passages quoted in the
text, to read Vattel to say that a declaration is required, but for purposes of triggering the legal
state of war the declaration may be made by words or by actions, so long as the sovereign
authority is manifest.
194 Wolff, 2 Jus Gentium at 377 (cited in note 142) (emphasis added).
195 Or rather, Vattel used the French word and Wolff the Latin, but each is rendered, it
would seem correctly, as "declare" in translation. See also Lee, Captures in War at 47 (cited in
note 151) (stating "whoever declares himself my enemy, gives me a liberty to use violence against
him," in a context clearly indicating that either a proclamation or an open attack was meant by
"declares").
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Further evidence of this usage lies in the constitutional precedent
for the Declare War Clause. There seems little doubt that one forebear
of the clause lay with the constitution of the United Provinces of the
Netherlands. Beginning in the late sixteenth century, the rebellious
districts in the Netherlands worked together to overthrow Spanish
rule and formed something like a confederated state governed by a
written constitution.'9 Outside of the ancient world, this was one of
the few such written charters in existence at the time of the
Constitution. The Netherlands Constitution had not been a great
success in practice: The provinces found it too hard to work together,
and ultimately the need for central authority led to domination by
Holland, the strongest province, whose ruler came to occupy a
position akin to king. ' But it was a precedent of sorts, and was
examined by early writers on American federated government such as
Adams and Madison 9
For present purposes, the key is that the Netherlands
Constitution had a Declare War Clause. Article 9 of that constitution
forbade the United Provinces "to declare war" without unanimous
approval of all the provinces.9 The leading eighteenth-century
interpreter of that provision was Bynkershoek, the great Dutch
scholar who, despite his internationalist orientation, devoted a fair bit
of his work to domestic matters. Bynkershoek interpreted Article 9 to
mean that the United Provinces could not commence war without
unanimous approval. In explaining Article 9, he used the words "wage
war" essentially interchangeably with "declare war"; he said, for
example, that despite the unanimity requirement one province might
"wage war" on its own behalf or on behalf of the Union, but that the
Union could not collectively "wage war" without unanimity, since "it is
possible for one province to dissent, and thus prohibit a common war
or a war waged in the name of the whole federation."w
As discussed above, Bynkershoek had elsewhere argued at length
that a formal declaration of war was not necessary to commence war,201
196 Bynkershoek, 2 Quaestionum Juris Publici at 127-32 (cited in note 121) (discussing the
political relationship between the several provinces of the United Netherlands and their written
constitution).
197 Id. See generally Federalist 20 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers 134 (cited in
note 55) (discussing problems of the Netherlands constitution).
198 See generally Federalist 20 (Madison) (cited in note 197); John Adams, 1 A Defence of
the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America 22, 69 (De Capo 1971) (origi-
nally published 1787).
199 See Bynkershoek, 2 Quaestionem Juris Publici at 128 (cited in note 121) (quoting Article
9 of the constitution of the United Provinces).
2W Id at 132. Following Bynkershoek, Madison described the powers of the United Prov-
inces as including the power to "make war," although the actual language says only "declare
war." See Federalist 20 (Madison) at 134-36 (cited in note 197).
201 See text accompanying note 130.
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so he would not have thought that preventing a formal declaration
would prevent a war. Instead, he must have thought that "declare war"
encompassed both formal announcements and declarations by hostile
act-otherwise the constitutional provision in question would not
have amounted to a single-province veto of all warfare, which
Bynkershoek plainly thought it did. Moreover, Bynkershoek was not
taking a controversial position in this regard. In the passage in
question, he was taking issue with what was apparently the more
common view, which gave Article 9 an even broader reading.
Specifically, the opposing view was that Article 9 prohibited any
initiation of warfare by any province without the consent of the
others. Bynkershoek argued that any province might declare/wage war
on its own behalf without consulting the others; the restriction applied
only to wars waged on behalf of the United Provinces as a whole.2
Thus, both sides of this debate agreed that the Netherlands' declare-
war clause prevented nonunanimous initiation of hostilities, a result
that depended on wars being declared by hostilities as well as by
formal pronouncement.
Thus examples from English writers, international law writers,
and prior practice show a usage persisting through the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries in which a state of war could be declared, as
Locke put it, "by Word or Action." It is perhaps worth noting that this
usage continued well past the time of the Constitution into the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in contexts unrelated to the U.S.
Constitution. The English international law scholar William Hall
wrote at some length on the subject of commencing war, and among
other things said that "an act of hostility, unless it be done in the
urgency or self-preservation or by way of reprisal, is in itself a full
declaration of intention."m Another English writer, J.M. Maurice, gives
two examples of this usage from the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. When Napoleon invaded Russia, without any
formal declaration, Tsar Alexander proclaimed:
For long we have observed the hostile proceedings of the French
Emperor towards Russia, but we always entertained the hope of
avoiding hostilities by measures of conciliation; but seeing all our
efforts without success, we have been constrained to assemble
our armies. Still we hoped to maintain peace by resting on our
frontiers in a defensive attitude, without committing any act of
aggression. All the conciliatory measures have failed: the
202 Bynkershoek, 2 Quaestionem Juris Publici at 130 (cited in note 121) ("It is the war in
behalf of the whole Union ... which cannot be declared except by common consent. But this does
not prevent any one from waging a war in its own behalf and at its own expense.").
M3 Hall, International Law at 444 (cited in note 119).
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Emperor Napoleon, by a sudden attack on our troops at Kowno,
has declared war.204
Similarly, Admiral Horatio Nelson wrote in 1798 of events during
Napoleon's Italian campaigns:
I have been thinking all night of the General and Duke of
Sangro's saying, that the King of Naples had not declared war
against the French. Now, I assert that he has, and in a much
stronger manner than the ablest minister in Europe could write a
declaration of war. Has not the King received, as a conquest
made by him, the Republican flag taken at Gozo? Is not the
King's flag flying there and at Malta, not only by the King's
absolute permission, but by his orders? Is not the flag shot at
every day by the French, and returned from batteries bearing the
King's flag? ... If those acts are not tantamount to any written
paper, I give up all knowledge of what is war.6
In sum, in the initiation of eighteenth-century war, actions spoke
at least as loudly as words. There would have been nothing remark-
able in using "declare war" to mean initiation of a state of war by sov-
ereign action, as well as by proclamation. "Declare" meant, among
other things, to make known or to show in open view. The military of
the eighteenth century (unlike in some earlier times) was inherently
and obviously a sovereign instrument in most European states; use of
military force showed the sovereign's command of hostilities as surely
as did a proclamation. Hostilities under sovereign command created
the state of war. Thus hostilities under sovereign command declared
the war, for they made known the sovereign's determination to settle
a dispute by force. That the eighteenth century would view the term in
this way is confirmed by numerous leading writers of the period who
thought that a state of war could be created by actions as well as
words. These authors described taking such actions (as well as speak-
ing such words) as "declaring". As recounted, Locke, Blackstone, Vat-
tel, Wolff, and Bynkershoek all used "declare" in this way. One might
"declare" by issuing a formal pronouncement of war, but one might
also "declare" by taking action that made manifest one's entry into a
state of war.
204 Maurice, Hostilities at 44 (cited in note 35) (quoting Alexander's proclamation of June
25,1812) (emphasis added).
205 Id at 32-33 (quoting Nelson to Wyndham, Nov 30,1798). The situation, as recounted by
Maurice, was that Napoleon had conquered much of Italy and forced Naples to remain neutral;
but following Nelson's victory over Napoleon at the battle of the Nile, Naples entered the fight-
ing against Napoleon (without any formal declaration) and seized territories held by the French.
One of the Neopolitan generals, however, restrained Nelson from seizing certain French ships, on
the grounds that Naples had not declared war on France; the quoted text is Nelson's comment
upon the episode. Id at 32.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF "DECLARE WAR"
The foregoing discussion shows that in the eighteenth century the
phrase "declare war" had two common meanings. First, it was used
narrowly to refer to a formal proclamation announcing the existence
of a state of war. Second, it was used more broadly to refer to any act
that created a state of war, whether that was done by "word or
action."
The question, therefore, is which meaning is the best reading of
the Constitution's text. In this Part, I argue that the narrow meaning is
not consistent with the text and structure of the Constitution, nor with
contemporaneous and near-contemporaneous readings of it; on the
other hand, giving "declare war" its broader meaning provides a better
harmonization with both the text and structure of the Constitution, as
well as with the constitutional generation's commentary upon it.
A. Text and Structure
This Part considers which of the two possible meanings of "de-
claring war" provides the best fit with constitutional text and structure.
I begin by returning to the executive power over foreign affairs, as the
textual basis for presidential war powers.2 Under this view, the Presi-
dent has all of the traditional executive powers over foreign affairs, by
virtue of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, except for those
powers expressly given to other branches. Put another way, grants of
foreign affairs powers to other branches (such as to Congress) have
two aspects: an affirmative component, giving power to Congress, and
a negative component, taking power away from the President that
would otherwise be part of the independent executive power over
foreign affairs. For example, when the Constitution gives the marque
and reprisal power-a traditional executive power-to Congress, that
power is thereby transferred away from the President, although it
would otherwise be part of the executive power encompassed in Arti-
cle II, Section 1. The Declare War Clause presumably works the same
way. It is generally accepted that the clause transfers the declare-war
power from the President to Congress; the dispute is how broadly to
read that power-or, in the terms that this Article has outlined, which
of that clause's two ordinary eighteenth-century meanings to adopt.
206 See Part I.B. One who rejects the theory of executive power over foreign affairs would
also seem to have textual difficulties with the narrow reading of declare war. If the President has
no textual claim to war-initiating power, and Congress's war-initiating power can be exercised
only by formal declaration, then no branch would seem to possess the power to create a state of
war by armed attack. See Sidak, 41 Duke L J at 120-21 (cited in note 36) (suggesting this view).
But very few congressionalist scholars consider this a viable interpretation, and in any event it
goes against common eighteenth-century practice, in which wars routinely began without a for-
mal declaration. See Part II.C.
20021 1597
The University of Chicago Law Review
Consider the broad meaning first. In this view, "declaring" war
amounts to placing the nation in a state of war, either by proclamation
or by military action. Viewed as a transfer of power away from the
President, this provision is easy to understand. Despite the President's
executive power over diplomatic and military affairs, the President
would not have the independent ability to proclaim a state of war (de-
claring by word) nor to signal the beginning of war by ordering an
armed attack (declaring by action). Although the President has the
general power to command the military (pursuant to the commander-
in-chief power of Article II, Section 2), in this view the President
would lack the more specific power to command the military in a way
that signals the start of a war; similarly, while the President has the
general power to communicate on behalf of the nation, through am-
bassadors or otherwise, the President lacks the more specific power to
communicate on behalf of the nation in a way that signals the begin-
ning of a state of war. This transfer of power away from the President
is at least a plausible one. Given the deliberative policymaking ele-
ments of the decision to initiate a state of war, one might plausibly
think that the decision should not rest with a single executive, and al-
though leading eighteenth-century political theorists said otherwise, at
least some of the Framers believed that war was best viewed as a legis-
lative rather than executive function.
Viewed as an affirmative grant of power to Congress, the broad
meaning of the clause requires some further explanation. Congress
can of course issue a formal proclamation,2 but there is a practical
limit on its ability to declare war by action, because Congress does not
command an army. As to action, then, Congress has (in this view) no
more than the power to direct the President, as commander-in-chief,
to use the military in a way that inaugurates a state of war. Whether
the President would be obligated to follow such a direction as a con-
stitutional matter is unclear, just as it is unclear whether the President
would be required to fight a war that Congress declared by proclama-
tion. But as a practical matter, in either event Congress would surely
have difficulty forcing a conflict on an unwilling commander-in-chief.
Thus Congress's war power is in this view necessarily a cooperative
power that gives Congress a role-but not a sole voice-in the deci-
sion to go to war. Congress's role is therefore not unlike the Senate's
role in treatymaking (another instance in which the Constitution de-
parted from the traditional understanding of unified executive power
in foreign affairs). Again, this is a plausible way to involve Congress in
207 I leave aside the question of whether a formal proclamation could be vetoed, or passed
over a President's veto.
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the warmaking process.m In short, one can tell a plausible story of how
the Declare War Clause works and why it works that way by giving
"declare" its broad meaning.
The broad meaning of "declaring war" also makes the clause fit
with its immediate neighbor, the Marque and Reprisal Clause. In the
eighteenth century, marque and reprisal referred specifically to the
seizure of foreign property in satisfaction of a specific injury commit-
ted by the foreign state. As Blackstone wrote:
These letters are grantable by the law of nations, whenever the
subjects of one state are oppressed and injured by those of an-
other; and justice is denied by that state to which the oppressor
belongs. In this case letters of marque and reprisal (words in
themselves synonymous [sic] and signifying a taking in return)
may be obtained, in order to seise the bodies or goods of the sub-
jects of the offending state, until satisfaction be made.m
The marque and reprisal power was, in short, a specific form of limited
hostilities.
Blackstone also made clear that granting letters of marque and
reprisal was an executive power of the monarch.2'° The Constitution's
text moves this power from the executive to the legislative branch,
another instance of the Framers rejecting unified executive power in
foreign affairs. We may presume, therefore, that the constitutional
generation thought the decision to engage in this limited form of of-
fensive hostility was better viewed as a congressional, rather than
presidential, enterprise. Given this outlook, it seems quite plausible
that the constitutional generation also thought the decision to enter
into wider forms of hostility should also involve the legislature. Giving
the Declare War Clause its broad meaning therefore fits with the
Marque and Reprisal Clause: Both were efforts to shift decisionmak-
ing about offensive war from the executive (where traditionally it had
resided) to Congress. It particularly makes sense to shift the two pow-
211ers together, since reprisals were often a prelude to open war.
203 Among other things, using the broad meaning of "declare" allowed the Constitution to
draw a line between offensive war (needing legislative involvement from the beginning) and de-
fensive war (part of the President's executive power). See Part VI.C (discussing President's
power over defensive war). This line is understandable in terms of putting power of action in the
President and power of deliberation in Congress: Defense must be mounted quickly and deci-
sively, and it is assumed that the nation must defend itself, whereas the decision to enter into of-
fensive war is one that might encompass more studied deliberation.
209 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *250-51 (cited in note 65). See also Hale, 1 Pleas of the
Crown at 161-62 (cited in note 119).
210 See Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *251 (cited in note 65). See also Vattel, Law of Na-
tions at 285 (cited in note 8) ("[I]n every civilized state, a subject who thinks himself injured by a
foreign nation, has recourse to his sovereign, in order to obtain permission to make reprisals").
211 An objection is that, if"war" is read broadly to encompass most hostilities among sover-
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To be clear, all that is argued so far is that the broader meaning of
declaring war is a plausible reading of the Declare War Clause, given
its constitutional context. I do not argue (as some congressionalist ac-
counts appear to) that this plausible description of the clause in itself
establishes the meaning of the text. The Framers may have wanted to
divide power in this way, but we cannot, on this basis alone, be sure
that they did so. It remains to ask what other meanings of the clause
are available.
Let us now turn to the narrow reading of declaring war. In this
view, the power encompassed by the Declare War Clause is only the
power to make an official announcement about the existence of a
state of war. Set in its constitutional context, this view runs into imme-
diate difficulties. First, it is hard to understand this provision in its role
as a transfer of power away from the President. Plainly the power to
issue an official proclamation regarding war was one of the traditional
executive powers over foreign affairs, along with the traditional execu-
tive's broader powers to initiate and conduct hostilities. To read the
Declare War Clause narrowly one must believe that of all the Presi-
dent's executive war powers, the Constitution singled out this particu-
lar communicative function to shift to Congress.
This seems an odd, and indeed inexplicable, allocation of power.
The President is the communicative organ of the nation in foreign af-
fairs, as to all other international subjects. 22 Why would the President
also not be the best communicator regarding war, particularly if wars
might be started at presidential initiative? It is hard to see any separa-
tion-of-powers value served by this allocation. If the Declare War
Clause, given its narrow reading, moved a substantive power away
eigns (as apparently it was in the eighteenth century, see Part V.A), and "declaring war" is read
broadly to mean entering into a state of war, the Marque and Reprisal Clause may seem redun-
dant. One might suppose that, even absent the Marque and Reprisal Clause, the branch with the
power to declare war (read broadly) would have the power to grant letters of marque and repri-
sal, as this would constitute the initiation of a limited form of war. However, historical usage con-
flicts over whether marque and reprisal should be called a type of war or a type of hostilities
short of war. Grotius, for example, noted the difference "between the taking of Prizes or Repri-
zals for the recovery of debts, or reparation of damages, and the making of War." Grotius, Rights
of War at 447 (cited in note 96). See also Vattel, Law of Nations at 283-84 (cited in note 8) (de-
scribing reprisals as a method of redress short of war). Other authorities saw reprisal as a form of
war. See Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at 161-62 (cited in note 119) ("[S]pecial kinds of war are
that, which we usually call marque or reprisal."). Given this disagreement, the Marque and Re-
prisal Clause clarifies what would otherwise be an ambiguity as to the extent of Congress's
power. Without the Marque and Reprisal Clause, one could plausibly argue, on the basis of
eighteenth-century terminology, either that Congress had the marque and reprisal power (be-
cause it was a subset of the war power) or that the President had the marque and reprisal power
(because it was part of the executive power over foreign affairs and was not included in the tex-
tual grant of war power to Congress).
212 See Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 317-24 (cited in note 4) (discussing the Presi-
dent's authority to speak for the nation as part of the executive power over foreign affairs).
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from the executive (for example, if a formal declaration were a pre-
requisite to engaging in hostilities or to invoking the legal state of
war), one might understand the shift; but, as argued above, the formal
declaration would not have been understood in this way. As a result,
the Declare War Clause, if given its narrow interpretation, essentially
ends up meaning that the President can initiate a state of war but can-
not formally say anything about it. This seems both inexplicable and• 21
counterproductive.
It is true, of course, that this narrow vision of the Declare War
Clause would move one material war power away from the President:
The President would not be able to begin a war by proclamation. The
President would, however, be able to begin a war by attack. It is hard
to see why the President should have one power but not the other.
Presumably all of the reasons against the President having the power
to begin war by proclamation would also apply to the power to begin
war by attack.
Similarly, the narrow meaning of the Declare War Clause is hard
to understand as an affirmative grant of power to Congress. The es-
sence of the legislative branch is deliberative policymaking. One
would expect that, to the extent that the Constitution shifted formerly
executive powers to the legislative branch, the powers shifted would
be deliberative functions. Indeed, the other executive powers trans-
ferred in whole or part by the Constitution are deliberative: for exam-
ple, treatymaking, appointments, and marque and reprisal. Adopting
the narrow meaning of the Declare War Clause makes it essentially a
communicative and rhetorical power, which is not the role the Consti-
tution envisioned for Congress.
213 This system also seems unworkable in practice. The President controls the diplomatic
channels of communication. Once the President initiates a state of war, how would we determine
whether the President's statements about the conflict, made through ordinary diplomatic chan-
nels, rose to a level of a "declaration" such that Congress would need to be involved? And in any
event, what would be the purpose of such an inquiry? Presumably it would be in everyone's in-
terest, once a war actually began, for the President to make the state of war, and its goals and in-
tents, manifest as soon as possible, in whatever way thought most effective, rather than waiting
for Congress to act.
214 It is important to distinguish the foregoing argument from the claim that the Declare
War Clause must be read broadly, because otherwise Congress would lack sufficient overall
checks upon presidential warmaking. As presidential advocates have pointed out, whatever the
Declare War Clause means, Congress has some material checks on presidential warmaking
through its appropriations and impeachment powers. It is extraordinarily difficult to tell whether
the Framers thought these checks, standing alone, were strong enough, since we cannot know
how strong the Framers thought they might be, or should be. In contrast, the argument made
here is not based on an attempt to intuit how the Framers would have chosen among competing
policy objectives about warmaking in general, but on the observation that no coherent set of ob-
jectives seems to explain the function of the Declare War Clause, if it is given its narrow
meaning.
215 The narrow reading of the Declare War Clause would transfer to Congress the delibera-
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Additionally, the narrow meaning of the Declare War Clause
does not fit well with the Marque and Reprisal Clause. As discussed,
the Marque and Reprisal Clause reflects a decision to shift from the
executive to Congress the policymaking power over a limited form of
offensive hostilities. That decision makes the most sense if the policy-
making power over wider hostilities is also shifted. In contrast, there is
no satisfactory explanation for why the President should have com-
prehensive powers to initiate hostilities, excepting only marque and
reprisal. Rather, belief that the lesser power should be shifted would
seem to imply belief that the greater power should also be shifted.
Other things being equal, one would expect more deliberation with
respect to exercise of the greater power, not less. Further, the fact that
the two shifts of power occur in the same part of Article I, Section 8
suggests that they are directed toward a similar goal. Finally, shifting
the marque and reprisal power without shifting the war power is not
likely to be effective as a practical matter. Presumably a President de-
nied congressional authority to make reprisals could simply start a
war (by attack) and direct property seizures as a wartime measure.
In sum, the narrow meaning of declaring war does not provide as
satisfactory an account of the text and structural role of the Declare
War Clause. Again, it is important to emphasize what is, and is not, ar-
gued here. This Article seeks to present a textual account of the De-
clare War Clause, not an account based on Framers' intent. Accord-
ingly, its initial focus has been on identifying possible meanings of the
phrase "declare war." Once two possible meanings of ambiguous text
are identified, it is surely relevant that one meaning yields a plausible
account of how the text fits into the overall structure of constitutional
government while the other raises substantial difficulties. Whether this
observation, standing alone, would be sufficient to establish the best
constitutional meaning of the text need not be conclusively addressed.
As discussed in subsequent sections, commentary from the ratification
and post-ratification period also fits better with the broad rather than
the narrow meaning of declaring war, and thus confirms that the
broad meaning is the better one.
tive power of declaring war by proclamation in advance of hostilities. But this seems an odd
power to transfer in isolation. First, formal declarations of war were rarely used in this way in the
eighteenth century, so one would not expect the Framers to have this role of the formal declara-
tion primarily in mind. Second, the reasons one would want to shift this power to Congress
would also support shifting the power to begin a state of war by hostilities. Since the effect of a
war declared by proclamation and a war declared by hostile act were the same, it seems odd to
transfer one power and not the other.
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B. Ratification
Commentary from The Federalist and the ratifying debates
indicates that leading ratifiers understood the Constitution's "declare
war" clause in its broader sense, to include declarations by action as
well as by formal proclamation. While this commentary might not be
sufficient to override clear constitutional text to the contrary, it is
appropriate to consult it in attempting to pick between two competing
2161textual meanings.
The power to declare war was not often discussed in the ratifying
debates. On the occasions when it did arise, it was typically used by
Federalists as an example of how the Constitution had reduced the
power of the President/executive. Because Congress, and not the
President, had the power to declare war, the President's power was
not as great as some Anti-Federalists suggested. Although Anti-
Federalists continued to object to the scope of presidential power, no
one disputed the Federalists' characterization of the Declare War
Clause as a material limit upon the executive. This strongly suggests
that both sides accepted the broad rather than the narrow meaning of
"declaring" war.
Hamilton, for example, observed in The Federalist that under the
Constitution the President's power was less than the King of Eng-
land's power because, among other things, the power of "the British
king extends to the declaring of war ... which, by the Constitution un-
der consideration, would appertain to the legislature." 27 It is true, as
advocates of presidential war power point out, that this observation
does not in so many words equate declaring war with control over
commencing hostilities. '8 But it is nonetheless entirely inconsistent
with the narrow reading of "declare war." First, Hamilton's observa-
tion confirms the general view that allocations of traditional executive
power over foreign affairs to Congress were understood to be
exclusive-that is, that the Declare War Clause gives the power to
Congress and denies it to the President. Second, Hamilton's
observation is only consistent with a reading of "declare war" that in
itself imposes a material reduction in executive war power. As
discussed above, the narrow reading of "declare war" does not impose
any material reduction, since the President would still be able to
initiate a state of war by armed attack and there was no difference
between a state of war begun by proclamation and a state of war
216 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 38 (cited in note 41).
217 Federalist 69 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at 418 (cited in note 55).
218 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 277-78 (cited in note 2) ("Hamilton did nothing to undermine
the prevailing belief that a declaration of war was unnecessary for waging war .... Here, Hamil-
ton emphasized formal constitutional powers and ignored the political process."). See generally
Yoo, 70 U Colo L Rev 1169 (cited in note 42).
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begun by armed attack. If the Declare War Clause is read narrowly to
refer only to issuing formal proclamations, Hamilton would have had
no basis to conclude that the President's power was materially less
than that of the British monarch due to the President's inability to
declare war. Indeed, Hamilton himself said earlier in The Federalist
that "the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has lately fallen
into disuse."2"9 On the other hand, if the Declare War Clause is read
broadly to encompass declaring war by word or action, Hamilton's
quote is perfectly understandable, for the Declare War Clause would
create a substantial difference between the war power of the British
executive and the war power of the U.S. executive.=
When the phrase "declare war" arose in the ratifying conventions,
the context again shows that it was used broadly rather than narrowly.
For example, James Iredell, a leading member of the convention in
North Carolina, said that "[t]he President has not the power of
declaring war by his own authority" but rather this and other powers
"are vested in other hands.' '22 In context Iredell, like Hamilton in
Federalist 69, was describing the Constitution's limits on presidential
power. Iredell's comment (like Hamilton's) is coherent only if the
Declare War Clause produces some material constraint on the
President. As discussed, only the broad reading of declare war
provides such a constraint; under the narrow reading, no material
constraint is imposed through the Declare War Clause because
although the President could not issue a formal proclamation of war,
the President could accomplish the same thing-creating a state of
war-unilaterally by armed attack.
To the same effect, and in similar context, Charles Pinckney said
in the South Carolina convention that "the President's powers did not
permit him to declare war."= Again, taken as a description of the
limits of presidential power, this makes sense only if "declare war" is
given its broader meaning. If the effect of the Declare War Clause was
only to prevent the President from issuing a formal proclamation, this
would hardly seem worth mentioning. Only if the clause is read to
include declaring war by word or action can we make sense of
219 Federalist 25 (Hamilton) at 165 (cited in note 55).
220 That this was in fact Hamilton's view is confirmed by several of his later statements. See
Part IV.C. The context of Federalist 69, in which this comment appears, is that Hamilton was try-
ing to make the President seem less powerful, in response to critics who claimed the proposed
Constitution gave the President too much power. Thus Hamilton had an incentive to understate
the President's power. Yet he would not likely have taken a position that was manifestly incor-
rect. Nor is there any record of anyone objecting to Hamilton's interpretation.
221 Elliot, 2 Debates at 287 (cited in note 20).
2M Id.
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Pinckney's emphasis on its role in reducing the executive power of the
President.='
This is also the main lesson of James Wilson's often-cited remark
at the Pennsylvania convention. Wilson said that "[i]t will not be in the
power of a single man" to involve the nation in war, "for the important
power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large."
'
24
Congressional advocates have been criticized for placing undue
weight on this quotation standing alone, for Wilson did appear to be
overstating in some respectsm and Wilson was not representative of
his generation on a number of key issues.2 But the preceeding
quotations show that on this point, at least, Wilson was not an outlier,
for he used "declare war" in essentially the same sense as Iredell,
Pinckney, and Hamilton.
In a slightly different context Madison in The Federalist wrote: "Is
the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this ques-
tion in the negative."m Again, this observation does not directly prove
the extent of Congress's war power. However, it is only consistent with
the broad meaning of "declare war." If "declare war" is read narrowly
to mean only the power to issue a formal proclamation, it could hardly
be thought so essential to government that "no man" would think it an
unnecessary power. Since a state of war could be created by an armed
attack without any accompanying formal proclamation, the formal
proclamation was in fact regarded by many in the eighteenth century
as an outdated and superfluous Roman ceremony. This -was the view
of a number of leading writers, including Hale, Bynkershoek, and
Rutherforth.m It was also the implicit view of at least two great
223 These points show the importance of rejecting Professor Yoo's view of the formal decla-
ration of war. In his account, there is a difference between a war declared by proclamation and a
war begun only by armed attack: One creates a legal state of war and the other does not. See
Part I.B. If this is correct, reading the Declare War Clause to mean only the power to issue a
formal proclamation does cause the Declare War Clause to impose a material limit on the Presi-
dent (though not as broad a limit as congressional advocates would impose). The President
would be free to use military force unilaterally, but could not invoke the laws of war without
congressional approval. If that is correct, then the comments of Hamilton, Pinckney, Iredell, etc.,
might be understandable even if Congress had only the power of formal proclamation. As dis-
cussed above, I think Professor Yoo's view does not capture the ordinary eighteenth-century un-
derstanding of how a legal state of war was created. Professor Yoo's view follows Grotius, but on
this point Grotius is not consistent with eighteenth-century international theory or eighteenth-
century English practice. See Part II.
224 Elliot, 2 Debates at 528 (cited in note 20).
225 See Part VI. Even congressional advocates would agree, for example, that the President
can take some actions that, while not creating a state of war in themselves, might lead to another
country attacking the United States and thus involving the country in war.
226 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 286 & n 547 (cited in note 2) (criticizing reliance on Wilson).
227 Federalist 41 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at 256 (cited in note 55). The
context was Madison's justification of the grant of various powers, including the power to declare
war, to the federal government. See id.
228 See Part II.
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military leaders, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and Frederick the
Great of Prussia, who waged their wars in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries without formal proclamation.29 And as noted,
Madison's coauthor Hamilton had, in an earlier number of The
Federalist, already observed that "the ceremony of a formal
denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse."'2 Plainly quite a
few prominent people thought the formal declaration unnecessary,
and if "declare war" is given its narrow meaning Madison's comment
is inexplicable. On the other hand, if "declare war" is taken in its
broader sense to mean declaring war by word or action, Madison's
comment is entirely understandable, for in the eighteenth century it is
likely that essentially everyone thought a nation must have the right
to initiate war to insist upon its international rights.
C. Post-Ratification Commentary and Practice
I now turn to post-ratification commentary and practice. As
discussed earlier, congressionalist scholarship points to an array of
quotations and events apparently showing that U.S. leaders of the
1790s thought that Congress had very substantial control over the
decision to go to war.2' But congressionalist scholarship has been
rightly criticized for invoking these post-ratification authorities
without any satisfactory tie to the Constitution's text. Without a
textual explanation of why post-ratification leaders might have
thought Congress had substantial war powers, the post-ratification
evidence is more puzzling than persuasive.
The foregoing discussion shows the problem to be the mistaken
equation of the Declare War Clause with a formal proclamation of
war. Once it is demonstrated that "declare war" could have a broad
meaning of "initiate a state of war" as well as a narrow meaning of
"issue a formal proclamation," the post-ratification evidence becomes
both understandable and valuable.
To pick one example, Hamilton said in his 1793 Pacificus essays
that "[t]he Legislature alone" can "plac[e] the nation in a state of
war."2m If "declare war" is equated with issuing a formal proclamation,
there is a considerable skip in Hamilton's reasoning. Hamilton was
surely familiar with the longstanding English practice holding that a
state of war would be triggered by open hostilities.2 Hamilton himself
229 Id.
230 Federalist 25 (Hamilton) at 165 (cited in note 55).
231 See Part I.
232 Pacificus No 1, in Lodge, ed, 4 Alexander Hamilton at 443 (cited in note 23).
233 See Part III. One response would be that by the power to place the nation in a state of
war, Hamilton meant only the formal legal state of war, not the condition of hostilities. However,
as discussed above, I think it unlikely that Hamilton, or any other reasonable observer of the
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had said earlier that the formal proclamation had fallen into disuse in
recent times.- It is hard to see, in light of eighteenth-century
experience, how Hamilton could think that the formal declaration was
the only way to place the nation in a state of war. Viewed in this way,
Hamilton's statement seems simply incoherent.
Once the textual inquiry is framed properly, however, Hamilton's
statement becomes much more useful. If Hamilton thought war could
be declared by word or action, then the association of "declaring war"
with "placing the nation in a state of war" is obvious. Hamilton was
simply using "plac[e] the nation in a state of war" (Pacificus's term for
Congress's war power) as a synonym for "declare war" (the
Constitution's term). This is precisely consistent with the broad
meaning of "declare war" identifiable in the works of the eighteenth-
century treatise writers. Recovering the broad meaning of "declare
war" allows us to make sense of Hamilton's statement.
This in turn renders Hamilton's statement important evidence of
the original meaning of the Declare War Clause. The point, of course,
is not ultimately what Hamilton himself thought, but what the Declare
War Clause would have meant to an ordinary reader. Hamilton's view
is highly probative of the ordinary meaning, however. Hamilton was a
vigorous advocate for presidential powers in general, so his concession
that the war-initiation power lay with Congress must be counted as
substantial. In the Pacificus essays, for example, he argued that most
foreign affairs powers other than war and treatymaking were presi-
dential. Hamilton wrote the Pacificus essays, moreover, to defend
President Washington's 1793 Proclamation of Neutrality against
charges that it interfered with Congress's war power. M If there were a
plausible reading of the Constitution available that would have pre-
served some war-initiation power to the President, one would not ex-
pect Hamilton to concede the point. Yet he did so repeatedly, not just
in Pacificus, but also earlier in Federalist 69 and later in the Lucius
Crassus letters.2" One can only conclude that Hamilton thought
reading the Declare War Clause narrowly to refer only to formal
declarations, and thereby preserving substantial independent
presidential power to initiate war, was not a tenable position in light
of the common understanding of the Declare War Clause.
time, would have thought that the legal state of war was separable from officially commenced
hostilities; this was a distinction that existed only in Grotius's theory, not in actual practice.
234 Federalist 25 (Hamilton) at 165 (cited in note 55).
235 On the context of the Pacificus letters, see Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 327-39
(cited in note 4); Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 337-45 (Oxford
1993).
2M See generally Federalist 69 (Hamilton) (cited in note 217); Examination of Jefferson's
Message to Congress of December 7,1801, No 1 at 249-50 (cited in note 23).
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Similar observations apply to other leading post-ratification
commentary. I do not propose to review the post-ratification
commentary in detail, as it has been thoroughly canvassed by
congressionalist scholars.27 However, the inability of prior accounts to
tie the commentary to an ordinary meaning of "declare war" has
greatly undermined the persuasiveness of the commentary. Viewed in
the light of the textual argument made here, additional weight must be
given to the argument for favoring a broad view of "declare war" over
a narrow one. While I do not believe that a proper interpretation of
the constitutional text must accord with every post-ratification
statement,2 the explanatory power of the broad reading of "declare
war" must count somewhat in its favor, especially as compared to the
difficulties of competing versions.?'
A second important point about the post-ratification period is
that practice conformed to the broad meaning of "declare war." Again,
congressionalist scholars have emphasized that early presidents
generally deferred to Congress on the question of war, and early
presidential advisors generally counselled such deference.? But
without a textual explanation for this deference, one could not know
whether it should be counted as evidence of constitutional meaning,
or merely as evidence that early presidents hesitated, for
nonconstitutional reasons, to use force unilaterally. It cannot be
doubted that the military weakness of the United States in the early
years did contribute to a certain amount of presidential
circumspection. But it is also somewhat significant that the United
States faced questions of war in at least five contexts between 1789
and 1800, and in each case the President looked to Congress to decide
whether war should be pursued. 4' Surely this practice standing alone
237 See Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War at 17-31 (cited in note 1); Reveley,
Who Holds the Arrows at 100-15 (cited in note 1).
238 Consider Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 334-39 (cited in note 4) (sharply criticiz-
ing Madison's view of executive power as expressed in his 1793 response to Hamilton's "Pacifi-
cus").
239 Hamilton's statements are representative of other comments directed at war powers. As
with Hamilton's observations, reading the Declare War Clause broadly to mean declaring war by
word or action provides a way to explain these comments in terms of the constitutional text.
240 See Fisher, Presidential War Power at 13-28 (cited in note 1) (describing the actions of
President Washington regarding the Indian Wars, Whiskey Rebellion, and Neutrality Act, Presi-
dent John Adams's actions in respect to the quasi-war with France, and President Jefferson's
dealings with Tripoli); Casper, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 242-60 (cited in note 33) (discussing
President Washington's dealings with Algiers).
241 The five instances were: (1) the continuing hostilities with the tribes on the United
States's western and southern borders; (2) the actions of Algiers in seizing U.S. shipping in the
Mediterranean; (3) the Nootka Sound incident, in which an impending war between Britain and
Spain appeared likely to involve the United States; (4) the neutrality crisis of 1793, in which war
between Britain and France appeared likely to involve the United States; and (5) the naval war
with France in 1798. See Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power at 100-24 (cited
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cannot establish the meaning of the constitutional text, but taken with
other evidence it is further indication that the broad rather than the
narrow meaning of "declare war" should be preferred.
A third key fact about the post-ratification period is that it
provides no evidence in support of the narrow meaning of "declare
war." Pro-executive scholars have argued at length that the post-
ratification discourse does not conclusively establish congressional
control over war initiation,2* but they have adduced no post-
ratification evidence of a belief in broad presidential war powers. This
approach is perhaps sufficient so long as they can rely on the plain
text of the Constitution to support their view. If the Constitution's text
unambiguously gave Congress only limited war powers, and reserved
most war power to the President, the absence of confirming evidence
from the post-ratification period would not count so heavily. As I have
argued above, however, the phrase "declare war" had two ordinary
meanings in the eighteenth century, and thus the Declare War Clause,
standing alone, is at best ambiguous as to which was intended. Once
the interpretive project is viewed as choosing between two possible
meanings, the fact that one meaning was commonly ascribed to the
constitutional text in the post-ratification period, while the other was
never advanced, becomes an important factor.
As a result, post-ratification commentary and practice confirms
that the broad reading of "declare war," rather than the narrow one,
was the meaning embraced by the constitutional generation in the
Constitution's Declare War Clause. Taken with the textual and
structural evidence and the evidence from the ratification period, this
evidence should be sufficient to show that the best original meaning of
the Declare War Clause is that Congress (and not the President) has
the power to place the nation in a state of war through words (a
formal proclamation) or action (authorizing an armed attack).
V. WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS
A. The Scope of "War"
The preceding Part argues that the best original constitutional
meaning of "to declare war" is to initiate a state of war by making a
public commitment to hostilities. Crucially, this could be done either
by official announcement or by the actual commencement of hostili-
ties. In eighteenth-century practice, either a proclamation or a hostile
act was sufficient to create a state of war, and as a result "declaring"
war-that is, making the state of war manifest-could be done "by
in note 30).
242 See Yoo, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1215-22 (cited in note 42).
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Word or Action."2 3 It is this power that Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution gives to Congress. Thus modem advocates of congres-
sional war powers are generally correct to describe Congress's power
as the power to authorize U.S. entry into war. I would describe it more
precisely as the power to place the United States in a state of war. As
discussed in Part VI, this allocation of power is not as complete a limi-
tation on presidential initiative as many congressional advocates sup-
pose, but the basic congressionalist starting point-that Congress in
general has war-initiation power-seems fully supported by the con-
stitutional text.
Whether Congress's power to place the United States in a state of
war amounts to near-complete control over the use of military force
depends in large part upon the scope of the term "war." This Part
shows that in the eighteenth century "war" had a broad meaning, en-
compassing most sovereign uses of the force of arms against another
sovereign or quasi-sovereign entity. As a result, I conclude that Con-
gress's power to place the United States in a state of war, as an origi-
nal matter, broadly encompasses the decision to initiate the use of
force against a foreign nation.
At least two positions have been advanced that, while conceding
the "war" power to Congress, argue that only some conflicts amount
to "war," and thus that Congress's power embraces much less than the
full range of hostilities. One view would apply the term "war" only to
those conflicts in which war is formally declared, or at most to those in
which the parties give the name of war to their contest. A second view
would give the term "war" only to broad conflicts in which each na-
tion is fully engaged against the other. In this view a lesser, limited
conflict might not rise to the level of war.2"
Nothing in the eighteenth-century literature gives any support to
either view. The eighteenth-century writers (and their forebears) uni-
formly gave "war" a broad reading. According to Johnson's dictionary,
243 Locke, Second Treatise § 16 at 278 (cited in note 9). See also Part III.
244 For example, the U.S. executive branch called both the Korean War and the Vietnam
War "conflicts" or "police actions" rather than war, implying that they were not technically wars
and thus did not trigger the Declare War Clause. See Sidak, 41 Duke L J at 39-43 (cited in note
36) (discussing and criticizing this approach). Similarly, Presidents have suggested that low-level
engagements such as those the United States encountered in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in
1989 were not of sufficient scale to qualify as "war." Some of Professor Yoo's work also suggests
that the Declare War Clause only refers to full-scale "total" war (akin to the eighteenth-century's
phrase "perfect" war), while lesser engagements are outside its scope. See Yoo, 148 U Pa L Rev
at 1696-97 (cited in note 6) ("The power to declare war only gave Congress the authority to
transform hostilities into a 'perfect' war under international law."). These positions have been
roundly criticized by academic defenders of congressional war powers, but without satisfactory
textual explanation. See, for example, Fisher, Presidential War Power at 141-42, 145-48 (cited in
note 1).
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"war may be defined as the exercise of violence under sovereign
command.' '24s Rutherforth similarly wrote:
War is a contention by force.... Nations are said to be at war
with one another, not only when their armies are engaged, so as
to be in the very act of contending; but likewise when they have
any matter of controversy or dispute subsisting between them,
which they are determined to decide by the use of force, and
have declared by words, or shewn by certain actions, that they are
determined so to decide it.2
In Richard Lee's words, "war is the state or situation of those ... who
dispute by force of arms."24 7 European writers also spoke broadly.
Bynkershoek defined war as "a contest of independent persons car-
ried on by force or fraud for the sake of asserting their rights.' '2. For
Vattel, "war is that state in which we prosecute our right by force....
Public war is that which takes place between nations or sovereigns,
and which is carried on in the name of the public power, and by its or-
der."24 Burlamaqui called war "the state of those, who try to determine
their differences by the ways of force"' ' and Wolff said it is war "if one
enters into violent contest with another.''nl Thus by war the eighteenth
century appeared to mean little more than violent conflict, with the
usual connotation of sovereign approval.
Moreover, many of the eighteenth-century writers explicitly rec-
ognized the idea of limited war as opposed to general war. Burlama-
qui, for example, said that:
[W]e may also distinguish [wars] into perfect and imperfect. A
perfect war is that, which entirely interrupts the tranquillity of
the state, and lays a foundation for all possible acts of hostility.
An imperfect war, on the contrary, is that, which does not entirely
interrupt the peace, but only in certain particulars, the public
tranquillity being in other respects undisturbed.2
245 Johnson, 2 Dictionary of the English Language (cited in note 129).
246 Thomas Rutherforth, 1 Institutes of Natural Law 470 (J. Bentham 1754).
247 Lee, Captures in War at 1 (cited in note 151) (emphasis omitted).
248 Bynkershoek, 2 Quaestionum Juris Publici at 15 (cited in note 121).
249 Vattel, Law of Nations at 291 (cited in note 8) (emphasis omitted).
250 Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 157 (cited in note 131).
251 Wolff 2 Jus Gentium at 311 (cited in note 142).
252 Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 180 (cited in note 131). See also Lee, Captures in War at 35
(cited in note 151); Rutherforth, 2 Institutes at 507 (cited in note 65). This terminology was
picked up by the US. Supreme Court in Bas v Tingy, 4 US 37,45 (1800), in speaking of the naval
war with France as an "imperfect" war because it was limited in scope.
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In this respect the theorists were not out of step with eighteenth-
century reality. Both limited conflicts and conflicts begun without
formal declaration were common, yet both were called wars.23
As a general matter, then, the eighteenth-century idea of war may
be taken as the acts of a sovereign resolving its disputes by force.25
Accordingly, a declaration of war would be a manifestation, by word
or action, of the sovereign intent to resolve a dispute by force.25 The
framework that this Article has developed suggests that the President
would not have independent authority to commit such an act, but
would require an act of Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 8. The
fact that the forceful contention was not formally announced, was lim-
253 As noted above, most of the major conflicts of the eighteenth century began without a
formal proclamation, yet were promptly designated "war": For example, the War of Spanish Suc-
cession, the War of Austrian Succession, and the Seven Years' War (or French and Indian War to
the American colonists) all fit this pattern. The leading example of limited war, from the colo-
nists' perspective, was the American Revolution itselt in which England and France fought in
the Americas but not in Europe. Despite the limited nature of the engagement, however, both
the English and the French spoke of themselves as being at war. See Maurice, Hostilities at 24-25
(cited in note 35).
254 One question that seems difficult to answer on the basis of eighteenth-century sources is
whether "war" meant only contentions between sovereigns, or whether sovereign force on one
side was sufficient. Johnson's dictionary definition seems to require sovereign force only on one
side. See Johnson, 2 Dictionary of the English Language (cited in note 129) ("War may be de-
fined [as] the exercise of violence under sovereign command against withstanders."). Blackstone
spoke of "war" against pirates, who were generally not representatives of sovereign entities.
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *71 (cited in note 65). But other authorities thought that the term
required two contending sovereigns. See Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 157 (cited in note 131)
("Common use has restrained the word war to that, carried on between sovereign powers."). See
also Wolff, 2 Jus Gentium at 311 (cited in note 142) (stating that "public war" is war "waged be-
tween nations, or by those leaders who have the supreme sovereignty"). Richard Lee said that
war is "a contest between independent sovereigns" but defined 'independent sovereigns' to
mean "nations, or private men, where there is no community." Lee, Captures in War at 2 (cited in
note 151). The seventeenth-century writers spoke more broadly of "private war" as a conflict
which lacked sovereign authority on either side. See Locke, Second Treatise § 21 at 278-82 (cited
in note 9); Grotius, Rights of War at 450 (cited in note 96). But as Johnson's dictionary indicates,
that usage had passed out of common usage by the eighteenth century. See Johnson, 2 Dictionary
of the English Language (cited in note 129) (defining "war" and reflecting sovereign participa-
tion as a necessary element of war). Without intending to be definitive, my view is that the best
eighteenth-century meaning of "war" would generally have connoted an armed struggle between
sovereigns, but likely would also have included contests with quasi-sovereign entities such as pi-
rates.
255 Despite the broad definition of war, the eighteenth-century writers did not consider
every incident of sovereign violence to be a war. For example, there was considerable semantic
debate over whether reprisals were a species of war. Many writers seemed to classify them sepa-
rately: Vattel, Wolff, Grotius, and Bynkershoek discussed reprisals in entirely different sections of
their work from their treatment of war, and Blackstone saw war and reprisal as distinct catego-
ries of sovereign prerogative. On the other hand, Burlamaqui, Hale, and Rutherforth described
reprisals as a special kind of war that, although technically within the definition, warranted spe-
cial treatment. Practice confirms that not every incident of force was considered war: Reprisals
often lead to war but sometimes did not, and occasional encounters between naval ships likewise
did not rise to the level of war. On the relationship of reprisals to the Declare War Clause, see
Part V.B.
Textualism and War Powers
ited in scope, or was given some other name by the sovereign, would
not alter that conclusion.
B. Congress's Power over Marque and Reprisal
To this point, this Article has approached the inquiry as a matter
of the meaning of the "declare war" power. That power, of course, is
not the Constitution's only mention of warlike powers. By the same
clause of Article I, Section 8, Congress has the power to "grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal."z A full understanding of the Constitution's
scheme of war powers also requires inquiry into the meaning of this
power.
Professor Lofgren and others have suggested that the "declare
war" and "marque and reprisal" powers, taken together, encompass all
methods of commencing hostilities."7 If that is true, perhaps we need
not be unduly concerned about the boundaries between the two-
whatever is not a "declared war" (whatever that may mean) is a form
of reprisal. Congress would thus have complete control over initiation
of hostilities by Article I, Section 8, clause 11, regardless of the mean-
ing of "declare war."
As set forth below, this view fails to take account of the common
meaning of marque and reprisal. Examination of eighteenth-century
writings reveals a surprising consensus on the meaning of the phrase.
Usually shortened simply to reprisal, it meant a specific sort of hostil-
ity short of general war. In particular, it referred to the seizure or de-
struction of enemy property in retaliation for a past wrong. Reprisal
did not encompass all hostilities not formally declared, since there
could be general wars broader in scope than reprisals but still not
commenced by formal declaration. Reprisal also did not refer only to
private action, although privateers could be licensed by letters of mar-
que and reprisal. By the eighteenth century the shift to modern pro-
fessional standing armies and navies had already begun, and reprisals
were as likely to be carried out by official forces as by private actors.
1. Reprisal as the seizure of property.
The common thread in all discussions of reprisal is the seizure of
property in satisfaction of an injury. Grotius referred to "the taking of
Goods between the People of divers Nations, which our Modern Law-
yers call Reprizals, or a violent seizing and detention of each others
Goods, which the English and the Saxons call Withernam and the
256 US ConstArt I, § 8,cl 10.
257 See Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 697 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that the Marque and Repri-
sal Clause meant that "Congress possessed whatever war-commencing power was not covered by
the phrase 'to declare war').
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French ... Letters of Marque." Wolff, a century later, wrote similarly:
"Reprisals are defined as the taking away of the goods of citizens of
another nation or even of the ruler of a state in satisfaction of a right
or by way of pledge.2 In Vattel's description:
Reprisals are used between nation and nation in order to do
themselves justice when they cannot otherwise obtain it. If a na-
tion has taken possession of what belongs to another,-if she re-
fuses to pay a debt, to repair an injury, or to give adequate satis-
faction for it,-the latter may seize something belonging to the
former, and apply it to her own advantage. °
Similarly, Burlamaqui wrote:
By reprisals then we mean that imperfect kind of war, or those
acts of hostility, which sovereigns exercise against each other...
by seizing the persons or effects of the subjects of a foreign
commonwealth, that refuseth to do us justice; with a view to ob-
tain security, and to recover our right, and in case of refusal, to do
justice to ourselves, without any other interruption of the public
tranquillity.2
This also was the English usage. In Blackstone's description:
These letters are grantable by the law of nations, whenever the
subjects of one state are oppressed and injured by those of an-
other; and justice is denied by that state to which the oppressor
belongs. In this case letters of marque and reprisal (words in
themselves synonimous and signifying a taking in return) may be
obtained, in order to seise the bodies or goods of the subjects of
the offending state, until satisfaction be made.2
From these sources can be discerned, not only what marque and
reprisal were, but what they were not. Since the object of reprisal was
to seize property, hostilities that do not have that intent were not re-
prisals. Thus, for example, an attack on a military force or fortified po-
sition for the purpose of weakening it would not be a reprisal (since it
would not be for the purpose of seizing property), nor would any act
done in anticipation of future hostilities or in order to induce future
behavior (since reprisal was a response to a prior act).6 Importantly,
258 Grotius, Rights of War at 449 (cited in note 96) (emphasis omitted).
259 Wolff, 2 Jus Gentium at 302 (cited in note 142).
260 Vattel, Law of Nations at 283 (cited in note 8).
261 Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 180 (cited in note 131).
262 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *250-51 (cited in note 65). See also Hale, 1 Pleas of the
Crown at 161-62 (cited in note 119).
263 See Rutherforth, 2 Institutes at 511 (cited in note 65):
If one nation seizes the goods of another nation by force, upon account of some damages,
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reprisal was not simply a word for undeclared war. Indeed, the writers
distinguished between reprisal and war; Grotius, for example, noted
the difference "between the taking of Prizes or Reprizals for the re-
covery of debts, or reparation of damages, and the making of War."'
Hale is particularly clear on this point, noting: "We may observe in the
wars we have had with foreign countries, that they have been of two
kinds, viz. Special and general." In his view "special kinds of war are
that, which we usually call marque or reprisal" while "[a] general war
is of two kinds... when war is solemnly declared or proclaimed by our
king ... [and] when two nations slip suddenly into a war without any
solemnity."26' 5
2. Sovereign authorization of marque and reprisal.
It was of course common ground that piracy and robbery were
outlawed and severely punished. Reprisal, being the seizure of goods
by force, could look a bit like piracy and robbery, especially if con-
ducted by a private party. The critical difference, obviously, was the
sovereign authorization. Vattel wrote: "It belongs therefore to sover-
eigns alone to make and order reprisals.''66 In Burlamaqui's view, "As
reprisals are acts of hostility, and often the prelude or forerunner of a
complete and perfect war, it is plain that none but the sovereign can
lawfully use this right, and that the subjects can make no reprisals, but
by his order and authority.' 'sa With sovereign authorization, a person
engaged in reprisals would not (or at least should not) be treated like
a pirate.
A particular sort of authorization was that given to a private sub-
ject who had himself been injured by the foreign nation .2 Blackstone
referred to the statute of 4 Hen V ch 7, which declared "that, if any
subjects of the realm are oppressed in time of truce by any foreigners,
the king will grant marque in due form, to all that feel themselves
grieved."6 9 This authorization distinguished the bearer from a pirate;
which the former has suffered from the latter; such contentions by force are called reprizals.
There may likewise be other acts of hostility between two nations, which do not properly
come under the notion of reprizals, such as the besieging of each others towns, or the sink-
ing of each others fleets, whilst the nations in other respects are at peace with one another.
264 Grotius, Rights of War at 447 (cited in note 96). See also Vattel, Law of Nations at 283-84
(cited in note 8) (describing reprisals as a method of redress short of war).
265 Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at 161-62 (cited in note 119).
266 Vattel, Law of Nations at 285 (cited in note 8).
267 Burlamaqui,2 Principles at 182 (cited in note 131).
W See Vattel, Law of Nations at 285 (cited in note 8) ("[I]n every civilized state, a subject
who thinks himself injured by a foreign nation, has recourse to his sovereign, in order to obtain
permission to make reprisals").
269 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *251 (cited in note 65). See also Hale, 1 Pleas of the
Crown at 161 (cited in note 119) (also referring to this statute and calling such proceedings "spe-
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the foreign nation's remedy was not a criminal proceeding against the
person executing the reprisal, but retaliation against the sovereign
who authorized it, by way of war or otherwise. This form was com-
monly called "special" reprisal, as it was accorded to a specific injured
person, or as Hale said, to "some particular persons upon particular
occasions to right themselves.' °
This practice became less common in the eighteenth century, be-
ing gradually replaced by "general" reprisals, in which "a state which
has received ... an injury from another nation, delivers commissions
to its officers and subjects to take the persons and property belonging
to the other nation, wherever the same may be found."27' In this case,
the persons authorized to make seizures were typically not the ones
injured; the injuries were as likely to be injuries to the sovereign or to
the rights of the nation as injuries to particular subjects, and the sei-
zures were made both by privateers and by regular military forces.
What remained key was the specific authorization, however, for since
the nations technically remained at peace there was risk of being
treated as a pirate without clear sovereign authorization. Thus, said
Hale, during periods of "general marque or reprisal ... it is not lawful
for any person by aggression to take the ship or goods of the adverse
party, unless he hath a commission from the king, the admiral, or those
that are specially appointed thereunto." 22
3. The constitutional meaning of letters of marque and reprisal.
From the foregoing, the constitutional meaning of letters of mar-
que and reprisal in Article I, Section 8, may be ascertained. First,
"marque" and "reprisal" did not appear to mean different things.
Blackstone specifically stated that they were synonymous; Hale used
them as synonyms and both Grotius and Vattel described "marque" as
a French version of "reprisal." It seems fair to conclude that the Con-
stitution used "marque and reprisal" as a unified phrase, meaning
what the international writers more commonly shortened simply to
reprisal. 3
cial reprizals").
270 Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at 161 (cited in note 119) (describing "particular" as opposed
to "general" reprisal). See also Wheaton, Elements at 210 (cited in note 127) (confirming this us-
age in the early nineteenth century).
271 Wheaton, Elements at 210 (cited in note 127) (paraphrasing Bynkershoek, 1 Quaes-
tionum Juris Publici). See also Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at 162 (cited in note 119) (making this
distinction in the seventeenth century).
272 Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at 161 (cited in note 119).
273 A tempting suggestion is that "marque" referred to special reprisals while "reprisal" en-
compassed what later came to be called general reprisals, thus giving independent meaning to
both terms. However, this usage is contradicted by all the leading writers who discuss both terms,
including Blackstone, Hale, Vattel, and Grotius.
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Second, the common meaning of marque and reprisal was the
seizure of property (or sometimes persons) of foreign states to redress
an injury committed by that state. This specific meaning runs through
all the commentary, both the theoretical work of the European inter-
nationalists and the more practical work of the English treatise writ-
ers. I am not aware of any usage of reprisal in a broader sense to sig-
nify undeclared war or low-level hostilities in general.
Third, the "letters" of marque and reprisal in the constitutional
language were undoubtedly the "commissions" given by the govern-
ment to show the sovereign authority to make seizures in reprisal. As
noted, specific sovereign authorization was thought necessary to dis-
tinguish peacetime reprisals from piracy, particularly if committed by
private parties. There is no reason to suppose the "letters" referred
only to the ancient practice of specific reprisals, since private pursuers
of general reprisals also required a specific authorizing letter. More-
over, the use of specific reprisal was waning in the eighteenth century
while the use of general reprisals was quite common, so there is no
reason to read the constitutional language to refer only to the out-
dated practice.7
The only serious interpretive difficulty is whether the Constitu-
tion's "letters" referred only to the authorizations (whether specific or
general) given to private parties, or whether they also encompassed
authorizations to public forces. This, of course, is a key question, for if
public reprisals are not encompassed, that power would seem to lie
with the President rather than Congress.27 Moreover, public reprisals
are the only ones with modern significance, the practice of privateer-
ing having been largely abandoned in the nineteenth century.
The international law writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries are not specific enough on this point to draw any satisfactory
conclusions. In practice, it appears that public forces engaged in repri-
sals operated under "orders" rather than "letters"; I am not aware of
any common reference to public orders as letters, but that usage is not
Z74 Professor Lofgren suggests but rightly rejects the narrower interpretation. See Lofgren,
81 Yale L J at 696-97 (cited in note 1):
While the wording in question admittedly spoke broadly of granting "letters of marque and
reprisal," issuance of the special variety had passed out of fashion in peace time. The clause
thus could easily have been interpreted as serving as a kind of shorthand for vesting in
Congress the power of general reprisal outside the context of declared war.
275 Per Blackstone, reprisals (public and private) lie under the executive authority of the
monarch, and thus are likely encompassed by the U.S. President's executive power unless con-
veyed to another branch of government by the Constitution. Since reprisal was a use of force
short of war, it would not be encompassed by the Declare War Clause, even if read broadly. If
public reprisal was not part of the Marque and Reprisal Clause, it would not appear to be a
power of Congress, and thus would remain with the President. See Part VI.D (discussing hostili-
ties short of war).
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obviously foreclosed either. Post-ratification usage suggests, however,
that the broader definition was understood. For example, Jefferson as
Secretary of State advised President Washington that Congress had all
of the reprisal power. In particular, Washington was considering possi-
ble responses to the seizure for ransom of American mariners by Al-
giers. Reprisal, by seizing Algerian ships, would have been a possible
response under international law. Jefferson advised (and Washington
appeared to accept) that any such reprisals (public or private) would
have to be authorized by Congress, suggesting a broad interpretation
of the Marque and Reprisal Clause 6 Thus, absent more conclusive
evidence of eighteenth-century usage, the better interpretation ap-
pears to be a broad one, encompassing both public and private repri-
sals.
This still leaves the Marque and Reprisal Clause with relatively
narrow operation, since it refers to the specific measure of forcible
seizure of foreign property in redress of a prior wrong. " Although
common enough in the eighteenth century, that particular means of
redress-even by public forces-has waned in modem times. Thus the
most important interpretive consequence of the clause in modem con-
text is what it suggests about other military measures short of war. If
the marque and reprisal power had to be conveyed separately to Con-
gress, presumably it was not encompassed within the Declare War
Clause (else it would be redundant)."' That suggests that other mili-
tary measures short of war that were not conveyed to Congress spe-
cifically are also not encompassed within the Declare War Clause, and
thus are not powers of Congress. In the ensuing Part, I turn to the
implications of this conclusion.
276 On the Algiers incident and Jefferson's advice, see Casper, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at
242-60 (cited in note 33). True, Washington did not have any public ships to make reprisals, so it
may have been that he and Jefferson assumed that any reprisals would have to be private, a
power that plainly lay with Congress. However, in subsequent dealings with Tripoli, another hos-
tage-taking North African state, Jefferson as President adopted a similar view. Jefferson had pub-
lic naval ships in Tripoltanean waters, but ordered them to confine themselves to defensive meas-
ures and not to take Tripoli's ships as prizes, unless Congress authorized offensive action. Appar-
ently, therefore, Jefferson thought he lacked power to order public reprisals. Hamilton, criticizing
Jefferson's restraint, argued that the U.S. was in effect already at war so no further Congressional
authorization was needed; he did not argue, however, that Jefferson had the authority to order
public reprisals. See Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs; and Constitutional Power at 208-16 (cited in
note 30).
277 See Yoo, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1188-89 (cited in note 42) (reaching the same conclusion).
278 More precisely, I would say that eighteenth-century terminology was ambiguous as to
whether the marque and reprisal power was part of war power or was something lesser and
separate. The Marque and Reprisal Clause therefore clarifies what would otherwise be an ambi-
guity as to the extent of Congress's power.
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VI. WAR POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT
The final step in assembling a textual theory of war powers is to
ask what powers remained with the President after the allocation to
Congress of the power to declare war and issue letters of marque and
reprisal. In the foregoing Part, I have argued that the eighteenth-
century meaning of these phrases encompassed the power to initiate a
state of war by word or action ("declare war") and the power to
authorize forcible seizure of foreign property in peacetime ("marque
and reprisal"). The residual executive power over foreign affairs held
by the President would give the President any remaining unallocated
power over the international use of force.2" The question considered in
this Part is what war-related powers remain after the allocation to
Congress. I consider this in four parts: the power to use force in a
declared war, the power to declare war if empowered by Congress, the
power to respond to attacks, and the power to use force short of war.
A. The President's Power to Use Force in War
Everyone agrees that the President has the authority to direct the
use of force once war is begun. While I join that consensus, I shall
make two additional points from the perspective of a textual theory of
war powers: First, that the President's strategic and tactical control of
warmaking is confirmed by the textual theory of this Article; and
second that, notwithstanding this presidential power, the textual
theory demands that Congress retain some substantial ability to set
war goals through its declare-war power.
As to the first point, much of the consensus as to the President's
power arises from two sources: the Commander-in-Chief Clause, and
the debate over the Declare War Clause at the Philadelphia
convention2 But even without these authorities, the President would
have the power to direct the war effort, as part of the residual
executive power. Wartime command of the military was a traditional
executive function, and while the declare-war power might encompass
some ability to set strategic goals, as argued below, it cannot be
stretched to cover management of the war effort as a whole. Since
direction of the war effort was a traditional executive power not given
279 See Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 272-78 (cited in note 4).
290 It will be recalled that the Convention changed an earlier draft giving Congress the
power to "make war" to the present "declare war." See Part I. See also Farrand, ed, 2 Records at
318-19 (cited in note 25). The view was expressed that the "make war" phrasing might encom-
pass the power to direct the course of hostilities once the war was begun, and that this power
should belong to the President, not Congress. Id at 319.
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to Congress by the Constitution's text, it remains with the President as
part of the residual executive power.
As to the second point, however, it needs be added that Congress
can exercise some strategic direction of a war through its declare-war
power. Whether considered from a practical or theoretical angle, the
eighteenth-century idea of the declaration included the idea of setting
forth the reasons and objectives of the war. For the theorists, this was
the principal reason for the formal proclamation.m In practice, formal
announcements of war frequently stated limited objectives or
intentions. Although a war declared purely by actions was obviously
less subject to such limitations, it was not unusual for nations to fight
limited wars without formal proclamation. One nation might make a
limited incursion that would be read by the other nation as opening
hostilities in a certain theater (at sea, for example) but not as a
declaration of war on all fronts. A leading example, well known to
early Americans, was the Revolutionary War, in which Britain and
France fought a naval war in the Americas but did not escalate to full
hostilities in Europe. This was accomplished not by formal declaration,
but by France's limited initiation of hostilities, and Britain's tacit
acceptance of the limitation by not responding in the Europe
theater.m
This point was a key element of a series of Supreme Court
decisions in the first few years of the nineteenth century, confirming
the constitutionality of the "quasi-war" with France. Congress had
authorized attack on the French at sea, but had not authorized a full-
scale war (which might have included, for example, seizing French
land territories).2 As the Court held, Congress's decision to declare
war was not a binary choice, involving total war or nothing; rather,
Congress was entitled to set limited goals for the hostilities.2 That is
perfectly consistent with the eighteenth-century understanding of
"declare war," which included the concept of limited declarations.
281 See Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 263 (cited in note 4). One might plausibly ob-
ject, if this is true, that the Commander-in-Chief Clause is redundant. As I have argued else-
where, I think the best way to understand that clause is as a clarification that Congress's power
to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces," US Const Art
I, § 8, cl 14, does not permit Congress to command the military. See Prakash and Ramsey, 111
Yale L J at 259 (cited in note 4).
282 See Part II.A.
23 See Maurice, Hostilities at 24-26 (cited in note 35).
24 See Alexander De Conde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared
War with France 1797-1801 105-08 (Scribner 1966) (describing Congress's act permitting the
Navy to take armed French ships anywhere and authorizing the President to commission priva-
teers).
285 Bas v Tingy, 4 US 37, 43 (1800) ("Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or
Congress may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects and in time."); Talbot v Seeman, 5
US 1, 28 (1801); Little v Barreme, 6 US 169,179 (1804).
1620 [69:1543
Textualism and War Powers
B. The President's Power to Declare War if Empowered
by Congress
Rather than formally declaring war itself, Congress has at times
authorized the President to commence hostilities in a given situation.
Indeed, if Congress is to exercise power to declare war by action, it
must act in this way, as Congress itself does not command military
force. Were Congress to instruct the President to take military action,
this would be an unqualified use of Congress's declare-war power; but
Congress historically has not acted so conclusively, and doing so might
raise constitutional questions under the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
Instead, Congress's authorizations are phrased to allow but not re-
quire military action, as the President sees fit. In terms of the theory
presented in this Article, it should be clear that what Congress is doing
in such situations is delegating to the President its power to declare
war (by word or action). Thus recent engagements such as the Persian
Gulf War and the conflict with Afghanistan's Taliban should be viewed
as wars declared by the President, pursuant to a delegation from Con-
gress.
This of course raises the question of whether (and to what extent)
Congress's war powers are delegable to the President, especially as
some congressional authorizations have been quite broad. I do not
propose to discuss this question in detail, as I doubt that any particular
insight can be gained from consideration of war powers in isolation.
Rather, any theory of war powers delegation must fit within a larger
theory of delegation of congressional powers generally. I note three
general positions, each of which has a range of refinements. First, one
might say that war powers are delegable to the same extent other
congressional powers are delegable. This, of course, produces a broad
spectrum of views, since the permissible extent of congressional
delegation in general has been variously urged to be extremely
narrow, intermediate, or extremely broad.m Second, one might say that
war powers are particularly nondelegable, based on a theory that
would limit delegations in particularly sensitive areas (of which war
powers might be one).2" Third, one might say that war powers are
26 In contrast, if one views Congress's power as only the power to issue a formal declara-
tion, it may be hard to fit congressional authorizations of "undeclared" presidential wars into the
constitutional scheme. See Sidak, 41 Duke L J at 63-73 (cited in note 36).
287 See Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 88th Cong, 2nd Sess, in 78 Stat 384 (Aug 10, 1964)
("[T]he Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in
Chief; to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression.').
288 See Cass Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich L Rev 303, 330-46
(1999) (discussing theories of nondelegation). See generally Eric A. Posner and Adrian Ver-
meule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U Chi L Rev 1721 (2002).
289 See Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War at 197-217 (cited in note 1) (argu-
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more subject to delegation than ordinary congressional powers,
because the field of foreign affairs allows broader delegations. As
often noted, the early practice was to afford much greater delegations
in foreign affairs than in ordinary legislative affairs,m and my
colleague Michael Rappaport has suggested a theory based on the
Constitution's text and its eighteenth-century understanding that
might explain this relaxed standard."
In any event, where Congress has authorized the President to
begin a war at the President's discretion, the question is properly seen
as a question of delegation, not as a question of war powers per se.
Accordingly, it calls for discussion far beyond the scope of this
Article.m
C. The President's Power to Fight a Defensive War
Essentially everyone in the war powers debate agrees that the
President has some independent power to fight a defensive war
without authorization from Congress. This was one of the stated
reasons for the constitutional convention's celebrated change from
"make" to "declare" in the Declare War Clause;2n the President's
ability to, in Madison's words, "repel sudden attacks" has long been
taken for granted. Whatever the ebb and flow of presidential claims to
war power may have been over the ensuing centuries, every
administration has claimed at least this power, and no one has
ing for a narrow interpretation of Congress's ability to delegate war power, while admitting
Congress's ability to delegate power in other fields such as foreign commerce).
290 See Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto:
A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New
York, 76 Tul L Rev 265, 347 n 292 (2001) (compiling early examples of foreign affairs delega-
tions); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 186-87
(Chicago 1997) (discussing delegation debates in the early Congresses).
291 Rappaport, 76 Tul L Rev at 320-40 (cited in note 290) (arguing that the Constitution
does not restrict Congress from conferring discretion on the executive as to appropriation laws).
This view was also suggested by the Supreme Court in United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Co,
299 US 304,320 (1936). However, the Court's rationale-that foreign affairs powers arise outside
the Constitution and thus are not subject to the same constitutional limits on delegation-is not
consistent with the text and history of the Constitution. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Ex-
traconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 Wm & Mary L Rev 379,379-81 (2000).
292 This framework reveals a misnomer embedded in much popular discussion of the issue.
Wars such as the Korean War, which arguably were not approved by Congress as required by the
Constitution, are frequently called "undeclared wars." This is not accurate in the eighteenth-
century sense, for President Truman assuredly declared a state of war between the United States
and North Korea, both by words and actions. The question is whether he was constitutionally au-
thorized to do so. Thus the appropriate inquiry, put in eighteenth-century terms, is not whether
the President has the power to fight "undeclared wars," but whether the President has been suf-
ficiently authorized by Congress to make a declaration (by word or action).
293 Farrand, ed, 2 Records at 318-19 (cited in note 25).
294 Id at 318.
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seriously contested it.25 Washington, for example, though quite
circumspect about uses of military power without congressional
authorization, assumed that defensive measures were within his
independent control and no objections were recorded to this
assumption.m
The President's power to fight a defensive war remains
incompletely understood in two respects, one practical and one
theoretical. As a theoretical matter, no one has fully explained why
the President has the power to fight a defensive war. As practical
matter, no agreement has been reached as to the scope of the
"defensive" war the President may fight. I explore each of these points
below.
1. The source of the President's power.
Among modem academic theories of war power, even the most
committed congressionalists accept the President's independent
power over some defensive measures. At minimum, the President
must have the power to "repel sudden attacks" -not only would it be
absurd not to make this a presidential power, but Madison specifically
said that the President would have the power.m War powers theorists
have not worked out how this arises from the constitutional text,
however. Rather, Madison's statement is often treated as if it were
part of the text, rather than a statement in a private meeting whose
minutes were not published until long after ratification. But in
pursuing a textual theory of war powers, it is important to trace the
source of the power, not from the private comments of one of the
drafters, but from the actual language.
To do so, I return first to the idea of the President's residual
executive power over foreign affairs. As explained above, the claim is
that the phrase "executive power" in the eighteenth century included
power over relations with foreign nations, and in particular the use of
force against foreign nations.m As used in Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution, this phrase gave the President the traditional executive
powers over foreign affairs, subject, however, to other specific
allocations made in the Constitution's text. The most relevant specific
295 See Fisher, Presidential War Power at 13-69 (cited in note 1). Fisher argues, for example,
on the basis of Madison's language, that the President is limited to repelling sudden attacks. See
id at 11.
296 See id at 13-16 (describing how President Washington understood the executive
branch's military operations to be limited to defensive actions); Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and
Constitutional Power at 61-129 (cited in note 30).
297 See Farrand, ed, 2 Records at 318 (cited in note 25). Hamilton also thought the President
had this power, as is clear from Federalist 25.
298 See Part I.B.3.
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allocation, of course, is the Declare War Clause, which gave the
declare-war power to Congress. The President, though, retains power
over aspects of the use of force not encompassed by the Declare War
Clause.
The second key step is the one presented in earlier sections of
this Article-namely, the identification of the appropriate eighteenth-
century meaning of the Declare War Clause. As argued above, the best
way to read that clause is to give Congress (and not the President) the
power to place the United States in a state of war with another nation.
This could be done either by formal proclamation (as preferred by
many international law writers) 29 or by open hostilities (as frequently
happened in practice).' Because the creation of a state of war by
open hostilities, as well as by formal written instrument, was called
"declaring" war, it makes sense to read the Declare War Clause to
cover all instances of creation of a state of war by the United States,
whether by formal declaration or by armed attack."' Therefore, the
Declare War Clause gives Congress all of the country's power to
create a state of war.
Now return to the idea of defensive war. Eighteenth-century
international law writers agreed that a formal proclamation was not
necessary in a defensive war, even if they would require it for an
offensive war. The reason was that a defensive war presupposed a
declaration by an enemy, either formally or by hostile act. This prior
declaration in itself created a state of war; no reciprocal manifestation
of intent was needed, since it was assumed that a nation under attack
would defend itself. As Vattel wrote, "He who is attacked and only
wages defensive war, needs not to make any hostile declaration, -the
state of warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the enemy's
declaration, or open hostilities."' ' Wolff explained somewhat more
laboriously that a declaration "is superfluous for the party waging the
defensive war" because "the supreme power owes defence to its
citizens, who have united into a state for the purpose of defending
themselves against the forces of outsiders" and "therefore, since the
supreme power necessarily wages defensive war as part of its duty, it
certainly seems incongruous to announce to another that we intend to
299 See Parts I.A-I.B.
300 See id.
301 See Part III.
302 Vattel, Law of Nations at 316-17 (cited in note 8). See also Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at
187 (cited in note 131) ("[D]eclaration takes place only in offensive wars; for, when we are actu-
ally attacked, that alone gives us reason to believe, that the enemy is resolved not to listen to an
accommodation.").
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do what we cannot omit without neglect of duty, nor without injury to
our citizens."30
The international law writers of course greatly overstated the role
of the formal proclamation, for in practice the formal proclamation
rarely preceded even an offensive war, and the legal state of war
might arise by enemy act as well as by formal proclamation.34
However, the practice reinforces the theorists' idea that declaration
was not a part of defensive war. According to writers describing actual
practice, the state of war might be triggered by attack."" But they
focused on the attack-not the response to attack-as creating the
state of war. As the British admiralty court held, the state of war could
be "announced by royal ships, and whole fleets, at the mouths of
cannons" -plainly suggesting that the initial attack created the state
of war."6 (This is consistent with Vattel's observation that "the state of
warfare" is created by the enemy's "open hostilities.") Thus, neither
the theoretical writers nor the practical writers thought a declaration
was needed in response to the enemy's formal declaration or
declaration by action.
Applied to the Constitution, this explains the President's ability
to wage defensive war without congressional declaration. The United
States could be placed in a state of war in three ways: by a formal U.S.
declaration, by a U.S. declaration by armed attack, or by declaration
(formal or by armed attack) of a foreign power. The President could
not create the state of war, since all of the United States's ability to
create a state of war was vested in Congress by the Declare War
Clause. But the President, by virtue of the executive power, could
wage war once the state of war was created. If the foreign nation
created the state of war, no reciprocal formal declaration or
declaration-by-act was needed on the part of the United States.
Responding to attacks did not count as a declaration, since responding
was assumed to be part of the sovereign duty, and since the state of
war had already been created by the aggressor. Therefore, Congress's
declare-war power did not apply, and the President could use the
executive power to fight the war created by the other side. Plainly,
then, the President would have the power to "repel sudden attacks"-
not because Madison privately said so, but because that was part of
303 Wolff,2 Jus Gentium at 368 (cited in note 142). See also Lee, Captures in War at 34 (cited
in note 151).
304 See Part Ill.
305 Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at 162 (cited in note 119) ("[I]f a foreign prince invades our
coasts, or sets upon the king's navy at sea, hereupon a real, tho not solemn war may and hath
formerly arisen, and therefore to prove a nation to be in enmity to England ... there is no neces-
sity of showing any war proclaimed.").
306 The Maria Magdalena, 165 Eng Rep 57,58 (Adm 1779).
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the President's executive power that was not conveyed to Congress in
the Declare War Clause.3
2. The scope of the President's power to fight a defensive war.
Although everyone concedes the President some power to fight a
defensive war, much debate persists as to the scope of this power.
There are two dimensions to this debate: first, what counts as a
defensive war, and second, what measures are permitted in a defensive
war. The framework suggested above-namely, conceiving of
Congress's power as the authority to create a state of war-provides a
useful approach to begin answering these questions. In particular, I
find that it provides the basis for rejecting the more extravagant
claims of both the President and Congress.
a) What counts as a defensive war? Although there is general
agreement, in the abstract, that the President can fight a defensive war
without congressional authorization, there is considerable dispute as
to what makes a war "defensive." Executive advocates have naturally
sought to define the term broadly, as encompassing attacks on or
threats to allies and threats to U.S. "national interests," loosely
described. Congressional advocates dispute this claim, but largely as a
matter of policy, on the ground that it would give too much power to
the President. A stronger response may be given, however, if one
remembers why, as a textual matter, the President has the power to
fight defensive wars, and proceeds from there.
The word "defensive" does not appear in the Constitution; rather,
the textually precise formulation is that the President has the power to
fight wars that do not involve a declaration of war by the United
States. Wars that did not involve a declaration by the United States
were those that the eighteenth-century terminology called
"defensive"-by which was meant a very specific thing: No
declaration was required because the state of war had already been
created ("declared") by the other side. Thus, to put it back into U.S.
constitutional terms, the President had the authority to fight wars in
which the United States was placed in a state of war by an opposing
power, either by formal announcement or by armed attack by that
power.
Once framed in this manner, it should be clear that the power is
not nearly as broad as presidential advocates would have it.
307 Of course this would not foreclose Congress from issuing a formal declaration of war in
response to an attack, as Congress has sometimes done. As noted, in the eighteenth century for-
mal declarations were issued in response to attack for rhetorical purposes, and I see no constitu-
tional barrier to this modem practice. The point is that these formal declarations are not consti-
tutionally required to authorize the President to respond militarily (or to create a state of war).
They may, however, be useful for other practical purposes.
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Eighteenth-century writing defined "defensive" war narrowly as one
in which a country was actually attacked, or in which war was formally
declared. Importantly, a war undertaken in defense of a national right,
such as trading rights, treatment of subjects or ambassadors by a
foreign power, etc., was offensive (though justified) rather than
defensive. Burlamaqui, who wrote most extensively on the point,
made plain that the distinction between offensive and defensive war
should not be confused with the distinction between just and unjust
war. "Defensive" simply meant responding to attack (whether or not
justified). Conversely, "offensive" meant initiating the attack (which
could occur with or without good reason).'
Acts that declared war should not be confused with acts that gave
rise to a just cause of war. Of acts declaring war, leading writers
typically referred only to two: actual invasion of territory, or attack
upon military forces.! On the other hand, many acts might constitute
a cause of war (including, for example, seizure of private property by
reprisal). The difference was that war necessarily resulted from the
former, but not the latter. A cause of war might or might not be acted
upon, depending upon the circumstances, and therefore one could not
say that a state of war automatically arose from it. The cause of war
did not create a war. Instead, the response to the cause of war
(whether by formal declaration or armed attack) was what created the
war (and if no response was made in spite of a just cause-a perfectly
reasonable result under some circumstances-then no state of war
occurred).310 Eighteenth-century writers said that in a defensive war no
declaration was required to create a state of war. The previous
analysis shows that "defensive" in this context meant war undertaken
in response to attack upon forces or territory, not broadly speaking
undertaken in response to some threat or offense under the law of
nations.
Further, a state of war existed, not in the abstract, but between
contending nations; non-contending nations were neutrals. For a
308 Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 174 (cited in note 131) ("We must therefore affirm in gen-
eral, that the first, who takes up arms, whether justly or unjustly, commences an offensive war,
and he, who opposes him, whether with or without a reason, begins a defensive war."). See also
Vattel, Law of Nations at 293 (cited in note 8) ("He who takes up arms to repel the attack of an
enemy, carries on a defensive war. He who is foremost in taking up arms ... wages offensive
war.").
309 See Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 173 (cited in note 131); Vattel, Law of Nations at 293
(cited in note 8).
310 See Vattel, Law of Nations at 328 (cited in note 8). See also Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at
173 (cited in note 131) ("Offensive wars are those, which are made to constrain others to give us
our due, in virtue of a perfect right we have to exact it of them; or to obtain satisfaction for a
damage unjustly done us, and to force them to give caution for the future."). But see Lee, Cap-
tures in War at 32-33 (cited in note 151) (arguing that a military response to a threat is defensive
rather than offensive).
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previously uninvolved nation to join the hostilities in support of one
side was a declaration by that nation that it was no longer to be
regarded as a neutral, but as a belligerent. Thus assisting an ally
militarily, even as a defensive matter, constituted a declaration.M In
constitutional terms, if the United States gave military assistance to an
ally under attack this would create a state of war between the United
States and the ally's attacker where none previously existed; this
would, in eighteenth-century terms, amount to a declaration of war by
M12the United States.
A defensive war, then, was a response to an attack that standing
alone created a state of war. It should be clear that this is quite a bit
less than executive advocates have claimed. For example, prior to the
Persian Gulf War, the executive branch asserted that no authorization
from Congress was necessary prior to U.S. forces moving against Iraqi
forces in Kuwait, either because Iraq's invasion of Kuwait threatened
U.S. strategic interests or because the U.S. was acting only defensively
in support of Kuwait.313 The foregoing review of eighteenth-century
terminology shows that these claims exceed presidential powers
granted by the original meaning of the Constitution's text. Although
in eighteenth-century terms the U.S. war against Iraq may have been
"justified," it assuredly was not "defensive.,34 Prior to the U.S. move
against Iraqi forces, no state of war existed between the United States
and Iraq; the U.S. attack amounted to a declaration of war that created
a state of war where none previously had existed .
b) How far can the President go in fighting a defensive war?
The next question is how far the President may go in waging a
311 See Wolff; 2 Jus Gentium at 377 (cited in note 142) ("Since the same thing is allowable
against one who allies himself to my enemy and against his property, as against an enemy and the
property of an enemy, it is allowable to enter his territory with an armed force, and to conduct
hostile operations there, or bring war upon him.").
312 I speak here of direct U.S. military intervention in the war. As Vattel made clear, eight-
eenth-century practice permitted countries to go some distance in assisting a nation at war with-
out actually being deemed to enter the war themselves. In the case of such low-level assistance, it
was for the country against whom the assistance was given to decide if the assistance should be
made a cause for war. See Vattel, Law of Nations at 328-29 (cited in note 8).
313 See Fisher, Presidential War Power at 148-51 (cited in note 1) (discussing the executive
branch position). See also Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implica-
tions, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 701 (1990)
(testimony of then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney).
314 See Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 174 (cited in note 131) (making this distinction).
315 It was likely not constitutionally problematic because Congress ultimately passed a reso-
lution authorizing the President to use force against Iraq. Authorization for Use of Military
Force against Iraq Resolution, HR J Res 77, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess, in 105 Stat 3 (Jan 14,1991). 1
would view this as a delegation to the President of the power to initiate a state of war with Iraq,
and that delegation seems constitutional under most leading theories of the nondelegation doc-
trine. But see Sidak, 41 Duke L J at 32-33,108-09 (cited in note 36) (arguing that the Gulf War
resolution was not sufficient for constitutional purposes).
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defensive war without congressional approval. This question was
debated from the beginning of constitutional history, perhaps most
famously during the Jefferson administration's dealings with the
Barbary powers. In 1801, Tripoli, one of the Barbary powers, began
attacks on U.S. shipping, and eventually issued a formal declaration of
war against the United States. Jefferson sent the U.S. Navy to the
Mediterranean without consulting Congress. 36 Because the President
had the authority to repel attacks, most everyone agreed that the U.S.
naval vessels could defend themselves if attacked by Tripoli's navy.
The more difficult question was whether they could initiate attacks on
Tripoli's ships.
For the most part, Jefferson's cabinet seemed to think they could,
and Jefferson's orders to the fleet had no limitations on offensive
activity.317 But when an engagement actually occurred, and Jefferson
had occasion to report it to Congress, he emphasized the defensive
nature of the fight and went so far as to say that offensive actions
required the assent of Congress.318 This drew a sharp response from
Alexander Hamilton, who argued that once war had been begun by
the other side, the President was authorized to use all available force
in response.31 9 This, in fact, was exactly what Jefferson's cabinet had
advised him, and what Jefferson's orders to the fleet appeared to
contemplate (although these facts were not known to Hamilton)30
The textual theory of war powers suggests that Hamilton and
Jefferson's cabinet had it right. When international law writers
referred to a defensive war, they focused on how the war began: A
defensive war was one initiated by attack or formal declaration by the
other side. However, once the war started, they did not distinguish
316 The episode is recounted in Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs; and Constitutional Power at
208-21 (cited in note 30) (describing actions by Barbary powers against the United States and
President Jefferson's decision to send naval units to the Mediterranean). See also Gary J.
Schmitt, Thomas Jefferson and the Presidency, in Thomas E. Cronin, ed, Inventing the American
Presidency 326,336-37 (Kansas 1989).
317 Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power at 209-10 (cited in note 30). Of
the cabinet, only Levi Lincoln expressed the opposing view, that defensive measures were lim-
ited to repelling an immediate attack. Id. Jefferson's instructions to Commodore Richard Dale,
the commander of the expedition, directed that "in case of their [the Barbary powers] declaring
War or committing hostilities" the expedition should retaliate fully, without defensive limitations.
Id at 210.
318 Jefferson reported that because the U.S. force was "[u]nauthorized by the Constitution,
without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense, the [enemy] vessel, being dis-
abled from committing further hostilities, was liberated by its crew." 11 Annals of Congress 11
(Gales and Seaton 1851).
319 See Examination of Jefferson's Message to Congress of December 7,1801, No 1 at 249-
50 (cited in note 23) ("[W]hen a foreign nation declares or openly and avowedly makes war
upon the United States, they are then by the very fact already at war, and any declaration on the
part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least unnecessary.").
320 See Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs; and Constitutional Power at 212-13 (cited in note 30).
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between defensive and offensive wars with respect to the way they
could be fought. Either kind of war triggered the rights of war, which
included doing whatever necessary (with the barest humanitarian
limitations) to destroy the enemy. It was not thought that a
"defensive" war was one in which the only object was to avoid being
overwhelmed by attack. Nor did taking the "offensive" in a tactical
sense convert the war from a defensive to an offensive war, such that a
new declaration was required. In short, the power to wage a defensive
war included both the tactical defensive and tactical offensive: The key
question was how it was begun, not how it was fought.'
If that is correct, then once a state of war is created by the
opposing side, the President has full power to fight the war to its
conclusion.3 Accordingly, the only question in the Tripoli situation
was at what point Tripoli's actions created a state of war. Once Tripoli
formally declared war, a state of war obviously existed (so Hamilton's
claim seems correct). On the other hand, Jefferson's cabinet may have
slightly overreached. Prior to the formal declaration, a state of war
could have existed only by Tripoli's declaration-by-action. Yet it is not
321 See Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 173 (cited in note 131); Vattel, Law of Nations at 293
(cited in note 8) ("He who takes up arms to repel the attack of an enemy, carries on a defensive
war. He who is foremost in taking up arms, and attacks a nation that lived in peace with him,
wages offensive war."). See also Lee, Captures in War at 47 (cited in note 151) ("[W]hoever de-
clares himself my enemy, gives me a liberty to use violence against him in infinitum, or as far as I
please; and that, not only till I have repulsed the danger which threatened me.").
322 As noted, this was the dominant view among the leading American statesmen who con-
sidered the matter during the Tripoli incident, including Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and Al-
bert Gallatin. Gallatin said "The exve [executive] cannot put us in a state of war, but if we be put
into that state either by the decree of Congress or of the other nation, the command and direc-
tion of the public force then belongs to the exve [executive]." Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and
Constitutional Power at 209 (cited in note 30). Madison later wrote: "The only case in Which the
Executive can enter on a war, undeclared by Congress, is when a state of war has 'been actually'
produced by the conduct of another power .... Such a case was the war with Tripoli during the
administration of Mr. Jefferson." Letter from Madison to Monroe (Nov 16, 1827), in 3 Letters
and Other Writings of James Madison 600 (Lippincott 1867).
The allocation of powers suggested here is also precisely consistent with the view of Framer
and Supreme Court Justice William Paterson, expressed in 1806:
If, indeed, a foreign nation should invade the territories of the United States, it would I ap-
prehend, be not only lawful for the [P]resident to resist such invasion, but also to carry hos-
tilities into the enemy's own country; and for this plain reason, that a state of complete and
absolute war exists between the two nations. In the case of invasive hostilities, there cannot
be war on the one side and peace on the other.... There is a manifest distinction between
our going to war with a nation at peace, and a war being made against us by an actual inva-
sion, or a formal declaration. In the former case, it is the exclusive province of [C]ongress to
change a state of peace into a state of war.
United States v Smith, 27 F Cas 1192,1230 (Cir Ct D NY 1806) (Paterson).
Professor Sofaer says only that "[o]ne might reasonably infer ... from the power to defend
against attacks on the United States ... a power to act offensively against any nation that de-
clared and made war." Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power at 213 (cited in note
30). I would say, instead, that the text makes this more than just a reasonable inference, by giving
Congress the power over war declaration and leaving residual war powers with the President.
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clear that anything Tripoli did (prior to the formal declaration) would
have counted as a declaration-by-action. Arguably, seizing U.S.
merchant ships would not. As recounted above, seizure of private
property, including ships, was called reprisal: If done without
justification, it was a cause for war, but it was not in itself an act of
war. In general, eighteenth-century writings described reprisal as
something less than war, though often leading to war. Thus, if it were
simply a case of Tripoli seizing U.S. merchant ships and the United
States responding with a naval assault, the state of war would be
initiated not by the Tripoltanean seizures, but by the U.S. response.
On the other hand, once Tripoli attacked U.S. naval ships, Jefferson
would be on stronger ground in saying that the state of war arose from
Tripoli's acts, and that he was thereafter entitled to wage a war on his
own authority.
In sum, then, the President's executive power over foreign affairs
includes the power to wage war once it is declared. This includes not
only a war declared (by word or action) by Congress and a war
declared (by word or action) by the President upon the properly
delegated authority of Congress, but also a war declared (by word or
action) by a foreign power. Once the state of war is created in any of
these three ways, the President has full power to pursue it to the end.3
D. The President's Power to Act Short of War
The presidential powers to be discussed in this Part are not,
strictly speaking, war powers, but consist of hostile actions short of
war. Some modem congressionalist scholars have loosely described
Congress's power as a power over hostilities in general. The
constitutional text, however, gives Congress power over war only (plus
letters of marque and reprisal); by the theory of the executive power
over foreign affairs, uses of force and other matters not included in
these two categories are presidential powers.
323 As Burlamaqui explained, this conclusion would not imply any misdeed on the part of
the United States. The Tripoltanean seizures were plainly done without good cause, and thus
were illegal under the law of nations and constituted a just cause for war; thus the United States
would be acting appropriately to begin a war in response, but it would, nonetheless, be an offen-
sive war on the part of the United States. See Burlamaqul, 2 Principles at 173-74 (cited in note
131).
324 This conclusion shows that advocates of congressional war powers, like their presidential
counterparts, have substantially overreached. Louis Fisher, for example, refers to "the expecta-
tion of the Framers that Congress, as the people's representative, would have to approve in ad-
vance any use of U.S. forces against foreign government[s]." Fisher, Presidential War Power at
161 (cited in note 1). Whether or not some individual Framers had such an expectation, the Con-
stitution's text labels only declaring war, not all uses of U.S. forces against a foreign power, as a
congressional power.
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As discussed, eighteenth-century terminology defined war as
including essentially all sovereign contentions by force.3 While broad,
this definition leaves considerable power to the President. I do not
propose to enumerate all of the ways the President might act in the
shadow of the war power without actually claiming power
constitutionally conveyed to Congress. However, the range of this
power may be suggested by considering a few prominent categories
and examples.
First, consider military deployments. Under the executive power,
the President may direct the movements of the military, subject only
to the restriction that the President cannot use the military to attack
another sovereign or invade another sovereign's territory (since that
would amount to a declaration of war). A number of controversial
deployments would still be within the President's power under this
scheme. For example, a peacekeeping mission approved by the
relevant territorial sovereign or sovereigns would not be a declaration
of war against anyone. Indeed, no deployment invited by the
territorial sovereign amounts to a declaration of war.m
Second, military incursions, even without the consent of the
territorial sovereign, do not amount to declarations of war (in the
eighteenth-century constitutional sense) if they are not targeted
against the territorial sovereign and the territorial sovereign does not
oppose them. A common example from the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries involved the U.S. border with Mexico, which U.S.
forces crossed on a number of occasions in pursuit of bandits and
other irregular forces.3 Crossing the border with hostile intent toward
the government or territory of Mexico would amount to a declaration
325 See Part IV.
326 A useful example here is President Clinton's deployment of troops to Bosnia under the
Dayton Accords. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 L &
Contemp Probs 125, 135-36 (2002). Numerous voices in Congress suggested that congressional
approval was required for this deployment. See id at 135. As a constitutional matter, though, it
seems that the deployment did not constitute a declaration of war against anyone, as it was ap-
proved by all of the contending forces. True, it placed U.S. troops in a potentially hostile envi-
ronment, but the congressional war power is specifically that of declaring war, not generally that
of managing the military's involvement in hostile situations.
Professor Damrosch says that the deployment was constitutional "on the ground that the
troops were not expected to become involved in hostilities" Id at 135 n 58. As the foregoing dis-
cussion suggests, I find this too narrow a view of the President's deployment power. The relevant
question is not whether hostilities are "expected," but whether the deployment amounts to a dec-
laration of war.
327 To the extent the deployment was made to join in hostilities against a third force-for
example, in an intervention in a civil war-the joinder of hostilities would amount to a declara-
tion of war that would require congressional authorization.
328 Most famously, General Pershing pursued Pancho Villa in northern Mexico after Villa's
raid on Columbus, New Mexico in 1916. See Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War at
130-31 (cited in note 1).
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of war, but it is hard to accord these border incursions such status. The
U.S. government typically had no quarrel with Mexico or its
government, only with the private bands of plunderers who were the
objects of the pursuit. Mexico did not oppose the crossing with force.
Although arguably a violation of international law, depending on the
circumstances and the authorities consulted, these acts did not
constitute a declaration of war against Mexico since there was no
intent to settle a dispute between sovereigns with violence.m Mexico
might well have chosen to treat these incursions as causes of war (had
the military disparity between the two countries not been so great),
but, as argued above, there was a sharp distinction in eighteenth-
century thought between an act that created a just cause and an actual
declaration of war.
A related example is the President's commonly asserted power to
rescue U.S. citizens abroad. As with the incursions in pursuit of
bandits, rescues (at least where the menace does not come from the
foreign sovereign) are not instances of force directed at the foreign
sovereign, and thus not declarations of war. It would be a different
case, of course, if the Americans were to be rescued from a hostile
sovereign, for such an effort would plainly amount to a use of force
between nations.
Similarly, a military deployment that appeared hostile or
threatening to another sovereign would not amount to a declaration
of war, since the eighteenth-century writers are clear that a mere
threat does not begin a war (indeed, some writers argued that a threat
was not even a just cause of war).33 This conclusion leaves the
President with considerable power to provoke a war by a threatening
deployment to which the foreign country responds with force.
The most famous U.S. incident of war provoked by deployment
was President Polk's deployment of U.S. troops into territory disputed
between the United States and Mexico in 1846, leading to a Mexican
attack on those troops and Polk's claim that Mexico had declared war
against the United States.31  Some congressmen objected on
329 To the extent the raiders constituted organized forces against whom war could be de-
clared (as Villa, at least, probably did), there would be a question of the authority to make such a
declaration. But in the typical case (as in the Villa episode), the U.S. incursion was made in re-
sponse to an attack by the Mexican raiders, and thus would be constitutionally authorized as a
defensive measure. See Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War at 130 (cited in note 1).
330 See Burlamaqui, 2 Principles at 163 (cited in note 131) ("[T]o have a just reason for war,
it is not sufficient, that we are afraid of the growing power of a neighbour .... We cannot for in-
stance justly declare war against a neighbor, purely because he orders citadels or fortifications to
be erected, which he may sometime or other employ to our prejudice."); Wolfm 2 Jus Gentium at
329 (cited in note 142); Vattel, Law of Nations at 308-09 (cited in note 8).
331 Fisher, Presidential War Power at 31-32 (cited in note 1).
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constitutional grounds at the time;3n the House-with the support of
then-Congressman Abraham Lincoln-later passed a resolution
censuring Polk for "unconstitutionally beg[inning]" the war.333
Although I do not propose to resolve the specific question here,
the framework suggested in this Article makes the constitutionality of
the Mexican-American War somewhat more manageable. The
question is whether any of Polk's actions constituted a declaration of
war (since it is that power, specifically, that is given to the Congress
and denied to the President). If not, Polk was on firm constitutional
ground in claiming the right to direct a military deployment as part of
his executive power.
Ordinarily, a military deployment-even a threatening one-was
not thought in the eighteenth century to create a state of war.3N Thus if
Polk had deployed General Taylor's army in a threatening manner
along the Mexican border in unambiguously American territory, that
would have been well within Polk's constitutional power. Conversely,
if Polk had ordered Taylor to invade Mexico, that would have been an
unconstitutional presidential declaration of war. The difficulty arises
because the case is somewhat in the middle-Polk directed Taylor to
occupy territory disputed between the United States and Mexico. The
proper question, therefore, is not whether Taylor's move was
provocative (surely it was, but that does not matter), or even whether
it violated international law, but whether Taylor's move would count
as a declaration of war by eighteenth-century standards.
The foregoing discussion suggests a broader category of
presidential power: The President has considerable latitude to
provoke a war. Many acts may cause another nation to go to war
against the United States, including insults, threats, and the incursions
short of war mentioned above. The eighteenth-century writers clearly
distinguish between acts giving rise to war and acts creating a state of
war.335 Only the latter are given to Congress by the Declare War
Clause. To the extent the others are part of the residual executive
332 Id at 32-33. Senator Calhoun, for example, argued that "[i]f we [the Congress] have de-
clared war, a state of war exists, and not till then." Cong Globe, 29th Cong, 1st Sess 784 (1846).As
discussed above, such a conclusion is flatly contrary to eighteenth-century usage, which recog-
nized first that a state of war could be created by the actions of one side, and second that a state
of war could be created by hostile act. The final form of Congress's resolution recognized that "a
state of war exists" as a result of Mexico's actions, War with Mexico: Recognition and Prosecu-
tion of Mexican War Act, 29th Cong, 1st Sess, in 9 Stat 9 (May 13,1846), a view consistent with
Polk's understanding and with eighteenth-century usage.
333 Cong Globe, 30th Cong, 1st Sess 95 (1848). The censure occurred in a confusingly back-
handed way: The resolution was added as an amendment to a resolution honoring Mexican War
veterans for their services. See id.The final resolution passed the House on February 7,1848. See
Cong Globe, 30th Cong, 1st Sess 304 (1848).
334 See note 330 and accompanying text.
335 See Part VI.C.2(a).
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power, the President may undertake them (even though the likely
result may be a declaration of war by the other side, which in turn
entitles the President independently to fight an unlimited war.) As
then-Congressman Lincoln noted in reflecting on the Mexican-
American War, the combination of these two powers-the power to
act provocatively and the power to fight a war to its conclusion once it
is begun by the other side-produces enormous presidential war
powers: Unlike Lincoln, however, I have no constitutional
reservations about the matter, as the constitutional text seems quite
clearly to point in this direction.
This observation leads back to Professor John Yoo's work on war
power. While I disagree in this Article with a number of aspects of
Professor Yoo's analysis, I think he is correct in his larger point that
the Declare War Clause is not the only constitutional protection (and
perhaps not even the primary constitutional protection) against
presidential overreaching in war powers.33 As the early Americans
knew from the English experience, the power over appropriations is a
powerful check on presidential war ambitions, for wars cannot be
fought without money. The Mexican-American War, of which Lincoln
complained, is a leading example. Had Congress wished to limit
President Polk to defensive operations against Mexico, it could easily
done so by appropriations limited to that purpose. Instead, Congress
voted money for two major offensive expeditions against Mexico, with
the result that essentially all of the fighting in the war after the initial
battles was done on Mexican territory, fully funded by Congress.
Lincoln was incorrect to say that the Constitution provided no means
of checking presidential war powers in a case such as Mexico-but the
check came through provisions other than the Declare War Clause. *
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought a textual theory of the constitutional
allocation of war powers, by attempting to recover the eighteenth-
336 See Roy P. Basler, ed, 1 Collected Works ofAbraham Lincoln 451-52 (Rutgers 1953).
337 See Yoo, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1175-91 (cited in note 42) (arguing that the Framers ex-
pected the branches to exercise their powers to cooperate and, at times, to struggle for control
over war); Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 1197-1240 (cited in note 2) (discussing how the tradition of war
powers that began in England in the 1620s and continued through to the American states in the
1780s shaped the Founders' decision to create a stable system supported by two pillars: executive
initiative in the commencement and management of war, and legislative participation by means
of the funding and impeachment powers).
338 As Professor Yoo also emphasizes, in addition to appropriations Congress has a poten-
tial check through the impeachment power, although this is a more difficult weapon to wield. See
Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 1197-1240 (cited in note 2). No one seriously proposed this remedy with re-
spect to Polk, and indeed Lincoln's practical problem in finding a check against Polk was that
Congress generally supported the war.
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century meaning of the phrase "declare war." It concludes that such a
textual approach shows a division of war powers between the
President and Congress, rather than a complete or near-complete
allocation of war powers to a single branch. This conclusion arises
from three basic propositions.
First, study of the eighteenth-century usage of "declaring" war
shows that the phrase had two common meanings. It could mean a
formal proclamation or announcement of war, which is the meaning
typically assigned to the phrase in the modem war powers debate. But
in eighteenth-century terms war could be declared by "word or ac-
tion." A hostile attack, as well as a formal proclamation, would trigger
a state of war between nations, and launching such an attack could be
called "declaring" war. As a result, the Declare War Clause, standing
alone, is ambiguous: It could have a narrow meaning that refers only
to a formal proclamation, or it could have a broad meaning that refers
to any words or actions that create a state of war.
Second, the broader meaning of "declaring" war fits better with
its constitutional context, and with discussions of the phrase during
the ratifying debates, than does the narrow meaning. Both the consti-
tutional context, and the ratifying debates, show that the Declare War
Clause was understood to describe an important power: The Constitu-
tion goes out of its way to take this power away from the President
and give it to Congress, and the Federalist ratifiers emphasized this
provision (without contradiction) as an important reduction in presi-
dential power. Yet the formal proclamation of war, in eighteenth-
century practice, was not prerequisite to initiating hostilities, nor to a
legal state of war. As commonly used and understood, it was a com-
municative and rhetorical tool, but not a necessary element of interna-
tional military relations. If the Declare War Clause referred only to
the formal proclamation, one cannot understand why it should be re-
allocated from the President to Congress, nor why the ratifiers
thought this reallocation was worthy of emphasis. The President did
not lose any essential power in losing the power to issue a formal
proclamation. On the other hand, if the Declare War Clause referred
to declarations by proclamation and declarations by hostile attack,
both elements are readily understandable: The Constitution sought to
reallocate the whole of the power to create a state of war from the ex-
ecutive (where it lay in the English system) to the legislature.
Third, the broad meaning of "declaring" war provides a way to
harmonize the Constitution's text and the post-ratification comments
and practices of the constitutional generation. As discussed, one of the
enduring puzzles of the war powers debate is that the political leaders
of the 1790s seemed almost universally to believe that Congress had
an exclusive power to initiate a state of war-even though the Consti-
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tution's text says only that Congress has the power to "declare" war,
and no one in the 1790s would have thought that a formal declaration
of war was prerequisite to initiating hostilities. This incongruity has led
prior theories of war power either to emphasize the text at the ex-
pense of the Framers' comments (producing a narrow view of Con-
gress's war power) or to emphasize the Framers' comments at the ex-
pense of the text (producing a broad view of Congress war power). A
fuller understanding of the eighteenth-century meaning of "declaring"
war, as pursued in this Article, shows that neither the text nor the
commentary need be sacrificed in finding a satisfactory meaning of
the Declare War Clause. Rather, when the Framers wrote that Con-
gress had the power "to declare War" they were giving "declare" its
broad eighteenth-century meaning, and thus giving Congress the
power over words or actions that created a state of war.
Though broad, this power does not extend as far as modem
advocates of congressional war power would have it. Once eighteenth-
century war was begun by one side's. actions or words, a state of war
was understood to exist and no declaration by the other side was
needed to sustain it. Accordingly, carrying on a war begun by another
nation is not part of the declare-war power. It therefore remains part
of the President's executive power. While a portion of this power is
commonly recognized in the President's conceded ability to "repel
sudden attacks," the President's power under the original meaning of
the Constitution is considerably broader, for the eighteenth-century
meaning would have also included the ability to carry hostilities into
the enemy's own country in response to an attack. In addition, taking
potentially provocative actions that might incite another nation into
war with the United States should not be read as part of the declare-
war power. Insults, threats, hostile military deployments, etc., might
have been just causes of war in the eighteenth century, but they would
not have been described as actions "declaring" war. They are not, then,
part of Congress's declare-war power under an eighteenth-century
meaning of the text, and instead fall to the President under the
executive's diplomatic and military powers. As a result, while the
President cannot strike the first blow, the President has broad power
to respond to a blow struck by the other side, and broad power to
incite the striking of such a blow.
Yet these presidential powers are in turn checked by further
important powers of Congress. It is a mistake to think of the Declare
War Clause as the sole check upon a President's warlike ambitions, for
Congress retains the power of appropriations and, in extreme cases,
impeachment. Even a weaker version of these powers allowed the
eighteenth-century English Parliament to claim a substantial role in
warmaking decisions, despite the English monarch's power to declare
2002] 1637
1638 The University of Chicago Law Review [69:1543
war. Although the Constitution leaves some war powers to the
President as an initial matter, it provides these further checks to
Congress. In this way, the text of the Constitution, given its original
meaning, produces complex layers of checks and balances in war
powers, rather than entrusting war wholly to a single branch.
